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 Introduction 
Erik Olin Wright 
 
The conference of The Real Utopias Project that generated the original papers in this book was 
called “Rethinking Redistribution.” One of the interesting issues raised in the conference 
concerned the use of the term “redistribution” in this title. The expression redistribution suggests 
that there is something called “distribution” which exists prior to political interventions and is 
then transformed by deliberate political action. This corresponds to the conventional rhetoric of 
economists and politicians: the income distribution generated by markets is the result of 
voluntary exchanges by freely acting individuals; this spontaneous distribution is then altered by 
acts of states which coercively take resources away from some people through taxes and transfer 
them to others. Redistribution reflects coercion; market-generated distribution reflects voluntary 
activity. This easily slides into the libertarian view that all redistribution is a violation of 
fundamental freedoms: taxation is theft; people have an absolute moral claim that whatever it is 
they can obtain from “voluntary exchange” in markets. 
 
There are several things wrong with this image. First of all, there is plenty of coercion within 
markets themselves, ranging from the near monopoly power of many large corporations, to the 
coercion embedded in inequalities of information of different actors in markets, to the coercion 
that comes from some people facing very limited alternatives in their market choices. Secondly, 
the state plays a pivotal role in establishing the very possibility of markets through the coercive 
enforcement of property rights that directly impact on the nature of market-generated 
distributions. And third, in all sorts of ways the state is involved in regulating aspects of market 
exchanges and production – from health and safety rules, to credentialing requirements in many 
labor markets, to labor laws – which impact on the income distribution process. It is therefore 
misleading to talk about a clear distinction between some pure “distribution” of income and a 
process of politically-shaped “redistribution”. 
 
We have thus decided to change the title of the book from the original “Rethinking 
Redistribution” to “Redesigning Distribution.” Income and wealth distributions are the result of 
the simultaneous, joint operation of voluntary choices of interacting individuals and authoritative 
rule-making and enforcement by states. The problem is to figure what combination of voluntary 
choice and authoritative allocation generates the most desirable outcomes, both in terms of 
efficiency considerations and moral concerns. 
 
There was a time, not so long ago, when the issue of the state’s positive role in shaping income 
distribution was at the center of political debate. In Europe, Social Democratic parties argued for 
the desirability of an activist, affirmative state engaged in policies that would generate income 
distribution far more egalitarian than those produced through market forces and a passive state. 
Even in the United States, advocating such a role for the state was part of spectrum of ordinary 
political debate. In the early 1970s in the United States, in the aftermath of the major expansion 
of welfare state programs of the previous decade, there was a lively political debate over whether 
or not a negative income tax should be adopted as a centerpiece of policies designed to alleviate 
poverty and reduce inequality. In the end the Family Assistance Program, as the proposal was 
known, was narrowly defeated in the U.S. Congress, and so the existing welfare mechanism of 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children remained intact. But still, in that debate of 30 years ago Introduction 
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the issue was what sort of state intervention into patterns of income distribution would best serve 
broader social and economic goals, not whether the state should get out of the business of trying 
to affect distribution altogether.  
 
The intervening three decades have witnessed a massive shift in the ideological coordinates of 
public policy discussions in the United States and elsewhere. By the early 1990s, particularly in 
the U.S., defenders of traditional income support policies of the affirmative state were on the 
defensive and virtually no one in the public debate argued that shaping the income distribution 
was a worthy political goal. Instead of a political ethos in which the basic well-being of all 
citizens was seen as part of a collective responsibility, the vision was one in which each person 
took full “personal responsibility” for their own well-being. The nearly universal call was to 
“end welfare as we know it”, replacing it with a vestigial welfare state that at most would 
provide a minimal safety net only for those people clearly incapable of taking care of themselves. 
Times were indeed bleak for progressives committed to an egalitarian conception of social 
justice.   
 
Given this ideological climate, it might seem like an unpropitious time to propose radical 
strategies for reducing inequality through new programs of income and wealth transfers. 
Government intervention to generate more egalitarian income distribution is now broadly 
regarded as antithetical to economic efficiency and thus ultimately self-defeating; there is no 
vocal political coalition demanding new efforts at egalitarian distribution; and talk of raising 
taxes and dramatically expanding the activities of the state are seen by most analysts as off the 
political agenda. The Real Utopias Project is based on the belief that it is important to engage in 
rigorous analysis of alternative visions of institutional change even when there seems to be little 
support for such ideas since posing clear designs for alternatives may contribute to creating the 
conditions in which such support can be built. 
 
In this spirit, this volume in the Real Utopias Project examines two provocative proposals for 
radical redesigns of distributive institutions: Universal Basic Income, as elaborated by Philippe 
van Parijs, and Stakeholder Grants, as elaborated by Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott. While 
both of these proposals contain a range of complex details, as ideals they are both based on very 
simple principles:   
 
 
Basic Income. All citizens are given a monthly stipend sufficiently high to provide them with a 
standard of living above the poverty line. This monthly income is universal rather than means-
tested – it is given automatically to all citizens regardless of their individual economic 
circumstances. And it is unconditional – receiving the basic income does not depend upon 
performing any labor services or satisfying other conditions. In this way basic income is like 
publicly-financed universal health insurance: in a universal health care system, medical care is 
provided both to citizens who exercise and eat healthy diets and to those who do not. It is not a 
condition of getting medical care that one be “responsible” with respect to one’s health. 
Unconditional, universal basic income takes the same stance about basic needs: as a matter of Introduction 
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basic rights, no one should live in poverty in an affluent society.  
 
Stakeholder Grants. All citizens, upon reaching the age of early adulthood – say 21 – receive a 
substantial one-time lump-sum grant sufficiently large so that all young adults would be 
significant wealth holders. Ackerman and Alstott propose that this grant be in the vicinity of 
$80,000 and would be financed by an annual wealth tax of roughly 2%. In the absence of such 
grants, children of wealthy parents are able to get lump-sum stakes for education, housing, 
business start-ups, investments, and so on, whereas children of non-wealthy parents are not. This 
situation fundamentally violates values of equal opportunity. A system of stakeholder grants, 
they argue “expresses a fundamental responsibility: every American has an obligation to 
contribute to a fair starting point for all.”  
 
In some ways, basic income and stakeholder grants are not completely different kinds of 
proposals. After all, if one invests a stakeholder grant in a relatively low-risk investment and 
waits a number of years, then it will eventually generate a permanent stream of income 
equivalent to an above-poverty basic income. Similarly, if one continues to work for earnings in 
the labor market while receiving a basic income and one saves the basic income, after a number 
of years it will become the equivalent of a stakeholder grant. Nevertheless, the two proposals 
reflect quite distinct visions of what kind of system of redistribution would be morally and 
pragmatically optimal in developed market economies. Stakeholder grants emphasize individual 
responsibility and what is sometimes called “starting gate equality of opportunity”. Individuals 
get a stake, and if they blow it on conspicuous consumption rather than long-term plans, then this 
is their responsibility. Basic income envisions a system of redistribution that permanently 
guarantees everyone freedom from poverty and a certain kind of lifetime equality of minimal 
opportunity: the opportunity to withdraw from the labor force to engage in non-remunerated 
activity.  
 
There are, of course, many objections that can be raised against both of these proposals. Some of 
these objections are moral: basic income rewards people for being parasites; redistributions of 
wealth illegitimately takes assets away from people who have worked hard to build them up. 
Others are pragmatic: so many people would withdraw their labor from the labor market if there 
was a decent basic income that the economy would collapse; the rates of taxation required for 
basic income will undermine incentives; redistributions of wealth to create stakes will eliminate 
incentives to save and build up assets. The two core chapters in this book and the series of 
commentaries which follow attempt to clarify the arguments behind these two proposals and 
evaluate the cogency of the objections. 
 
 1 
Basic Income : 
A simple and powerful idea for the 21
st century
∗ 
Philippe Van Parijs 
 
Give all citizens a modest, yet unconditional income, and let them top it up at will with income 
from other sources.  
 
This exceedingly simple idea has a surprisingly diverse pedigree. In the course of the last two 
centuries, it has been independently thought up under a variety of names —  “territorial 
dividend” and “state bonus”, for example, “demogrant” and “citizen’s wage”, “universal benefit” 
and “basic income” —, in most cases without much success. In the late sixties and early 
seventies, it enjoyed a sudden popularity in the United States and was even put forward by a 
presidential candidate, but it was soon shelved and just about forgotten. In the last two decades, 
however, it has gradually  become the subject of an unprecedented and fast expanding public 
discussion throughout the European Union. Some see it as a crucial remedy for many social ills, 
including unemployment and poverty. Others denounce it as a crazy, economically flawed, 
ethically objectionable proposal, to be forgotten as soon as possible, to be dumped once and for 
all into the dustbin of the history of ideas.  
 
To shed light on this debate, I start off saying more about what basic income is and what it is not, 
and about what distinguishes it from existing guaranteed income schemes. On this background, it 
will be easier to understand why basic income has recently been attracting so much attention, 
why resistance can be expected to be tough and how it will eventually be overcome. It is the 
author's firm conviction that basic income will not be forgotten, and that it must not be dumped. 
Basic income is one of those few simple ideas that must and will powerfully shape, first the 
debate, and next the reality, of the new century. 
 
1. WHAT BASIC INCOME IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT 
 
 A basic income is an income paid by a political community to all its members on an individual 
basis, without means test or work requirement. This is the definition  I shall adopt. It does not fit 
all actual uses of the English expression “basic income”, or of its most common translations into 
other European languages, such as “Bürgergeld”, “allocation universelle”, “renta básica”, 
“reddito di cittadinanza”, “basisinkomen”, or “borgerlon”. Some of these actual uses are broader 
: they also cover, for example, benefits whose level is affected by one’s household situation or 
which are administered in the form of tax credits. Other uses are narrower: they also require, for 
example, that the level of the basic income should match what is required to satisfy basic needs 
                                                           
∗ The first version of this paper was prepared for the international seminar “Policies and instruments to fight poverty 
in the European Union: A guaranteed minimum income” organised under the aegis of the Portuguese presidency of 
the European Union (Almancil, Portugal, February 2000). Later versions served as background papers for the VIIIth 
Congress of the Basic Income European Network (Berlin, Germany, October 2000) and, jointly with a paper by 
Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott for the workshop “Rethinking Redistribution” (Madison, Wisconsin, May 2002).  Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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or that it should replace all other transfers. The aim of the above definition is not to police usage 
but to clarify arguments. Let us briefly focus on each of its components in turn.  
 
(i) An income 
 
Paid in cash, rather than in-kind. One can conceive of a benefit that would have all other 
features of a basic income but be provided in kind, for example in the form of a standardized 
bundle of food, or the use of a plot of land. Or it could be provided in the form of a special 
currency with restricted uses, for example food stamps or housing grants, or more broadly 
consumption in the current period only without any possibility of saving it, as in Jacques 
Duboin’s (1945) “distributive economy”.
  A basic income, instead, is provided in cash, without 
any restriction as to the nature or timing of the consumption or investment it helps fund. In most 
variants, it supplements, rather than substitutes, existing in-kind transfers such as free education 
or basic health insurance. 
 
Paid on a regular basis, rather than as a one-off endowment. A basic income consists in 
purchasing power provided at regular intervals, such as a week, a month, a term or a year, 
depending on the proposal. One can also conceive of a benefit that would have all other features 
of a basic income but be provided on a one-off basis, for example at the beginning of adult life. 
This has occasionally been proposed (see Cunliffe & Erreygers 2003), for example long ago by 
Thomas Paine (1796) and far more recently by Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott (1999). There 
is a significant difference between a regular basic income and such a basic endowment. Yet, it 
should not be overstated. Firstly, the basic endowment can be invested to generate an actuarially 
equivalent annual or monthly income up to the recipient’s death, which would amount to a 
regular basic income. If left to the insurance market, the level of this annuity would be negatively 
affected by the length of a person’s life expectancy. Women, for example, would receive a lower 
annuity than men. However, the advocates of a basic endowment (including Paine and Ackerman 
and Alstott) usually supplement it with a uniform basic pension from a certain age, which erases 
most of this difference. Secondly, while other uses can be made of a basic endowment than 
turning it into an annuity, the resulting difference with a basic income would be essentially 
annulled if the latter’s recipients could freely borrow against their future basic income stream. 
Even if one wisely protects basic income against seizure by creditors, the security it provides will 
make it easier for its beneficiaries to take loans at every stage and will thereby reduce the gap 
between the ranges of options opened, respectively, by a one-off basic endowment and a regular 
basic income. 
 
(ii) Paid by a political community 
 
By definition, a basic income is paid by a government of some sort out of publicly controlled 
resources. But it need not be paid by a Nation-state. Nor does it need to be paid out of 
redistributive taxation.  Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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The Nation-state, beneath and beyond. In most proposals, the basic income is supposed to be 
paid, and therefore funded, at the level of a Nation-state, as sometimes indicated by the very 
choice of such labels as “state bonus”, “national dividend” or “citizen’s wage”. However, it can 
in principle also be paid and funded at the level of a politically organised part of a Nation-state, 
such as a province or a commune. Indeed, the only political unit which has ever introduced a 
genuine basic income, as defined, is the state of Alaska in the United States (see e.g. Palmer 
1997). A basic income can also conceivably be paid by a supra-national political unit. Several 
proposals have been made at the level of the European Union (see Genet and Van Parijs 1992, 
Ferry 2000, Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2001) and some also, more speculatively, at the level 
of the United Nations (see e.g. Kooistra 1994, Barrez 1999, Frankman 2001). 
 
Redistribution. The basic income may, but need not, be funded in a specific,  ear-marked way. 
If it is not, it is simply funded along with all other government expenditures out of a common 
pool of revenues from a variety of sources. Among those who advocated ear-marked funding, 
most are thinking of a specific tax.  Some want it funded out of a land tax or a tax on natural 
resources (from Thomas Paine (1796) and Joseph Charlier (1848) to Raymond Crotty (1987), 
Marc Davidson (1995) or James Robertson (1999) for example).  Others prefer a specific levy on 
a very broadly defined income base (for example, Pelzer 1998, 1999) or a massively expanded 
value-added tax (for example, Duchatelet 1992, 1998). And some of those who are thinking of a 
worldwide basic income stress the potential of new tax instruments such as “Tobin taxes” on 
speculative capital movements (see Bresson 1999) or “bit taxes” on transfers of information (see 
Soete & Kamp 1996). 
 
Distribution. Redistributive taxation, however, need not be the only source of funding.  Alaska’s 
dividend scheme (O'Brien & Olson 1990, Palmer 1997) is funded out of part of the return on a 
diversified investment fund which the state built up using the royalties on Alaska’s vast oil 
fields.  In the same vein, James Meade’s (1989, 1993, 1994, 1995) blueprint of a fair and 
efficient economy comprises a social dividend funded out of the return on publicly owned 
productive assets. Finally, there has been a whole sequence of proposals to fund a basic income 
out of money creation, from Major Douglas’s Social Credit movement (see Van Trier 1997) and 
Jacques and Marie-Louise Duboin’s (1945, 1985) Mouvement français pour l’abondance to the 
more sophisticated (and more modest) proposals of Joseph Huber (1998, 1999, 2000 with J. 
Robertson).  
 
(iii) To all its members 
 
Non-citizens? There can be more or less inclusive conceptions of the membership of a political 
community. Some, especially among those who prefer the label “citizen’s income”, conceive of 
membership as restricted to nationals, or citizens in a legal sense. The right to a basic income is 
then of a piece with the whole package of rights and duties associated with full citizenship, as in Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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the conception of the French philosopher Jean-Marc Ferry (1995, 2000). Most advocates of basic 
income, however, especially among those who view it as a policy against exclusion, do not want 
a restrictive entitlement to basic income to further deepen the dualisation of the labour market. 
They thereofre tend to conceive of membership in a broader sense that tends to include all legal 
permanent residents. The operational criterion may be, for non-citizens, a minimum length of 
past residence, or it may simply be provided by the conditions which currently define residence 
for tax purposes, or some combination of both 
Children? There can also be a more or less inclusive conception of membership along the age 
dimension. Some restrict basic income, by definition, to adult members of the population, but 
then tend to propose it side by side with a universal, i.e. non-means-tested, child benefit system, 
with a level of benefit that may or may not be differentiated as a (positive or negative) function 
of the rank of the child or as a (positive) function of the child's age. Others conceive of basic 
income as an entitlement from the first to the last breath and therefore view it as a full substitute 
for the child benefit system. The level of the benefit then needs to be independent of the child’s 
family situation, in particular of his or her rank. Some also want it to be the same as for adults, 
and hence independent of age, as is actually the case in the modest Alaskan dividend scheme and 
as would be the case under some more generous proposals (for example Miller 1983). But the 
majority of those who propose an integration of child benefits into the basic income scheme 
differentiate the latter’s level according to age, with the maximum level not being granted until 
majority, or later. 
 
Pensioners? Analogously, some restrict basic income to members of the population which have 
not reached retirement age and then see it as a natural complement to an individual, non-means-
tested, non-contributory basic pension pitched at a higher level, of a sort that already exists in 
some European countries, like Sweden or the Netherlands. In most proposals, however, the basic 
income is granted beyond retirement age, either at the same level as for younger adults or at a 
somewhat higher level. In all cases, this basic income for the elderly can be supplemented by 
income from public or private contributory pension schemes, as well as from private savings and 
from employment. 
 
Inmates? Even on the most inclusive definition of the relevant notion of membership, any 
population is still likely to contain some people who will not be paid a basic income. Detaining 
criminals in prison is far more expensive to the community than paying them a modest basic 
income, even if full account is taken of any productive work they may be made to perform. 
Unless the detention turns out to have been ill-founded, it is therefore obvious that prison 
inmates should lose the benefit of their basic income for the duration of their imprisonment. But 
they can get it back as soon as they are released. The same may apply to the long-term inmates of 
other institutions, such as madhouses or old people’s homes, to the extent that the full cost of 
their stay is directly picked up by the community rather than paid for by the inmates themselves. 
 
(iv) On an individual basis Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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Paid to each. The basic income is paid to each individual member of the community, rather than 
to each household taken as a whole, or to its head, as is the case under most existing guaranteed 
minimum schemes. 
 
Uniform. Even if a benefit is paid to each individual, its level could still be affected by the 
composition of the household. To take account of the fact that the per capita cost of living 
decreases with the size of the household, existing guaranteed minimum income schemes grant a 
smaller per capita income to the members of a couple than to a person living alone. A fair and 
effective operation of such schemes therefore supposes that the administration should have the 
power to check the living arrangements of their beneficiaries. A basic income, instead, is paid on 
a strictly individual basis. Not only in the sense that each individual member of the community is 
a recipient, but also in the sense that how much (s)he receives is independent of what type of 
household she belongs to. The operation of a basic income scheme therefore dispenses with any 
control over living arrangements, and it preserves the full advantages of reducing the cost of 
one’s living by sharing one’s accommodation with others. Precisely because of its strictly 
individualistic nature, a basic income tends to remove isolation traps and foster communal life.  
 
(v) Without means test 
 
Irrespective of income. Relative to existing guaranteed minimum income schemes, the most 
striking feature of a basic income is no doubt that it is paid, indeed paid at the same level, to rich 
and poor alike, irrespective of their income level. Under the simplest variant of the existing 
schemes, a minimum level of income is specified for each type of household (single adult, 
childless couple, single parent of one child, etc.), the household's total income from other sources 
is assessed, and the difference between this income and the stipulated minimum is paid to each 
household as a cash benefit. In this sense, existing schemes operate ex post, on the basis of a 
prior assessment, be it provisional, of the beneficiaries' income.  A basic income scheme, instead, 
operates ex ante, irrespective of any income test. The benefit is given in full to those whose 
income exceeds the stipulated minimum no less than to those whose income falls short of it. Nor 
are any other means taken into account when determining the level of benefit a person is entitled 
to: neither a person's informal income, nor the help she could claim from relatives, nor the value 
of her belongings. Taxable "means" may need to be taxed at a higher average rate in order to 
fund the basic income. But the tax-and-benefit system no longer rests on a dichotomy between 
two notions of "means": a broad one for the poor, by reference to which benefits are cut, and a 
narrow one for the better off, by reference to which income tax is levied. 
 
Does not make the rich richer. From the fact that rich and poor receive the same basic income, 
it does not follow, however, that the introduction of a basic income would make both rich and 
poor richer than before. A basic income needs to be funded.  Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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(1) If a basic income were simply added to existing tax-and-benefit systems, it is clear that the 
comparatively rich would need to pay both for their own basic income and for much of the basic 
income of the comparatively poor. This would clearly hold if the funding were through a 
progressive income tax, but would also hold under a flat tax or even a regressive consumption 
tax. For the ex nihilo introduction of a basic income to work to the financial advantage of the 
poor, the key condition is simply that, relative to their numbers (not necessarily to their 
incomes), the relatively rich should contribute more to its funding than the relatively poor.  
 
(2) In most proposals, however, the introduction of a basic income is combined with a partial 
abolition of existing benefits and tax reductions. If the proposed reform simply consisted in 
spreading more thinly among all citizens the non-contributory benefits currently concentrated on 
the poor, the latter would clearly lose out. But no one is making such an absurd proposal. In most 
proposals that rely on direct taxation, the basic income replaces only the bottom part of the non-
contributory benefits, but also the exemptions or reduced tax rates on every taxpayer's lower 
income brackets. The immediate impact on the income distribution can then be kept within fairly 
narrow bounds for a modest basic income. But the higher its level, the higher the average rate of 
income tax and therefore the greater the redistribution from the comparatively rich to the 
comparatively poor. 
 
Better for the poor to give to the rich? Thus, giving to all, rich and poor, is nor meant to make 
things better for the rich. But, for a given level of minimum income, is there anything reason to 
believe that it is better for the poor than a means-tested guaranteed income? Yes, for at least 
three interconnected reasons. Firstly, the rate of take up of benefits is likely to be higher under a 
universal scheme than if a means test is in place. Fewer among the poor will fail to be informed 
about their entitlements and to avail themselves of the benefits they have a right to. Secondly, 
there is nothing humiliating about benefits given to all as a matter of citizenship. This cannot be 
said, even with the least demeaning and intrusive procedures, about benefits reserved for the 
needy, the destitute, those identified as unable to fend for themselves. From the standpoint of the 
poor, this may count as an advantage in itself, because of the lesser stigma associated with a 
universal basic income. It also matters indirectly because of the effect of the stigma on the rate of 
take up. Thirdly, the regular, reliable payment of the benefit is not interrupted when accepting a 
job under a basic income scheme, whereas it would be under a standard means-tested scheme. 
Compared to means-tested schemes guaranteeing the same level of minimum income, this opens 
up real prospects for poor people who have good reasons not to take risks. This amounts to 
removing one aspect of the unemployment trap commonly associated with conventional benefit 
systems, an aspect to which social workers are usually far more sensitive than economists. 
 
Makes work pay? The other aspect of the unemployment trap generated by means-tested 
guaranteed minimum schemes is the one most commonly stressed by economists. It consists in 
the lack of a significant positive income differential between no work and low-paid work. At the Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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bottom end of the earnings distribution, if each Euro of earnings is offset, or practically offset, or 
more than offset,  by a loss of one Euro in benefits, one does not need to be particularly lazy to 
turn down a job that would yield such earnings, or to actively look for such jobs. Given the 
additional costs, travelling time or child care problems involved, one may not be able to afford to 
work under such circumstances. Moreover, it would generally not make much sense for 
employers to design and offer such jobs, as people who would be grateful for being sacked are 
unlikely to constitute a conscientious and reliable work force. A minimum wage legislation may 
anyway prevent full-time jobs from being offered a wage lower than the income guarantee, in 
which case the latter consideration only applies to part-time jobs. The replacement of a means-
tested guaranteed income by a universal basic income is often presented as a way of tackling this 
second aspect of the unemployment trap too. If one gave everyone a universal basic income but 
taxed at 100% the portion of everyone's earnings that does not exceed the minimum guarantee 
(see for example Salverda 1984), the unemployment trap would be the same, in this respect, as 
under a means-tested guaranteed minimum income. (See Fig.1 and Fig.3 in the appendix) But if 
one makes the mild assumption that the explicit tax rate applying to the lowest income brackets 
must remain noticeably lower than 100%, then the following statement holds. Since you can 
keep the full amount of your basic income, whether working or not, whether rich or poor, you are 
bound to be better off when working than out of work. (See Fig. 2 in the appendix) 
 
Equivalent to a negative income tax? Note, however, that this second aspect of the 
unemployment trap can be removed just as effectively, it would seem, by a means-tested scheme 
that would phase out the benefit less steeply as earnings rise. This is achieved through the so-
called negative income tax, a uniform and refundable tax credit. The notion of a negative income 
tax first appears in the writings of the French economist Augustin Cournot (1838). It was briefly 
proposed by Milton Friedman (1962) as a way of trimming down the welfare state, and explored 
in more depth by James Tobin (1965, 1966, 1967, 1968) and his associates as a way of fighting 
poverty while preserving work incentives. On the background of an explicit tax schedule which 
taxes no income at 100% and which can be, but need not by definition be, linear, a negative 
income tax amounts to reducing the income tax liability of every household (of a given 
composition) by the same fixed magnitude, while paying as a cash benefit the difference between 
this magnitude and the tax liability whenever this difference is positive. (See Fig. 3 below.) 
Suppose the fixed magnitude of the tax credit is pitched at the same level as under some basic 
income scheme under consideration. Someone with no income, and hence no income tax liability 
will then receive an amount equal to the basic income. As the income rises, the benefit will 
shrink, as in the case of conventional means-tested schemes, but a slower rate, indeed at a rate 
that will keep post-and-transfer income at exactly the same level as under the corresponding 
basic income scheme. (Se Fig. 3 and 4.) The NIT variant simply consists in netting out taxes and 
benefits. Under a basic income scheme, the revenues needed to fund the NIT's universal tax 
credit are actually raised and paid back to all. Under NIT, transfers are all one-way only: positive 
transfers (or negative taxes) for households under the so-called break even point, negative 
transfers (or positive taxes) for households above. (See Fig. 3.)  Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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Cheaper than negative income tax? How much of a real difference there is between the a basic 
income and a negative income tax depends on further specification of administrative procedures. 
It shrinks, for example, if taxes are levied at source on a pay-as-you-earn basis (rather than only 
after tax returns have been processed), or if tax liabilities are assessed on a weekly or monthly, 
rather than an annual basis, or if everyone is entitled, under a NIT scheme, to an advance 
payment of the presumptive tax credit (subject to subsequent correction), or if everyone is 
entitled, under a BI scheme, to get the BI as a tax discount rather than in cash. But even in the 
closest variant, there remains a difference between a system that operates, by default, "ex ante", 
and one that operates, by default, "ex post". Any remaining difference would count as an 
advantage for the basic income variant with respect with the first, uncertainty-linked dimension 
of the unemployment trap. Yet, with a rudimentary benefit payment technology (coins carried by 
the postman!) or with a tax collection administration plagued with corruption or inefficiency, the 
case for the NIT variant, which does away with the back-and-forth of tax money, may be 
overwhelming. In an era of technological transfers and with a reasonably well run tax 
administration, on the other hand, the bulk of the administrative cost associated with an effective 
guaranteed minimum income scheme is the cost of information and control: the expenditure 
needed to inform all potential beneficiaries about what their entitlements are and to check 
whether those applying meet the eligibility conditions. In these respects, a universal system is 
bound to perform better than a means-tested one. As automaticity and reliability increase on both 
the payment and the collection side, it is therefore, in this administrative sense, increasingly 
likely to be the cheaper of the two, for a given degree of effectiveness at reaching all the poor. In 
is for this sort of reason that James Tobin (1997), for example, preferred a universal "demogrant" 
to its negative-income-tax variant. 
 
(vi) Without work requirement 
 
Irrespective of present work performance. The right to a guaranteed minimum income is by 
definition not restricted to those who have worked enough in the past, or paid in enough social 
security contributions to be entitled to some insurance benefits. From Juan Luis Vives (1526) 
onwards, however, its earliest variants were often linked to the obligation to perform some toil, 
whether in the old-fashioned and ill-famed workhouses or in a more varied gamut of 
contemporary private and public workfare settings. Being unconditional, a basic income sharply 
contrasts with these forms of guaranteed income intimately linked to guaranteed employment. It 
also diverges from in-work benefits restricted to households at least one member of which is in 
paid employment, such as the American Earned Income tax Credit or the UK's more recent 
Working Families Tax Credit. By virtue of removing the unemployment trap — i.e. by providing 
its net beneficiaries with an incentive to work — a   basic income (or a negative income tax) can 
be understood and used as an in-work benefit or a top-up on earnings. But it not restricted to this 
role. Its unconditionality marks it off from any type of employment subsidy, however broadly 
conceived. Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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Irrespective of willingness to work. It also marks it off from conventional guaranteed minimum 
income schemes, which tend to restrict entitlement to those willing to work in some sense. The 
exact content of this restriction varies a great deal from country to country, indeed sometimes 
from one local authority to another within the same country. It may involve that one must accept 
a suitable job if offered, with significant administrative discretion as to what "suitable" may 
means in terms of location or skill requirements; or that one must give proof of an active interest 
in finding a job; or that one must accept and respect an "insertion contract", whether connected to 
paid employment, to training or to some other useful activity. By contrast, a basic income is paid 
as a matter of right — and not under false pretences — to homemakers, students, break-takers 
and permanent tramps. Some intermediate proposals, such as Anthony Atkinson's  (1993a, 
1993b, 1996, 1998; Vanderborght & Van Parijs 2001) "participation income", impose a broad 
condition of social contribution, which can be fulfilled by full- or part-time waged employment 
or self-employment, by education, training or active job search, by home care for infant children 
or frail elderly people, or by regular voluntary work in a recognised association. The more 
broadly this condition is to be interpreted, the less of a difference there is with a basic income. 
 
2. WHY DO WE NEED A BASIC INCOME ?  
 
If we want no means test, it is important to drop the work test. Bringing together the last two 
unconditionalities discussed — the absence of the means test and the absence of the work test —  
makes it possible to briefly formulate the core of what makes basic income particularly relevant 
under present circumstances. At first sight, there is total independence between these two 
unconditionalities, between the absence of an income test and the absence of a work test. But the 
strength of the basic income proposal crucially hinges on their being combined. The abolition of 
the means test, as we have seen,  is intimately linked to the removal of the unemployment trap 
(in its two main dimensions), and hence to the creation of a potential for offering and accepting 
low-paid jobs which currently do not exist. But some of these jobs can be lousy, degrading dead-
end jobs, which should not be promoted. Others are pleasant, enriching stepping-stone jobs, 
which are worth taking even at low pay because of their intrinsic value or the training they 
provide. Who can tell the difference? Not legislators or bureaucrats, but the individual workers 
who can be relied upon to know far more than what is known "at the top" about the countless 
facets of the job they do or consider taking. They have the knowledge that would enable them to 
be discriminating, but not always the power to do so, especially if they have poorly valued skills 
or limited mobility. A work-unconditional basic income endows the weakest with bargaining 
power in a way a work-conditional guaranteed income does not. Put differently, work-
unconditionality is a key instrument to prevent means-unconditionality from leading to the 
expansion of lousy jobs.  
 
If there is no means test, no work test is needed. At the same time the work incentives 
associated by means-unconditionality makes work-conditionality less tempting as a way of Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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alleviating the fear that benefits without a counterpart would nurture an idle underclass. In the 
absence of a means test, the tax and benefit structure can be expected to be such that 
beneficiaries can significantly increase their disposable incomes by working, even at a low rate 
and on a part-time basis, and without being trapped in such jobs once their skills improve or once 
they can improve their working time. Moving (back) into the work sphere will therefore be 
facilitated and encouraged, and, for those who fear a dualisation of society into workers and non-
workers, there will therefore be far less of a need to insist on coupling the right to the benefit to 
some obligation to (be available for) work.  To put it (somewhat too) succinctly: Just as work-
unconditionality prevents means-unconditionality from unacceptably supporting exploitation 
(which it would do by subsidising unworthy low-paid jobs accepted under the threat of losing the 
benfit), similarly means-unconditionality prevents work-unconditionality from unacceptably 
fostering exclusion (which it would do by inviting one to no longer regard as problematic a 
system that durably disconnects the less productive from any labour participation by effectively 
killing off low-productive jobs). The two key unconditionalities of basic income are logically 
independent, but they are intrinsically linked as components of a strong proposal. 
 
Activating while liberating. This solidarity between the two unconditionalities underlies the 
central case for basic income as a specific way of handling the joint challenge of poverty and 
unemployment. Compared to guaranteed income schemes of the conventional sort, the crucial 
argument in favour of the desirability of basic income rests on the widely shared view that social 
justice is not only a matter of right to an income, but also of access to (paid and unpaid) activity. 
The most effective way of taking care of both the income and the activity dimension consists in 
maintaining the income transfer (in gross terms) whatever the person’s activity, thereby 
“activating” benefits, i.e. extending them, beyond forced inactivity, to low-paid activity. It can 
correctly be objected that there are other schemes — such as earned income tax credit or 
employment subsidies — that could serve better, or more cheaply, the objective of securing the 
viability of low-productive jobs and thereby providing a paid job to the worst off. However, if 
the concern is not to keep poor people busy at all cost, but rather to provide them with access to 
meaningful paid activity, the very unconditional nature of a basic income is a crucial advantage: 
it makes it possible to spread bargaining power so as to enable (as much as is sustainable) the 
less advantaged to discriminate between attractive or promising and lousy jobs.  
 
Basic income and social justice. The preceding argument implicitly appeals to a conception of 
social justice as the fair distribution of the real freedom to pursue the realisation of one’s 
conception of the good life, whatever it is. It is such a conception that I have developed and 
defended in my Real Freedom for All (Van Parijs 1995). A handful of alternative principled 
justifications of basic income have been proposed (see Van Parijs ed 1992) and a large number 
of pragmatic justifications have been offered for it, as a simple handy second-best for a more 
complicated ideal package of policy instruments (see e.g. Goodin 1992, Barry 2003). However, I 
am convinced that any cogent case for basic income as a first-best must adopt some notion of 
“real freedom” (not only the right but also the means to do what one may wish) as the Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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distribuendum of social justice and combine it with some strongly egalitarian criterion of 
distribution. The particular “real-libertarian” conception I offered gives a key role to the view 
that the substratum of our real freedom essentially consists in very unequal combinations of gifts 
we have received throughout our existences, among them the opportunities that enable us to hold 
our jobs. As a result there are massive “employment rents” incorporated in our jobs which can 
and must be (partly) captured through predictable and sustainable revenue-maximising income 
taxation whose proceeds are to be used to fund a universal and unconditional basic income. The 
formulation I offer can no doubt be improved (see the critical essays collected in Elkin ed. 1997, 
Krebs ed. 2000 and Reeve & Williams eds. 2003, followed by my replies), but I have no doubt 
that if a first-best case for basic income can be made, it must be some fairly close variant of what 
I propose. 
 
3. IS A BASIC INCOME AFFORDABLE ? 
 
An underspecified question. Phrased in this very general way, the question makes no sense. Let 
us bear in mind that it is not part of the definition of a basic income that it should be sufficient to 
satisfy the beneficiaries' basic needs: consistently with its definition, the level of the basic 
income could be more and it could be less. Nor is it part of the definition of a basic income that it 
should replace all other cash benefits: a universal benefit need not be a single benefit. A 
meaningful answer can only start being given to the question of affordability if one specifies the 
level at which the basic income is to be pitched and stipulates which benefits, if any, it is to 
replace. Under some specifications — for example "abolish all existing benefits and redistribute 
the corresponding revenues in the form of an equal low benefit for all" —, the answer is trivially 
yes. Under other specifications — for example "keep all existing benefits and supplement them 
with an equal benefit for all citizens at a level sufficient for a single person to live comfortably" 
—, the answer is obviously no. Each of these absurd extreme proposals is sometimes equated, by 
definition, with basic income. But neither has, to my knowledge, been proposed by anyone. 
Every serious proposal lies somewhere in between, and whether some basic income proposal is 
affordable must therefore be assessed case by case. 
 
More expensive because work-unconditional? Are there, however, some general reasons why 
a basic income would not be affordable at a level at which a conventional guaranteed income 
would? One obvious reason might simply be that a basic income is given to all, whether or not 
they are willing to work, whereas a conventional guaranteed minimum income is subordinated to 
a willingness-to-work test. As a result, it is claimed, more poor people will be receiving a basic 
income than a conventional guaranteed income, or, if the number beneficiaries is not much 
greater, they will be doing less work than would be the case under a work-conditional benefit 
system. In net terms, therefore, a basic income scheme is certain to cost more.  
 
Job seeker's allowance versus state-sponsored workfare: a dilemma. Closer scrutiny reveals 
that this expectation rests on feeble grounds indeed. For suppose first that the work test is Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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conceived as an obligation to accept work if offered by some (private or public) employer 
concerned to get value for money. If the worker has no desire to take or keep the job, her 
expected and actual productivity is unlikely to be such that the employer will want to hire and 
keep her. But if the worker is formally available for work, the fact that she is not hired or that she 
is sacked (owing to too low a productivity, not to anything identifiable as misconduct) cannot 
disqualify her from a work-tested guaranteed income any more than from an unconditional basic 
income. The only real difference between the former and the latter is then simply that the former 
involves a waste of both the employers' and the workers' time. Alternatively, suppose that the 
work test is conceived as an obligation to accept a fall-back job provided by the state for this 
very purpose. Rounding up the unemployable and unmotivated is not exactly a recipe for high 
productivity, and even leaving aside the long-term damage on the morale of the conscripted and 
on the image of the public sector, the net cost of fitting this recalcitrant human material into the 
workfare mould might just about manage to remain lower than plain prison, with the cost of 
supervision and blunder correction overshadowing  the work-shy workers' contribution to the 
national product. The economic case for the work test is just about as strong as the economic 
case for prisons.  
 
Giving to the lazy is cheaper. Thus, as fully recognised by no-nonsense advocates of workfare 
(e.g. Kaus 1990), if a willingness-to-work condition is to be imposed, it must be justified on 
moral or political grounds, not on the basis of a flimsy cost argument inspired by the shaky 
presumption that a benefit coupled with work is necessarily cheaper than the same benefit taken 
alone. From the fact that workfare is likely to be costlier than welfare, it does not follow that the 
"unemployable" should be left to rot in their isolation and idleness. There can and must be a way 
of helping them out of it, namely by creating a suitable structure of incentives and opportunities 
of a sort a universal basic income aims to help create, whether or not a willingness-to-work test 
is coupled with it. Setting up such a structure is costly, as we shall shortly see, but adding a work 
test will not make it any cheaper — quite the contrary. And the absence of such a test, therefore, 
cannot be what jeopardises basic income's affordability.  
 
(i) More expensive because income-unconditional?  
 
The equivalence of means-tested and universal schemes. Instead of resting on the fact that a 
basic income is paid to all, whether or not they show any willingness to work, the claim that a 
basic income is unaffordable invokes even more often the fact that it is paid to rich and poor 
alike. The earlier discussion of the means test — in section 1(v) — should have made plain that 
this allegation is wrong, misled as it is by too superficial a notion of cost. As the comparison of 
Fig.1 and Fig. 2 shows, it is in principle possible to achieve with a basic income exactly the same 
relationship between gross and net income as with a conventional guaranteed minimum income. 
If this relationship is the same, it means that the cost to those taxpayers who net contributors to 
the scheme is the same in both cases. If one is politically affordable, therefore, the other should 
be too. If the relationship is the same, it also means that the marginal tax on earnings at any level Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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of earnings is the same in both cases. If one of the two schemes is economically affordable, 
therefore, the other should be too.  
 
Giving to the rich is cheaper. Of course, the budgetary cost is hugely different in the two cases, 
and if one could sensibly reason about transfers in the same way as about other public 
expenditures, there would indeed be a strong presumption that a basic income may be 
"unaffordable" when a conventional guaranteed minimum income is within our means. But 
transfers are not net expenditures. They are reallocations of purchasing power. This does not 
mean that they are costless. They do have a distributive cost to the net contributors, and they do 
have an economic cost through the disincentives they create. But both costs, we have seen, can 
be the same under either scheme. In addition, there are administrative costs. But, as also pointed 
out earlier, assuming a computerised and efficient tax-collection and transfer-payment 
technology, these are likely to be lower under a universal, ex ante scheme, than under a means-
tested, ex post one, at least for a given level of effectiveness at reaching the poor. Paradoxically, 
therefore, giving to all is not more expensive but cheaper than giving only to the poor. 
 
(ii) More expensive because creates work incentives at the bottom?  
 
Marginal rates at the bottom and in the middle: the big trade off. To be fair, however, the 
fact that the basic income is not means-tested naturally combines with the mild requirement that 
the explicit rate of tax should fall short of 100%. Which means that the sort of basic income 
proposal we should be looking at is not represented by Figure 2, but rather by Figure 4, or at 
least by Figure 6. Relative to the conventional guaranteed minimum scheme represented by 
Figure 1, it can then no longer be said that there is not genuinely higher cost. True, it does not 
uniquely stick to the universal nature of the benefit, since the corresponding means-tested 
negative-income-tax variants share exactly the same feature. In particular, a linear tax combined 
with a uniform refundable tax credit at the current level of the minimum guaranteed income 
(Figure 3) would be very expensive in this sense. But that the problem should be entirely shared 
with negative income schemes does not make it less of a problem, which needs to be faced 
squarely. The basic fact is that the more material incentives one wishes to provide (for a given 
minimum income) to people earning at the bottom of the earnings scale, the more one needs to 
decrease the material incentives higher up. There is a sharp trade off here, which can be spelled 
out as follows. 
 
An example. To keep the reform budget-neutral while remaining able to pay for everyone's basic 
income, one must compensate the lowering of the rate at which the lowest layer of everyone's 
income is taxed by raising the rate at which higher layers are taxed. But while every earner has 
income in the lowest layer, not everyone earns income in higher layers, and the higher the layer, 
the fewer the tax payers involved. Suppose one starts from a basic income scheme of the sort 
depicted in Figure 2, i.e. with a tax rate of 100% on the lowest layer of income which mimics the 
effective rate of existing guaranteed minimum income schemes (Figure 1). Lowering by 20% the Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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average rate of tax in the monthly income range comprised, say, between 0 and 500 Euro will 
need to be offset by an increase in the rate of tax higher up. By how much? It depends on how 
many taxpayers have an income in the income bracket over which the tax increase is being 
considered. If it is in the 500-1000 Euro range, most incomes will still be affected by the rise, 
and budget neutrality may be achieved with, say, a 25% increase of the tax rate in that range. But 
if it is in the 2000-2500 range, a far smaller number of taxpayers will be affected, and the tax rate 
that balances the budget will need to rise by, say,  over 50%. Once this is realised, the following 
conclusion is inescapable. If one is to finance a significant reduction of the effective marginal tax 
rate on the lowest earnings, one will have to significantly raise it on a broad range of rather 
modest earnings. Concentrating the increase on the higher brackets would quickly make them 
rocket towards 100% and make much of the corresponding incomes vanish (if only for domestic 
tax purposes).  
 
Better for the poor that the poor be taxed more? This is not as terrible as it sounds. The 
modestly paid workers whose marginal tax rate would need to go up are also among the main 
beneficiaries of the introduction of a basic income, as the increased taxation of their wage falls 
short of the level of the basic income which they henceforth receive. The concern, therefore, 
need not be distributive. Even if one ends up, as in some proposals, with a linear income tax, i.e. 
if the lowest earnings are taxed at the same rate as the highest ones currently are, the reform 
would still redistribute downwards from the higher earners (whose tax increase on all income 
layers would exceed their basic income). However, there is some ground for a legitimate concern 
about the impact such a reform would have on incentives. As stressed by some opponents of 
basic income and negative income tax (e.g.  the marginal rates would be lowered in a range in 
which there is a possibly growing, but still comparatively small proportion of the economy's 
marginal earnings, while being raised in a range in which far more workers would be affected. 
The incentive to work and train, to be conscientious and innovative would be increased in the 
very lowest range of incomes (say, between 0 and 500 Euro per month), but it would be 
decreased upward of this threshold, where the bulk of society's work force, and particularly of its 
most productive work force, is concentrated. We would therefore be well advised not to rush too 
quickly to a system in which the effective marginal tax rate on the lowest incomes would not be 
higher than those higher up (see Piketty 1997). 
 
Low earners' overcharge versus partial basic income. There are two ways of accommodating 
this advice in a basic income proposal. One consists in correcting a linear, or even a progressive 
system with an "overcharge" for the net beneficiaries of the basic income (Figure 6), as 
suggested for example by James Meade (1989). Another is a "partial basic income", as proposed 
for example by the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR 1985) and explored 
at length since, both in the Netherlands (Dekkers & Noteboom 1988, de Beer 1993,  van der 
Veen & Pels eds. 1995, Groot 1999) and in other European countries (Atkinson 1989, Parker ed. 
1991, Lahtinen 1992, Brittan 1995, Gilain & Van Parijs 1995, Clark & Healy 1997). A partial 
basic income would fall short of the level of income currently guaranteed to a single person, but Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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it may approach or even exceed half the level currently guaranteed to a couple, and it would go 
hand in hand with the maintenance of a residual means-tested guaranteed income scheme. It 
would therefore imply the preservation of a 100% effective tax rate on a shrunk lower range 
(Figure 7). Under either variant, the earlier paradox becomes sharper: it is not only better for the 
poor that the rich should receive the same as the poor. It is also better for them that they should 
be taxed more than the rich.  
 
(iii) More expensive because strictly individual ?  
 
The beauty of individualisation. Thus, it cannot be denied that the lifting of the means test 
raises a genuine cost problem, not as such by virtue of the fact that the basic income is given to 
the rich as well as to the poor but because (part of) its point is to provide the poor with stronger 
material incentives. It is not the only genuine cost problem intrinsic to basic income proposals. 
Another directly stems from the fact that, unlike most existing guaranteed minimum income 
schemes, basic income is meant to be strictly individual. These schemes typically provide a 
lower level of income support to each of the two members of a couple than to a single person, 
especially when account is taken of the housing subsidy, sometimes administered as a separate 
benefit. Why? Obviously because it is cheaper per capita to share a house, durable goods 
(cooker, washing machine, car, bed?) and some services (child care) with one or more other 
people than to shoulder the cost individually. The cheapest way of covering a given definition of 
fundamental needs therefore involves tracking the household composition and modulating the 
per capita level of the income guarantee accordingly. Of course, the corollary of this household-
conditionality is that economies of scale are discouraged, fake domiciles rewarded and hence 
checks on people's living arrangements required. One of the blatant advantages of basic income 
is precisely that it would do away with all that. People who put up with each other and thereby 
make society save on accommodation and consumer durables would be entitled to the benefits of 
the economies of scale they generate. There would therefore also be no bonus for those 
pretending to live apart when they do not, and no need to check who lives where and with whom.  
 
Another dilemma: inadequate or household-based?  Great, but at what level would the 
individual and unconditional basic income be pitched. If it is at the level of the guaranteed 
income currently enjoyed by each member of a couple, the amount is bound to fall far short of 
what is needed by someone who has no option but to live alone. If it is at the level currently 
awarded to a single person, the cost implications, in some countries at any rate, are phenomenal. 
This is again not just a matter of budgetary cost. There is an irreducible distributive cost in the 
sense of a dramatic shift of purchasing power from one-adult to bi- or multi-adult households. 
And there is also an irreducible economic cost, owing mainly to a substantial increase in the 
marginal rates required in order to fund the outlays for this enhanced basic income. There is 
therefore, in the short term at any rate, a dilemma between giving a fully individualised but 
inadequate basic income and giving a sufficient but household-modulated one (see Brittan & 
Webb 1991, Brittan 1995). Note, however, that this dilemma is not to be confused with a Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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dilemma between making some households unacceptably poor (with too low an individual basic 
income) and subjecting all households for an indefinite period to a control of their living 
arrangements (with an adequate, but household-dependent basic income). Even under short-term 
cost constraints, the latter dilemma does not hold, for it is possible to conceive of a strictly 
individual but inadequate "partial" basic income for all, combined with a much shrunk residual 
means-tested household-tested social assistance for the reduced number of those who, despite the 
floor provided by the household's basic income(s), do not earn enough to reach the income 
threshold as from which means-tested assistance is switched off (see Fig. 7). Providing it is not 
conceived as an immediate full substitute for existing social assistance, such a partial basic 
income thus provides an attractive way of handling both of the real cost problems — those 
stemming from incentives for low earners and individualisation — which a full basic income 
would raise (see e.g. Gilain & Van Parijs 1995 for a microsimulation of the distributive impact of 
such a partial basic income in the case of Belgium). 
 
 
4. WHICH WAY FORWARD ? 
 
An eye in the distance and an eye on the ground. For reasons explained at length elsewhere 
(Van Parijs 1995), a coherent and plausible conception of social justice requires us to aim, with 
some important qualifications, for an unconditional basic income at the highest level that is 
economically and ecologically sustainable, and on the highest scale that is politically imaginable. 
But while a defensible long-term vision is important, precise proposals for modest, immediately 
beneficial and politically feasible steps are no less essential. The sort of general but household-
tested, means-tested and willingness-to-work-tested guaranteed minimum scheme that is now in 
place with many variants in most EU countries (including, most recently, Portugal) is a 
fundamental step in the right direction. But whatever the well-meaning “insertion” or 
“integration” conditions, it cannot avoid generating traps whose depth increases with the 
generosity of the scheme and whose threat increases as so-called “globalisation” sharpens 
inequalities in market earning power. In countries in which guaranteed minimum schemes have 
been operating for a while, these traps and the dependency culture said to be associated with it 
risk triggering off a political backlash and the dismantling of what has been achieved. But they 
have also been prompting progressive moves in the form of basic income and related proposals. 
Like the fight for universal suffrage, the fight for basic income is not an all-or-nothing affair. 
This is no game for purists and fetishists, but for tinkerers and opportunists. Without going all 
the way to even a partial basic income, the following three types of proposals are plausible 
candidates — more or less plausible, depending on each country’s institutions, and in particular 
its tax and social security context — as the most promising next step. 
 
(i) An individual tax credit. The Netherlands already have universal (i.e. non-means tested) 
systems of child benefits, of student grants and of non-contributory basic pensions, in addition to 
one of the world's most generous and comprehensive means-tested guaranteed income schemes. Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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In January 2000, the Dutch Parliament approved the essentials of the government's plan for a 
comprehensive tax reform incorporating the replacement of the exemption on the lower income 
layer by a strictly individual  tax credit at a level of about Euro 140 per month for all families 
with at least one worker (see Boerlage 1999). Gradually increased and made individually 
refundable (so that a worker's non-working partner, for example, would be entitled to a cash 
payment equivalent to the credit rather than have the working partner doubly credited), this 
"negative income tax" for working families would provide the last missing element for the 
provision of a universal income floor. It could then be painlessly integrated into a low, but 
strictly individual, universal and unconditional basic income. Of course, even at a significantly 
increased level, this would remain a partial basic income, which would need to keep being 
supplemented, et any rate for single-adult households, with residual means-tested assistance. 
Similar, tough more modest, schemes have since been approved by the Belgian and by the 
French governements (see Cantillon & al. 2000, Cohen 2001, Piketty 2001, Chaidron 2001, 
Vanderborght 2001).  
 
(ii) A household-based regressive negative income tax. Despite the forbidding label, this 
would definitely be a major change in the right direction. Under the more enticing name of 
"Bürgergeld", it has been been advocated for many years in Germany by Joachim Mitschke 
(1985, 1995), professor of public finance at the University of Frankfurt. Ulrich Mückenberger, 
Claus Offe and Ilona Ostner (1989) argued for a less specific version of the same proposal, and 
Fritz Scharpf (1994, 2000), director of Cologne's Max Planck Institute, endorsed it as his 
preferred option. More recently, under the clumsier label "allocation compensatrice de revenu”, a 
variant of it has been defended in France by Roger Godino (1999), former Dean of the 
management school INSEAD, and has been cautiously supported by sociologist Robert Castel 
(1999) and economists François Bourguignon (1999) and Laurent Caussat (2000). The idea is 
simply to take as given the household modulation of the current guaranteed minimum income 
and, instead of withdrawing the benefit at a 100% rate as earnings increase, to withdraw them at 
a somewhat lower rate, say 70 or even 50%, so as to create material incentives to work for any 
household, however low its earning power. In Godino's proposal for France, for example, the 
rate is calculated so that the benefit would be entirely phased out for single people as their 
earnings reached the level of the guaranteed minimum wage (seen Figure 3), as opposed to the 
much lower level of the guaranteed minimum income, as is currently the case (Figure 1). In the 
case of a larger household, the starting level is higher. If the same reduced rate of benefit 
withdrawal applies, the benefit is completely phased out only at a level of earnings that exceeds 
the minimum wage. One major political advantage of this formula is that it can be presented as 
taking the current guaranteed minimum income as its point of departure and strengthening it by 
getting rid of the absurd penalisation of any effort to get out of the trap by taking on some low-
paid activity. One major administrative disadvantage is that it implies not just that a much 
expanded number of households will be on benefit (admittedly at a far lower average rate), but, 
more awkwardly, that how high a benefit the households are entitled to receive depends on their 
living arrangements, which the administration must therefore be allowed to control. Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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(iii) A modest participation income.  Finally, it is possible to build upon existing parental, 
study or care leave schemes and integrate them, jointly with tax credits for the employed, into a 
universal basic income subjected to a very broad condition of social contribution, as proposed for 
example by Anthony Atkinson (1993a, 1993b, 1996, 1998) under the label "participation 
income”.  “In order to secure political support", Atkinson (1993a) argues, "it may be necessary 
for the proponents of basic income to compromise. To compromise not on the principle that there 
is no means test, nor on the principle of independence [i.e., the idea that no one should be 
directly dependent on any particular person or group], but on the unconditional payment”. A 
participation income would be a non–means–tested allowance paid to every person who actively 
participates in economic activity, whether paid or unpaid. Persons who care for young or elderly 
persons, undertake approved voluntary work or training, or are disabled due to sickness or 
handicap, would also be eligible for it. After a while, one may well realise that paying controllers 
to try to catch the few really work-shy would cost more, and create more resentment all over than 
just giving this modest floor income to all, no questions asked. But in the meanwhile the 
participation income will have politically bootstrapped a universal basic income into position. 
Compared to the income-tax-reform approach and the social-assistance-reform approach, this 
third approach would be particularly appropriate if some specific funding were set aside for basic 
income: a tax on energy consumption, or a dividend on some public asset, or simply some 
broadly based levy on the national product. But it could also be combined with either of the first 
two approaches. 
 
Southern paths to basic income. In those countries which already have some sort of guaranteed 
minimum, there is much work to be done along each of these paths, both intellectually and 
politically. In less “advanced” countries, there is even more work to be done to build the first 
ingredients of a comprehensive scheme of social assistance (see Van Parijs 2002). However, two 
of these countries are particularly interesting in showing both how the basic income project can 
build on important existing achievements and how it can mobilise and guide further progress on 
this basis. One is South Africa, which, since the final years of the apartheid regime has a 
comprehensive non-contributory old-age pension scheme which distributes benefits to the 
overwhelming majority of black South African people in the relevant age category and no doubt 
constitutes the most powerful redistributive scheme in the whole of the African continent (see 
Case & Deaton 2000). On this background, a surprisingly vigorous campaign for a universal 
basic income has arisen, with support from the trade union movement, churches, and many other 
organisations (see Matisonn & Seekings 2002). The other country is Brazil, where Eduardo 
Suplicy, the Working Party’s (PT) first senator,  has been campaigning since the early nineties 
for the introduction of a comprehensive negative-income-tax-type guaranteed minimum income 
(see Suplicy ed. 1992), where countless schemes of family income support, coupled with 
compulsory school attendance have been introduced at the municipal level, after a while with 
federal support (see e.g. Suplicy & Buarque 1996; Sposati ed. 1997), and where a number of 
people, not least Suplicy himself have increasingly put present-day experiments and demands Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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within the framework of a struggle for the eventual implementation of an unconditional basic 
income for all Brazilians (Suplicy 2002).  
 
Fighting along these or other paths towards greater income security should of course not make 
one neglect the prior importance of providing every child with quality basic education and every 
person with quality basic health care. More important still, for the model advocated here ever to 
become a widespread reality, the most difficult and crucial struggles may well need to be fought 
on apparently very remote subjects: to ensure the efficiency and accountability of public 
administration, to regulate migration, to design appropriate electoral institutions and to 
restructure the powers of supranational organisations. But these many struggles can gain 
direction and strength if they are guided by a clear and coherent picture of the core distributive 
institutions of a just, liberating society. 
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5. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
• http://www.basicincome.org contains a downloadable version of all contributions to the 
most recent congressesof the Basic Income European Network (BIEN), as well as 
comprehensive annotated bibliography of many publications in several languages.  
 
• BIEN’s electronic newsletter can be obtained free of charge by sending name and address 
+ “subscribe BIEN” to bien@basicincome.org.  
 
• http://www.usbig.net/, the web site of the US basic income guarantee network, contains a series 
of downloadable working papers. 
 
• English-language book-length discussions of basic income include 
van der Veen /Van Parijs & al. (1986), Walter (1989), Van Parijs ed. (1992), Clark & Healy 
(1997), Fitzpatrick (1999), Lerner, Clark & Needham (1999), Van Parijs & al. (2001), Blais 
(2002). 
 
• On the prehistory of the contemporary basic income discussion,  
see esp. Cunliffe & Erreygers (2001, 2003), Van Trier (1995), Moynihan (1973), and the short 
history of basic income on http://www.basicincome.org. 
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APPENDIX:  
A STYLISED PRESENTATION OF BASIC INCOME AND RELATED SCHEMES 
 
 
In order to get the concepts straight and to think clearly about the pros and cons of competing 
proposals, it is indispensable to keep in mind a stylized representation of the way in which each 
proposes to convert gross income —  i.e. the income earned by people through their work or 
savings, prior to paying any taxes or social security contributions and to receiving any benefits 
— into net income — i.e. their disposable income taking taxes, contributions and benefits into 
account. In each of the following graphs, the horizontal and vertical axes correspond to gross and 
net income, respectively. Hence, the dotted 45° line, which matches to each level of gross 
income an equal level of net income represents what the net income would be if there were no 
redistribution whatever, while the bold curve indicate how a person’s net income changes as her 
gross income increases when the tax-and-transfer scheme represented by the graph is in place. 
To isolate the essential features of each scheme, it is convenient to abstract from any public 
expenditure other than the redistribution scheme under consideration and from the corresponding 
taxation. For the same reason, it is also useful to focus first on the case in which all households 
consist in one single adult.  
 
 
 
 Chapter 1. Basic Income 
Philippe van Parijs 
 
 
 
32
 
 
 Net  income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          G 
 
 
 
 
          G r o s s   i n c o m e  
 
 
Figure 1.  
Conventional minimum guaranteed income 
Conventional minimum income schemes pick a particular level of income which they aim to 
secure for every household (G). They identify the households whose gross income is smaller 
than G and transfer to them a benefit equal to the difference between their gross income and G. 
Such schemes can therefore be said to be “income-tested” or “means-tested”, in the sense that the 
size of the benefit they provide to a person is sensitive to some assessment of that person’s 
income. The level of the benefit paid obviously reaches zero when the household’s gross income 
reaches G. The benefits paid to households with a gross income lower than G are being funded 
by a tax on those with a gross income higher than G. This tax is here supposed to be linear, i.e. at 
the same rate on any gross income above G. How high this rate needs to be — and hence how 
depressed the slope of the right-hand portion of the bold line on the graph — depends on how 
many households have a gross income lower than G and on how much short of G their gross 
incomes fall. One feature of such a scheme — as represented by the flatness of  left-hand portion 
of the bold line — is that the effective marginal tax rate on all gross incomes below G is 100%. 
The effective marginal tax rate can be understood as 100% minus the rate of increase of net 
income relative to gross income. This rate of increase is here zero as any increase in gross 
income is exactly offset by a shrinking of the benefit. This feature of a guaranteed minimum 
scheme is often said to create an “unemployment trap” for people with a low earning power, as it 
kills any financial incentive to earn a gross income lower than G (or even somewhat higher, as 
being employed is likely to generate some costs), rather than nothing at all. Chapter 1. Basic Income 
Philippe van Parijs 
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Figure 2. 
Basic income with trap 
(e.g. Salverda 1984) 
Contrary to conventional schemes, a basic income is paid to all households, irrespective of their 
gross income. A basic income paid to all at level G lifts the initial 45° curve by a distance equal 
to G, which yields the higher dotted 45° line. A basic income at level G obviously involves an 
aggregate volume of benefits far larger than is the case with means-tested benefits paid only to 
households with gross incomes lower than G. One way — imaginable, though never actually 
proposed — of funding this larger volume consists in taxing all gross incomes below G at a 
100% rate, and all gross incomes above G at whatever marginal rate is required to cover the costs 
of all benefits. What we end up with is a relationship between gross and net income (as 
represented by the bold line) identical, in both its flat left-hand portion and its sloping right-hand 
portion, to the one we had in the means-tested case (Figure 1). The slope needs to be the same as 
in the means-tested case because the net benefits paid to people with a gross income below G is 
the same in both cases, and hence also the tax revenue and tax rate needed to fund them. 
Considering this far-fetched case is important to clarify the conceptual distinction between 
means-tested schemes versus basic income on the one hand, and the presence versus the absence 
of an unemployment trap (or a 100% effective marginal tax rate on the lowest incomes) on the Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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Figure 3. 
Linear negative income tax 
(e.g. Friedman 1962) 
A means-tested guaranteed minimum scheme can avoid creating an unemployment trap by 
maintaining the sensitiveness of the size of the benefit to a person’s level of gross income, but by 
making the former fall less fast than the latter grows. When this is the case, the bold line that 
represents net income as a function of gross income no longer has a flat left-hand portion at level 
G, while the level of gross income from which people stop receiving benefits (called the “break-
even point”) rises.  If we keep assuming (as in Figure 1) that all households who do not receive 
benefits pay tax at a uniform rate to finance the benefit, this rate obviously has to increase 
(relative to the situation of figure 1) to fund the increase in the numbers and sizes of the benefits 
paid. With an unchanged minimum income fixed at G, the rate at which the benefit is with drawn 
can be lowered below 100% (as it was in Figure 1) and the required rate of tax on higher 
incomes correspondingly adjusted upwards, until the rate of withdrawal of the benefit (below the 
break-even point) is the equal to the positive rate of taxation (above that point). This case 
corresponds to the linear negative income tax, which associates levels of negative tax (or benefit) 
and positive tax to gross income in such a way that net income increases at a same rate, relative 
to gross income, whatever a household’s level of income. Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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Figure 4. 
Basic income combined with flat tax 
(e.g. Atkinson 1995) 
A basic income given to all at level G can conceivably be funded by a linear tax on all gross 
income, from 0 onwards. After people receive their basic income, their gross income, as 
represented by the 45° dotted line) shifts upward parallel to itself. The large amount of tax 
revenue required to fund this (tax-exempt) basic income determines the uniform rate at which all 
gross income in excess of the basic income needs to be taxed, and hence the slope of the bold 
line representing net income. The intersection between this bold line and the original 45% line 
determines the point below which people pay less in taxes than they receive as a basic income, 
and beyond which they pay more in taxes than they receive as a basic income. It is easy to 
understand that this point and the bold line that determines it must coincide with the break-even 
point and the corresponding bold line in Figure 3. For the slope of Figure 3 has been drawn so 
that the negative taxes collected by the relatively poor would exactly match the positive taxes 
paid by the relatively rich. Hence, if the slope in Figure 4 were flatter or steeper than the slope in 
Figure 3 (which), the relatively poor would receive less or more net benefits (basic income minus 
tax) and hence fail to exhaust or overstretch the net contributions (tax minus basic income) of the 
relatively rich. In this sense, a basic income scheme funded by a flat tax can be said to be 
“equivalent” to a linear income tax with the same level of minimum income. And similar 
equivalences can be asserted for any matching pair of non-linear schemes.Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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Figure 5. 
Nonlinear negative income tax 
(e.g. Mitschke 1985, Godino 1999) 
In order to abolish the unemployment trap without dropping the minimum income level nor 
raising too much the marginal rate of tax on the earnings of the bulk of the work force, various 
non-linear negative income tax proposals have been made. The rate of benefit withdrawal is then 
higher than the rate of positive tax, and the negative income tax scheme as a whole can be called 
regressive, in the sense that the effective marginal rate of tax is higher for the poor than for the 
rich. Such a scheme is of course nonetheless less regressive and more redistributive than 
conventional guaranteed minimum schemes of the type depicted in Figure 1. Chapter 1. Basic Income 
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Figure 6. 
Basic income with low earners' overcharge 
 (e.g. Meade 1989) 
Just as some negative income tax proponents have proposed negative tax rates higher than 
positive tax rates (see Figure 5), some basic income advocates have recommended regressive 
taxation, for example in the form a “low earners’ overcharge” on top of the standard rate of tax, 
as the best way of sustainably funding a relatively high basic income. The unemployment trap is 
abolished less vigorously than in the linear case, but the material incentives for skilled workers to 
supply labour, make efforts and improve their skills are eroded to a lesser extent. Even with this 
“tax on the poor”, this sort of scheme is of course again less regressive and more redistributive 
towards the poor,  than existing guaranteed income systems with the same level of minimum 
income (as in Figure 1). And this can remain the case even when the latter are funded by 
progressive positive taxation. 
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Figure 7. 
Partial basic income  
(e.g. WRR 1985, Dekkers & Nooteboom 1988) 
Instead of funding a “full” basic income with a regressive income tax (as in Figure 6), one can 
try to combine a high minimum income, an improvement of the unemployment trap and a 
protection of incentives for the bulk of the work force by settling for a “partial” basic income 
combined with a partial preservation of a means-tested guaranteed minimum scheme. In this 
case, a universal basic income is introduced at level B, significantly less than the minimum 
income that needs to be guaranteed to a person living alone. This shifts the dotted 45° line 
upwards, parallel to itself at a distance of B. Any extra gross income is taxed at a uniform rate 
(which determines the flatter slope of the other discontinuous line starting fromB), but 
supplemented in such a way that any post-tax income inferior to G is brought up to G thanks to a 
means-tested benefit. In this case, there remains a range of low earnings over which the effective 
marginal tax rate is 100% (the left-hand flat part of the bold line). But  this range is significantly 
shortened relative to the conventional scheme depicted in Figure 1 (how significantly depends on 
how close B is to G). If most of the people stuck in the unemployment trap created by 
conventional schemes have potential earnings reasonably close to the minimum income, this low 
or “partial” but unconditional basic income, which people can combine at will with their 
earnings, will be enough to empty most of the trap. At the same time, maintaining a 100% rate 
on the first layer of everyone’s income is precisely what makes it possible to tax higher layers at 
a far lower level than under the linear schemes of Figures 3 and 4.  2 
Why Stakeholding? 
Bruce Ackerman 
Anne Alstott 
 
 It is easy to view “liberty” and “equality” as if they were inexorably at war with one another. 
Easy, but a mistake. The great project of liberal political philosophy, over the last generation, has 
been to reject the false dichotomy between “leveling” equality and “free” markets that has had 
such a baleful influence over the modern mind. 
 
The  challenge has been to reconstruct the tradition of the liberal Enlightenment to 
achieve a deep reconciliation of these superficially competing ideals.
1    Modern liberalism is 
grounded in two affirmations. On the one hand, it affirms equality by insisting that each citizen 
has a fundamental right to a fair share of resources as he sets out in life. On the other hand, it 
affirms freedom by recognizing that different people will use their initial resources differently. 
The liberal state expects these differences to arise and refuses to suppress them. To the contrary, 
it systematically respects and facilitates individual choices -- so long as they proceed from a 
background of fair initial entitlements. 
  
The distribution of material resources crucially shapes this background.  If citizens are to 
begin adult life under fair conditions, it is wrong to deprive them of their just share of the wealth 
created by prior generations. In a liberal society, this commitment should be cashed out in terms 
of private property -- since property provides an essential tool for effective self-definition.  
  
It follows that a grant of private property should be recognized as the birthright of every 
liberal citizen -- not a scarce commodity to be doled out by the community as a reward for proper 
behavior. 
  
Stakeholding and basic income both express this commitment -- albeit in different ways. 
These differences are significant, but they should not conceal a common ambition. Both 
initiatives seek to use the recent revival of liberal philosophy as a springboard for a new 
progressive agenda. Both respond to the same challenge: to transform the twenty-first century 
into a new age of liberal reform.  
 
 
                                                
Contrast the libertarian and utilitarian philosophies that dominate political economy 
today.  The libertarian trumpets her commitment to freedom.  She opposes “social programs,” 
seeks tax cuts to “return the people’s money to them,” and derides inheritance levies as “death 
taxes.”  But libertarian freedom is little more than a screen for inequality.  By contrast, liberal 
freedom, to use Van Parijs’ term, is real freedom: it requires society to give every individual the 
resources she needs to shape a life plan.  Libertarianism offers individuals only the right to make 
the most of the circumstances into which they are born.  Born to poor parents? “Too bad,” says 
the libertarian. “Do the best you can.”  Competing in the marketplace with the sons and 
daughters of privilege?  “Be content with your lot,” she advises.  “It would be wrong for the 
 
1 See Rawls (1971), Ackerman (1980), Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), Walzer (1983), Sen (1992), Van Parijs (1995). Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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government to interfere.”  In place of these patronizing reassurances, stakeholding and basic 
income offer a social inheritance to every individual.  
 
 
                                                
The utilitarian economist adopts a more progressive attitude toward redistribution but 
loses sight of individualism and freedom.  In his enthusiasm for maximizing social welfare, he 
looks to paternalist schemes of social engineering.  The utilitarian calculus favors transfers to the 
worst-off class, preferably in a form that directs them toward some “productive” activity like 
work or savings.  Means-testing helps channel assistance to the needy.  And restrictions like 
work requirements or vouchering prod the poor to take jobs and spend on approved items like 
food and shelter. The American welfare state, not coincidentally, comprises a collection of 
meager, means-tested programs directed at the very poor and designed to pull them into 
economic life.  
 
  We reject both the utilitarian philosophy and its mechanisms.  We seek freedom for 
everyone, not charity for some.  And we believe that respect for the individual requires respect 
for her choices -- to work in the home, at a paid job, or not at all.  
 
  There are deep injustices in our nation’s treatment of the poor, but we reject the idea that 
poverty relief is the only, or even the best, target for reform.  Today,  the very rich inherit from 
their parents the resources they need to shape a life plan.  The government directs aid toward the 
top 25% of the population in the form of college subsidies, and toward the bottom 20% through 
means-tested social programs.   But young adults in the vast middle group embark on their adult 
lives without the resources they need to make meaningful choices. 
 
  The basics of stakeholding reflect our philosophical commitments.  At age 21, as each 
liberal citizen steps forward to begin her adult life, she should receive a stake of $80,000 from 
the government.
2  The $80,000 is hers to spend, with just a few conditions intended to ensure that 
she has the capacity to make meaningful choices.  First, she must graduate from high school.  
Without a high-school diploma, she receives a variation on basic income -- interest on her stake 
each year.
3  Second, she must stay clear of crime.
4  Once a young citizen has met these 
 
2 Only citizens may claim stakes.  The citizenship restriction raises a number of moral quandaries, which we explore 
in Ackerman and Alstott (1999), pp. 46-49.  We permit citizens not yet 21 to receive advance stake payments to 
fund higher education. Id., at 51-52.  
3 Interest on a principal amount is not equivalent to the annuitized payment, which includes a partial return of 
principal, but especially for a long-term annuity, the numbers are close. 
4 In many cases, commission of a crime should only lead to a postponement of a stake, not forfeiture. But we do 
support the selective use of forfeiture if the alternative is a lengthy term in prison. See Ackerman and Alstott (1999), 
pp. 49-51. Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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requirements, she may collect her money in four annual installments of $20,000 each.
5  The 
money is hers to spend or invest.  She may go to college, or not. She may save for a house or a 
rainy day -- or blow her money in Las Vegas.  
 
  We will raise the necessary stakeholding fund in different ways as time marches on. 
During the “short term” -- the first fifty years or so -- we rely on a flat tax of 2 percent on each 
individual’s wealth in excess of $230,000. This high exemption level means that 80% of 
Americans will pay no tax, and that the burden will be borne entirely by the big winners in a 
market society. 
6 As the first generation of stakeholders begin to die out, we propose to shift the 
burden by means of a “payback requirement.” Stakeholders who have done well with their 
$80,000 must pay back their stake, with interest, upon their death.
7  As the first generation of 
stakeholders recognize their responsibility to sustain the institution for their successors, it will be 
possible to reduce, or perhaps eliminate, the wealth tax. 
 
 
                                                
Although stakeholding and basic income share a commitment to progressive 
redistribution, they challenge the identity politics and watered-down Marxism that have come to 
dominate conventional “left” thinking.  Every citizen may claim her stake – or collect a basic 
income – simply because she is a human being, capable of shaping a life plan.  She does not 
claim more – or less – by virtue of being female, or a minority, or possessing a disability.  
Stakeholding and basic income take a concrete step toward initial equality, recognizing the 
 
5 College-bound stakeholders may collect $20,000 each year beginning at 18.  To equalize the present value of 
payments made to college-bound stakeholders and others, who wait until age 21, we provide for the accrual of 
interest.  Id, p. 51. 
6 Our book proposes a 2 percent wealth tax with an exemption of $80,000.  Id., chapter 6.  That proposal was based 
on 1995 Federal Reserve data, the most recent available at the time.  As of 2001, we are able to draw on data from 
the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances.  Between 1995 and 1998, wealth in the middle and top of the distribution 
grew significantly.  Wilhelm (2001), p. 1.  These data show that a 2 percent tax on net worth in excess of $80,000 
would raise $547 billion, far more than the cost of stakeholding, and far more than the $402 billion (in 1998 dollars; 
$378 billion in 1995 dollars) we originally proposed to raise. Id.  We estimate that the 1998 cost of stakeholding 
would be $268 billion.  Authors’ calculations, updating the calculation in Ackerman and Alstott (1999), pp. 219-
220. 
  We propose to take advantage of the nation’s increasing prosperity by retaining the 2 percent rate but 
increasing the exemption level to increase the progressivity of the tax.  With an exemption of $230,000 per 
individual, we could raise $406 billion from the top 20 percent of individual wealth-holders.  Wilhelm (2001), p. 10 
(Table 3).  Alternatively, a tax rate of 1.5 percent with an exemption of $80,000 would raise $410 billion (in 1998 
dollars). 
  Although 1998 numbers are the most recent available, they are outdated today. Nevertheless, there is no 
reason to suppose, a priori, that they systematically understate wealth tax revenues compared to 2001.  As of June 
2001, the S&P500, the broadest major stock index, is higher than or flat relative to 1998; the Dow Jones Industrials 
are higher than in 1998, and the NASDAQ is flat compared to that year.  See 
http://host.businessweek.com/businessweek/Corporate_Snapshot.html?, (viewed June 22, 2001). 
 
7 Of course, those who have not done well financially will not be able to contribute to the stakeholding fund at death. 
Ackerman and Alstott, chapter 5. Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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individual not the group.  We do not deny the persistence of sex and race discrimination, or the 
importance of accommodations for severe handicaps – and wholeheartedly support special 
initiatives targeted at these problems.  But stakeholding and basic income are universalistic 
programs, responding to the right of each individual citizen to his share in the achievements of 
past generations. It responds to other serious social problems only indirectly -- by promoting 
women’s economic independence, and alleviating African-Americans’ striking disadvantage in 
family wealth.
8 
 
 
                                                
Stakeholding and basic income also reject the center-left’s version of universalism: social 
democracy.
9  Social democrats envision the paid workplace as the focus of social justice.  In their 
utopia, everyone has a  right to a job with good wages, short hours, and a pension that rewards 
years of diligent work.  But stakeholding and basic income promise real freedom for all, rather 
than justice for the “working class.”  They offer every individual unconditional resources, and 
they refuse to make the moral judgment that paid work is the only proper focus of a good life.  
Van Parijs, famously, has defended the right of surfers – representing the nonconformist idlers – 
to a basic income.
10  And we defend the right of every young citizen to use her resources to 
shape her own life on her own terms.  
 
  Social democracy pushes far too many human beings off the center stage of social life.    
Van Parijs’ defense of surfing is well-taken, but too limited.  Social democracy demotes tens of 
millions of ordinary people to second-class citizenship.  Begin with the caretakers: the great 
majority of women (and some men), who devote large portions of their lives to caring for 
children or elderly parents.  For caretakers, justice linked to the workplace is too often no justice 
at all.  Although the last generation of women has made remarkable gains in paid work, the 
average woman still has a far more interrupted work history, and earns far less, than the average 
man.  Thus, when social democracy makes paid work and money wages the measure of “desert”, 
caretakers lose out.  In the United States, for example, the Social Security system links 
retirement security to paid work -- or long-term marriage to a steady breadwinner.  Divorced 
women, single women, and women married to low-earners or intermittent workers may find 
themselves living in poverty despite a lifetime of real work on behalf of others.
11 
 
  Workplace justice also offers far less freedom to workers at the bottom of the economic 
ladder.  In a free-market economy, less-skilled workers earn low wages for harsh and sometimes 
demeaning work.  Liberals and social democrats agree that less-skilled workers are entitled to 
 
8 For feminist support of basic income, see, e.g., Pateman (1988).  For data on African-American wealth, see Keister 
(2000), who notes that in 1992, median black income was 60% of whites’, but median black wealth was only 8% of 
whites’.  In the same year.  25% of white families but 60% of black families had zero net wealth.    
9 One of us has praised basic income for this reason.  See Alstott (1999).  
10 Van Parijs (1991).  
11 See Ackerman and Alstott (1999), pp. 145-148. Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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greater dignity than their market earnings alone will provide.  But social democracy makes 
dignity conditional on paid work: mechanisms like employment subsidies, the “earned income 
tax credit,” and workfare offer the poor a  bargain: do the right thing by working, and society 
will take care of you.  This bargain is surely better than the libertarian alternatives:  starve or 
steal.     
 
  But the work condition fails the test of liberal justice.  No one else in a free society is 
required to make such a bargain.  The middle- or upper-class person with a private inheritance 
need not prove to the bank manager that she is a productive citizen before drawing down her 
bank account.   Basic income and stakeholding offer some of the same freedom to the less-
skilled worker.  She can work full-time, and use her stake or basic income as an income 
supplement or as a buffer against hard times.  If she is willing to live frugally or with a partner, 
she can work less, or not at all, and devote herself to the matters that concern her most: children, 
community, or perhaps some religious or artistic pursuit that engages her far more than fast-food 
jobs ever could.  
 
  But is there such a thing as too much freedom?  Here is where stakeholding and basic 
income begin to part ways. Under basic income, citizens are not allowed to go to their 
neighborhood bank and capitalize their lifetime stream of basic income payments into a single 
stake. While Van Parijs prohibits citizens from switching to our program, we are more tolerant: 
any stakeholder can switch to basic income simply by buying an annuity policy from an 
insurance company and asking it to send a monthly check.  
 
  To fix ideas, suppose that an insurance company would sell a young stakeholder a 
lifetime annuity of $400 a month in exchange for a stake of $80,000.  The Ackerman-Alstott plan 
permits each citizen to arrange for her own basic income of $ 400 -- but only if she wants to!  
Van Parijs would give her $400 a month, but forbids her to capitalize it into a single $80,000 
payment.
12 Basic income, in short, is a fancy name for a restraint on alienation.  
 
 
                                                
Anglo-American law contains a wonderfully evocative term to describe this particular 
restraint. Suppose you wanted to give $80,000 to your nephew when you die, but you didn’t trust 
his judgment. Rather than providing him with a flat $80,000 in your will, the law permits you to 
create a spend-thrift trust  -- which grants your nephew access to the money only with the 
permission of a trustee, who acts under the explicit instructions provided in your will.  Van Parijs 
would extend this principle to the new liberal form of social inheritance. He would impose a 
universal spendthrift trust on all citizens as they rise to maturity.  
 
 
12 Throughout our discussion of basic income, we assume that a basic income would be paid to adults from, say, age 
21 to retirement age.  We do this because we advocate stakeholding in lieu of basic income only for this group.  We 
favor children’s allowances and other initiatives for children, and a flat-rate pension for old-age. See Ackerman and 
Alstott (1999), chap. 8.  It is only for the group rising to maturity that we believe stakeholding is the right idea. Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
Ackerman and Alstott 
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  We reject this extension as a matter of principle. Some citizens undoubtedly lack the 
capacity to make reasonable use of their economic freedom -- and we do not oppose some broad 
sifting devices to identify them. This is why we have required all stakeholders to obtain a high 
school degree and refrain from criminal activity before gaining full access to their $80,000. But 
treating all young men and women as presumptive spendthrifts demeans their standing as 
autonomous citizens and radically constrains their real freedom.  
 
  A guaranteed income of $4,800 a year, every year, may be fine for surfers. But most 
young adults will find that basic income restricts their real freedom to shape their lives, often 
severely.  Most obviously, the restraint sharply cuts into the freedom of people who want to 
invest their stakes in the development of their own “human capital.” Consider a 21-year-old high 
school graduate aiming to become a first-rate auto mechanic. He needs $20,000 to learn the skills 
of this increasingly high-tech trade. Under basic income, he will have to wait four or five years 
to accumulate the money. Why?   
 
 
                                                
Or consider newlyweds who want to have kids and share parenting responsibilities. In 
support of this decision, they would  pour most of  their joint stake of $160,000 into a small 
house and use the rest to reduce their work commitments out of the home and share child-rearing 
responsibilities. Suppose they can’t do this on $8,800 a year. Why stop them?
13  
 
  More broadly: basic income encourages a short-term consumerist perspective, but 
stakeholding invites young adults to take the longer view. Most people in their twenties are 
crushed by the vast gap between adult responsibilities and small financial resources.
14 Although 
their future is still ahead of them, they live lives of quiet desperation -- trying to make ends meet 
from month to month. Although $400 a month will ease short-term financial crises,  it is  too 
small a sum to give them real freedom to look decades ahead and appreciate the life-shaping 
choices they are making, often by default.   
 
  Stakeholding, by contrast, invites them to take charge of their lives. With $80,000 in the 
bank, young adults may pause and consider how their aims and abilities are likely to unfold over 
time, and whether a short-term perspective will lead them down paths that they will later bitterly 
regret.  
 
  Stakeholding’s distinctive emphasis on the life-shaping perspective is dramatized by the 
way it treats the problem of premature death. If Jane Citizen dies at 35, she has received her full 
 
13 Or will Van Parijs allow them, covertly, to capitalize their stake by taking out a mortgage on their home, pledging 
their basic income as security? If so, he is well on the way to the stakeholder society. We will return to this point 
shortly. 
14 In 1998, the median wealth for all U.S. households was $60,700.  Thirty percent of U.S. households had net worth 
of less than $10,000.   Wolff (2000), table 1.  Wolff does not provide data on median wealth by age, but he does 
show that mean wealth of households headed by adults under age 35 was just 22% of mean wealth. Id., Table 10. Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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stake, but her stream of monthly payments has fallen far short of $80,000. On stakeholding’s 
view, this is perfectly appropriate. Each young adult should have the precious opportunity to put 
meaning on the shape of her life as a whole. The only regret is that Jane probably hasn’t had a 
decent opportunity to live out the commitments and investments she made in her twenties. Basic 
income proceeds on a different moral foundation. It presumes that Jane should get fewer 
payments because she will have fewer months to consume.   
 
  We reject this consumerist premise. Each citizen’s claim to real freedom is independent 
of  the number of months she will enjoy herself as an adult. It should depend instead on her 
status as a person capable of impressing a meaning on the shape of her life. If a young person 
uses her stake to pursue a risky but rewarding life, and this decision increases her chances of an 
early death, her claim to basic resources is worthy of no less respect than that made by risk-
averse types.
15  “One person, one life, one stake” is the fundamental principle of the Stakeholder 
Society.
16 
 
   Turn now from liberal ideals to  to some crucial real world matters of administration. 
Suppose that John Citizen is grimly determined to obtain his $20,000 course as an auto mechanic 
despite efforts to impose a spend-thrift trust on his money.  Here, some clever lawyering may 
suffice to convert basic income into stakeholding.  Depending on how strictly the spend-thrift 
provisions are written, John may be able to walk into a bank and take out a mortgage, pledging 
his basic income as security for the monthly repayments.  To prevent this kind of transaction, the 
government would have to insulate John’s basic income from creditors’ claims.  That rule would 
prevent advance borrowing, but it would also create a distasteful spectacle: bankrupts would 
walk out of the bankruptcy court with basic income rights intact, no matter how high their debts.  
We propose to insulate young adults’ stakes from creditors, but only to prevent advance 
borrowing before ages 21-24.  After that, every citizen must take responsibility for his or her 
actions – and debts.  In contrast, basic income runs the risk of underwriting adult irresponsibility: 
how to justify letting the 40-year-old default on her credit-card debts while keeping her basic 
income intact? 
 
 
                                                
 And then there is the black market.  Suppose that John, the would-be auto mechanic, is 
not deterred when legitimate banks refuse to deal with him on the ground that any loan which 
capitalizes his $400 monthly payments is illegal. He simply gets his neighborhood loan shark to 
lend him the $20,000, promising to use his $4,800 a year as collateral. Since this deal is illegal, 
Mr. Shark won’t be able to go to court to enforce it – but he will hire thugs, at his own expense, 
if John refuses to cough up when the time comes. All this expense and uncertainty will greatly 
 
15 This point, unfortunately, has great salience for minorities, who live with multiple injustices, including greater 
poverty rates, poorer health, and greater exposure to violence.  African-American men, for example, have an average 
life expectancy of just 66 years at birth, compared to 74 for white men.  Statistical Abstract (1999), table 127.  Black 
men are far more likely to die from criminal violence than are white men.  Id., table 145.   
16 See Ackerman (1980), pp. 49-53.  Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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increase the interest that Shark will charge his customer. But John is willing to pay the price to 
begin executing his life plan.  
 
  How does basic income propose to respond? Putting the expense of an on-going  
campaign of criminal prosecution to one side, do we really want to transform John into a 
criminal – simply because he wants to make an investment in his future? What kind of crime is 
that?
17 
 
  Sort of like making consensual sex into a crime. Only less sensible. After all, some 
people think that consensual sex outside of marriage is a mortal sin. But nobody thinks that it is a 
sin to become a trained mechanic. Whatever the law may say, it is virtually certain that it won’t 
be enforced by draconian sanctions. The black-market option not only lets the loan sharks 
appropriate the lion’s share of John’s economic birthright, but it will also reorient his 
relationship to the entire program. Under stakeholding, John could proudly come forward and 
claim his stake as a free citizen; now the state’s efforts to restrain his freedom has turned him 
into a devious thief.   When John finally becomes a skilled mechanic, he will not remember the 
stakeholding experience with pride, and seek to reciprocate by acts of loyal citizenship. Instead,  
he will more probably reflect on the ways he cheated, and was cheated, in the process of turning 
his basic income into a capital grant. 
 
 
                                                
The resulting demoralization is a matter of the first importance. We have thus far 
presented only one side of the case for stakeholding --  emphasizing its function as a  major new 
vehicle for the exercise of real freedom. But the initiative also discharges a second major 
function: we expect it to serve as the institutional focus for a dynamic culture of citizenship.  
From their earliest days, children will learn that stakeholding is part of their birthright as citizens: 
“When you grow up, you won’t be casually left at the mercy of the market or the arbitrary will of  
wealthy friends and relations (if you have any). You will confront your future under economic 
conditions worthy of a citizen of a free society.” Parents and schools will continually urge their 
 
17 To respond to these difficulties, some have suggested a more elaborate form of “spendthrift” trust under which 
young adults receive $80,000 but can only obtain access to their money by convincing a bureaucrat of the merits of 
their proposed expenditures. See, e.g., Nissan (2000) pp. 12-13. But bureaucrats will inevitably import their own 
value judgments into the process, and claimants will be made to feel like supplicants. A standard list of worthy 
projects would avoid egregious forms of caseworker paternalism but would encourage legalistic  manipulation and 
downright cheating. In purely practical terms, it would be impossible to design a process that is flexible and fair. 
Think of the borderline cases, which would quickly discredit the system. Amy may use her stake to open a hair 
salon, because that is entrepreneurship, but Ben may not become a street musician, because it is not a "business." 
Chris can enroll in divinity school and become an ordained minister because that is "education", but Dana may not 
travel to Asia to live in Buddhist monasteries because that is merely "travel."  Extra procedural protections -- like 
agency adjudication or judicial review -- may worsen the situation. See generally Mashaw  (1983); Lipsky (1980). 
More fundamentally, stakeholders are free men and women, not claimants on state charity.  They should 
not be required to bend the knee to some caseworker before moving on with their lives. The entire ritual smacks of a 
welfare state mentality  inconsistent with the liberal spirit of stakeholding.  
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charges to use their freedom in a responsible fashion, and as the stakeholding period draws near, 
each man and woman will be enmeshed in an ongoing and multilayered conversation about their 
stakes: “Did you hear how Jane spent her first payment $20,000 -- what a fool! If she keeps this 
up, she’ll never make anything of her life!” Stakeholding will provoke millions of such 
conversations -- and they will forge a cultural bond that will make stakeholders’ common 
citizenship into a central reality of social life. As they grow older, citizens will forever be 
returning to their youthful days, and reflect on their choices, and what has become of them.   
  
The dynamics of basic income would be different.  Even if payments began on the 
eagerly-awaited twenty-first birthday, the stream of small checks would not create a proud 
culture of free citizenship.  Stakeholding creates a focal point at age 21 for young citizens and 
their elders alike, dramatizing the importance of the rise to maturity.   Basic income makes its 
impact gradually and incrementally, adding a few thousand to the annual budget.  Those sums 
would make a difference in day-to-day life, especially at the bottom of the income distribution.  
There is much to be said for replacing grudging handouts with a dignified income entitlement.  
But the power of stakeholding reaches well up the economic ladder, and offers all an opportunity 
to take their life-shaping decisions seriously.  
 
  To be sure, the stakeholding culture will have its dark side. Some stakeholders will curse 
the day they made such foolish, youthful choices. But all will recognize  the fundamental role 
stakeholding played in their lives. And except for the most bitterly disappointed, these reflections 
will prompt a  patriotic determination to pass on the heritage of stakeholding to the next 
generation. 
 
  This reciprocating sense of membership lies at the heart of liberal understandings of 
citizenship. The liberal state does not bind its citizens by an appeal to a common race or 
language or religion or other moral authority. It seeks to engage people in the common project of 
assuring equal freedom to all, and to take pride in a polity that guarantees everybody the 
resources needed to confront the mystery of life with dignity and responsibility. If this noble 
ideal is ever to become a reality, it must be embodied in social institutions that ordinary people 
find meaningful. Stakeholding promises to be such an institution, but basic income threatens to 
destroy the integrity of this message as millions predictably undermine its imposition of a 
universal spendthrift trust by countless deviations and obfuscations. 
 
  Van Parijs may respond by calling on us to face some harsh facts. Some young people 
will undoubtedly  “blow” their stakes -- going on a gambling spree, or crashing a fancy sports 
car.  We agree, but is this a good reason for depriving millions of other people of the economic 
power over their own lives?  After all, neither the auto mechanic nor the newlyweds are planning 
a trip to  Las Vegas any time soon. Why should their claims to real  freedom be sacrificed simply 
to prevent others from “abusing” their freedom?     
 
  We reject this utilitarian calculus. Each person is her own person. Each is entitled to real Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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freedom to shape her own life.  This precious freedom should be not be compromised merely to 
save others from the consequences of their own choices. 
 
  To be sure, this liberal commitment leaves us with an obvious  problem: How to respond 
to somebody who goes directly from the Stakeholding Office to the nearest casino and loses 
everything?  
 
  Van Parijs doesn’t have this problem, because he has imposed a spendthrift trust on 
everybody. Ms. Stakeblower is free to lose $400 a month at the casino, but can’t go for broke. 
She must wait till next month for her next $400 check before she again spins the wheel of 
fortune.  
 
  But for us, stakeblowing raises a distinctive question: What to do when Ms. Stakeblower 
returns empty-handed and confronts the political community with her starving self? 
 
   We think it is a plus, not a minus, for stakeholding to place this question at the center of 
discussion surrounding the next reform agenda. The effort to provide answers will invite the 
polity to confront a question much in need of fundamental reappraisal. Call it the problem of  
life-cycle distribution. 
 
  Speaking broadly, welfare states of the twentieth century distributed different benefits 
during three different phases of life: youth, adulthood, and old age. During youth, the accent is 
on education; during adulthood, on need; during old age, on cash pensions. The average 
American, for example, has a fundamental right to a free high school education but is then left to 
fend for himself in the marketplace  unless he demonstrates a dramatic “need” for assistance. 
Even then, he can expect American government to respond in a miserly fashion until old age 
arrives, when more generous forms of cash (and medical) assistance are available.  
 
  Stakeholding suggests the importance of identifying a fourth moment in this 
distributional cycle -- the moment of transition from youth to maturity. Just as all children 
receive an unconditional grant of educational resources, regardless of parental ability-to-pay, 
young adults should receive an unconditional  grant of economic resources, regardless of 
parental ability-to-give. Just as liberal education provides each citizen with vital cultural 
resources for self-understanding, an economic stake provides them with the material resources  
for real freedom.  
 
  Within this life-cycle framework,  stakeblowing is a special case of a much more general 
problem: How does the grant of a new right at an early stage of life (in this case, $80,000 to 
young adults) shape the collective response to claims of entitlement at later stages (in this case, 
Stakeblower’s claim to “need” assistance)? Does the enhancement of  entitlements early in the 
life cycle justify a reduction of entitlements at later stages? And if so, which ones, and on what 
principles? Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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  The particular problem raised by stakeblowing seems pretty easy. Of course Ms. 
Stakeblower should be held responsible for her conduct in Las Vegas when she tries to collect a 
second time on the basis of her newly acquired financial “need.”   While a decent society 
shouldn’t allow anybody to starve in the streets, Stakeblower’s prior conduct disqualifies her 
from more than this minimum.
18 If she wants more out of life, let her work for it.  (In other 
words, stakeblowers will be obliged to face a situation similar to that confronted by the 
overwhelming majority of people in any Western society.) 
 
  Other life-cycle issues are much harder: How should the earlier receipt of an $80,000 
stake change government policy for the provision of unemployment benefits, or retraining 
assistance, or health insurance?  What is the appropriate relationship between stakes to the young 
and government pensions to the elderly? 
 
  Our book proposes a few principles for confronting these life-cycle trade-offs.
19 Rather 
than revisiting these controversial matters, we focus on an important question of process. Given 
the likelihood of serious disagreement on life-cycle trade-offs, how to structure the on-going 
process of political decision?   
 
   Begin with basic income, and consider the chaotic resolution that it will likely generate.   
If a political party seriously proposed a  $400 monthly payment, this would immediately provoke 
a debate on basic income’s ramifications on every other monthly payment provided by the 
modern welfare state – ranging from disability to unemployment to health care and beyond. Each 
affected group will predictably clamor to preserve its entire benefit while fiscal conservatives 
will be on the rampage for massive cut-backs to make room for the new fiscal requirements 
imposed by basic income.  
 
  This doesn’t sounds like a recipe for deliberate attention to the demands of justice in 
particular contexts. Perhaps it is utopian to expect much from any scenario, but stakeholding 
does permit greater hope.  Rather than proposing yet another monthly payment, it frames the key 
question in a different way: Are we making a big mistake ignoring the distinctive predicament of 
young adults as they start off in life with new responsibilities but without significant assets?  
 
 
                                                
To answer this question responsibly, it isn’t necessary to undertake a comprehensive 
scrutiny of every monthly payment made by the welfare state. Over time, the adoption of 
stakeholding will lead to reconsideration of other programs as they reach the top of the political 
agenda. But there is no compelling necessity to resolve all these loose ends at once. 
 
 
18 In fact, Stakeblower would be lucky to get a half-decent hand-out in America today. So much the worse for 
America.  
19 See Ackerman and Alstott (1999), pp. 129-180. Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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  And a good thing too. The effort to do so might readily defeat any serious progress on the 
basic income front. Once beneficiaries of all existing welfare programs are alerted to the danger, 
they may well join with conservatives to fight for the status quo. This right-left coalition would 
be tough to beat.  
 
  In contrast, the structure of stakeholding will predictably diffuse potential opposition. 
Consider, for example, the clever way Tony Blair introduced stakeholding as the “big new idea” 
behind his successful campaign for  reelection.  Under the Labor Party initiative, each Briton 
would receive a “baby bond” of $750 or so at birth, which would accumulate compound interest 
until he received a stake at age 18.
20 Supplemental amounts would  be added to each child’s 
account on his fifth, eleventh, and sixteenth birthdays – with the aim of providing him with as 
much as $7,500 when he reaches maturity. 
 
  From a dollars-and-cents view, Blair’s initiative doesn’t cost much  in the near future. 
Surely it doesn’t pose a clear and present danger to the monthly checks received by present 
beneficiaries of the welfare state.  Indeed, even when payouts begin 18 years down the line, 
$7,500 isn’t very much at all. Nevertheless, it is a substantial enough to raise the question: 
Doesn’t  the next generation deserve something better than the indefinite extension of the present 
welfare state? 
 
  In framing his initiative,  Blair copied a move out of Franklin Roosevelt’s political 
playbook. When introducing Social Security in 1935, the President also took steps to minimize 
the short-run cost of his proposal. While he took immediate credit for pensions for the elderly, 
the first pay-out occurred five years later in 1940.  The same political calculus is evident in the 
Prime Minister’s program: every prospective parent breathes a bit easier today, even though 
payouts won’t occur for a generation.  
 
  Similarly, the initial Social Security statute was a transparently inadequate response to 
the plight of the elderly.  For example, Roosevelt secured the support of white Southern 
Congressmen by excluding agricultural and domestic workers from coverage, which 
immediately deprived most blacks of any benefits. So far as the President was concerned, it was 
far more important to secure public support for the principle of retirement pensions. Once this 
was accomplished, Roosevelt was confident that its success would generate pressure to expand 
coverage over time.   
 
 
                                                
So too with the Prime Minister’s “baby bonds.” The important point at this stage is to 
gain public recognition of the imperative need to promote the real freedom of young adults at the 
threshold of life. It will then be time enough for activists to start campaigning for bigger stakes 
 
 
20 For details, see U.K. Treasury (2001).  Contributions would be based on a sliding scale – $750 to 
children born to poor families, reduced to a minimum of $450 for children in better-off circumstances.  See id.; see 
also Broder (2001). Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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and quicker transitions. 
 
  It will be much harder to generate a similar political dynamic in the case of basic income. 
Within the context of stakeholding, it did not seem arbitrary for Blair to announce that only 
children born after the statutory date of enactment would qualify for a “baby bond.” After all, the 
entire point of the program is to channel resources to the rising generation, and so it would have 
seemed bizarre for a fifty-year-old, say, to demand that he should be granted a “baby bond” 
retroactively.  
 
  In contrast, basic income does not focus on the particular predicament of the young, but 
spreads its concern to all citizens – fifty-year-olds no less than eighteen-year-olds.  Nobody 
would even think of proposing a “transitional scheme” that barred a particular age group as a 
cost-cutting measure. But this means, of course, that politicians will not find themselves in the 
delicious situation of granting immediate symbolic benefits to a large constituency while the 
financial costs only mount up later.  
 
  Which immediately leads to a second political problem.  Since basic income’s costs are 
immediate, and  broadly distributed to the adult population, practical politicians won’t be in a 
position to begin basic income with very generous monthly payments. Imagine, for example, that 
Tony Blair had taken the first year’s budgetary cost of supplying “baby bonds” and had 
distributed this money to every adult Briton (of working age)
21 as a basic income. This would 
have amounted to the princely sum of $1.25 a month!
22 
 
  This simply doesn’t have the same pizzazz as promising the next generation “baby 
bonds” that, upon maturity, will provide $4,500-$ 7,500 to each young adult.
23 While these sums 
are rather small,  they are big enough to suggest a certain seriousness of purpose in aiming for a 
more just future for the next generation. In contrast, a monthly basic income of a dollar and 
twenty-five cents is just a joke.  
 
 
                                                
Call this the “chump change” problem.  To solve it, proponents of basic income must 
 
 
21 As noted above, we focus on a basic income for working-age adults; we have endorsed a basic-income-
type scheme of our own for the elderly, in addition to stakeholding.  Ackerman and Alstott (1999), chap. 8. 
 
22 Translated into dollars, the baby bond proposal would pay up to $750 to each of the 750,000 infants born 
in Britain annually, or a total of $563 million.  That estimate overstates the first-year cost of the program, because a 
means-testing rule would limit to $450 the grant to babies born to higher-income parents.  But the first-year estimate 
also understates the steady-state program cost, because in future years the Blair plan would make deposits into each 
child’s account of $75-$150 at ages 5, 11, and 16.  For purposes of a rough estimate, we have settled on $750 per 
newborn. According to Downing Street statisticians, there are 37 million Britons between the ages of 16 and 
retirement age.  See http://www.number-10.gov.uk/default.asp?PageID=3396, visited June 22, 2001.  Thus, a basic 
income costing $563 million and paid only to working-age adults would yield $15 per year, or $1.25 per month. 
 
23 For the particular details surrounding the Blair plan, see U.K. Treasury Consultative Document (2001); 
for a discussion in U.S. terms, see Broder (2001). Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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insist that, from the very beginning, budgetary expenditure be large enough to fund a significant-
looking sum for every adult recipient. But this makes a Roosevelt-Blair gambit impossible.  
There is no prospect for gaining big symbolic gains at low short-term cost. Instead, the 
protagonist for basic income must immediately wrest big budgets away from competing 
programs, and somehow overcome the resistance of well-organized vested interests who will 
fight for their familiar share of the pie. 
 
  We do not say that victory is impossible. But the political calculus for basic income does 
suggest a certain utopianism that presently afflicts much liberal theorizing. It is one thing – and a 
great thing – to propose deep philosophical resolutions of the conflict between liberty and 
equality. But it is no less great to structure initiatives that have half-a-chance of enactment. We 
must rid ourselves, once and for all, of Marxist delusions that history will mysteriously work on 
behalf of the oppressed. The challenge is to design programs that promote justice and make 
political sense in  real-world democracies.  
 
  This is where the taxation side of the equation becomes especially important. By casting 
itself as a form of capital endowment, stakeholding invites the construction of a symbolic tie to 
underutilized  forms of taxation that focus on the present maldistribution of wealth. Just as the 
promise of $80,000 at age 21 is readily comprehensible to ordinary citizens, so is the funding for 
the program: an annual wealth tax on everything above $230,000 and a payback from 
stakeholders at the time of their deaths.  In an age of sound-bite journalism, it is no small virtue 
to convey the essence of a program in a sentence or two.  More importantly, the link between 
stakeholding and its funding taps into the expressive power of taxation. The payback rule 
underlines the importance of intergenerational justice.  To ensure a universal social inheritance, 
decedents must give back something from their estates.  The old make way for the new – but in 
an egalitarian way.   Regrettably, Democrats who opposed the 2001 repeal of the estate tax had 
no such symbolism on which to draw.  Faced with Republican attacks on a macabre “death tax” 
that (ostensibly) forced family businesses into bankruptcy, Democrats managed only a muddled 
protest at “regressivity”.  Without any clear platform, their general commitment to progressive 
taxation met an easy defeat.  Stakeholding, in contrast, makes the egalitarian debate vivid.  Large 
inheritances for a few versus a meaningful inheritance for everyone. 
 
 
                                                
The wealth tax weaves in a second symbolic message.  By spotlighting the concentration 
of wealth in America, it both reveals a problem and, linked with stakeholding, suggests a 
remedy. The revenue potential of a 2 percent wealth tax is stunning – $406 billion using 1998 
data..
24  And it speaks volumes about the vast gap in wealth.  With a $230,000 exemption and a 
2% rate, only the top 20% would pay any wealth tax at all.
25  
 
 
 
24 Wilhelm (2001), p. 10.   
 
25 See supra note 6. Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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  Our commitment to the wealth tax over an income or consumption tax reflects several 
considerations, both principled and pragmatic.
26  From a principled perspective, the extreme 
concentration of wealth reflects past injustice and perpetuates it.  In an ideal setting, with true 
equal opportunity, differences in individual wealth-holdings would be untroubling; simply an 
indicator of one’s life choices.
27  There would be no reason to penalize savers relative to 
spenders; or those with great material wealth over those with little, because (by hypothesis) 
everybody received a fair start.  But today,  the wealthy cannot plausibl claim that their fortunes 
were earned on a level playing field.  It is impossible to know who would have prevailed in a fair 
competition, but lacking that information, the annual wealth tax is rough-cut justice.   
 
  The wealth tax also targets inequality in the next generation.  Wealth buys advantages not 
merely for oneself, but, crucially, for one’s children, who go to better schools, get into better 
colleges, and can rely on the security of the family bank account to get them out of future 
scrapes. Once again, a truly just state would remedy those inequalities directly, through 
education and the restriction of inheritance.  But in the absence of such measures, it is fair to tax 
the wealthy to fund better opportunities for every child. 
 
  From a practical viewpoint, wealth taxation provides a useful backstop to the payback 
requirement, ensuring that wealthy market-winners who spend-down their assets before death 
will still contribute to stakeholding for the next generation.  The wealth tax could even enhance 
the functioning of the income tax.  The cumulation of administrative compromises and deliberate 
tax breaks has reduced the effective rate of income taxation on capital to very low levels.
28  By 
taxing capital directly, the wealth tax could do what the income tax, now hopelessly riddled with 
loopholes, cannot: extract a fair contribution to the polity from capital owners.  Although the 
wealth tax would require new administrative structures for valuing – and locating – assets, that 
technocratic challenge is also a virtue, because it offers the potential to broaden the capacity of 
the income tax as well.
29 
 
 
                                                
Basic income shares some of these virtues, but less clearly.  Like stakeholding, it can be 
described in a sound bite that conveys its egalitarian character.  But the tax side of Van Parijs’ 
proposal is less expressive.  In Real Freedom for All, Van Parijs proposes funding a basic income 
with an income tax and an inheritance tax.
30  The inheritance tax taps into the same symbolism 
 
 
26 For a more detailed discussion of the ideas in this paragraph and the next, see Ackerman and Alstott 
(1998), pp. 96-101.  For additional arguments on behalf of wealth taxation, see Shakow and Shuldiner (2000). 
 
27 We emphasize that stakeholding alone will not guarantee anything like true equality of opportunity. 
Aggressive steps are also required to assure liberal education for all, to fight racial and other forms of invidious 
discrimination, and to remedy serious handicaps. See Ackerman (1980), parts 1 and 2. 
 
28 Slemrod and Bakija (1996), p. 179. 
 
29 For a detailed consideration, see Ackerman and Alstott, chap. 5. 
 
30 Van Parijs (1995), pp. 100-102, 113-119. Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
Ackerman and Alstott 
 
 
 
55
 
we employ: the justice of social inheritance (or, more precisely for Van Parijs’ plan, a social 
dividend) for all.  The income tax reflects Van Parijs’ conclusion that income from good jobs 
and investments are a scarce resource that should be considered to be owned collectively, and 
shared equally through basic income.  There is a fine symmetry here: unequal income streams 
transformed into an egalitarian minimum income.  But the real-world income tax muddies that 
principled symmetry and may create harder political battles for the basic income idea.  In the 
United States, as in most Western countries, the income tax is the workhorse of the fiscal system.  
Here, it accounts for 47% of revenue (compared to 28% in Germany, 34% in Italy, and 37% in 
Britain, though only 18% in France).
31 The result is a long line of political claimants for income 
tax revenue.  Basic income is just one more. Given the already dismal record of the income tax in 
reaching income from capital, a hike in the income tax may amount, in effect, to yet another 
burden on wages, which are already heavily taxed for various social-insurance programs.  
 
  This brings us squarely back to politics in the most mundane sense – getting out the vote.  
Our ambition, like Van Parijs’, is to bring modern liberal philosophy into the real world.  We aim 
not merely for elegant principles but for practical programs with a realistic chance of adoption.  
But because liberal redistribution is costly in tax terms, it faces predictable political opposition. 
In the United States, proposals for “higher taxes” for “new welfare programs” have a predictably 
dismal fate.  The challenge, then, is to frame the public debate in a new way. 
 
  We have already suggested how stakeholding allows for a Blairish mode of presentation 
– in which immediate symbolic gains can be won at small short-run costs. But suppose that we 
were dealing with a more adventurous political leader, who was not satisfied with the long 
transition contemplated by Blair’s “baby bonds,” and wished to move to a relatively  rapid 
embrace of the full Ackerman-Alstott alternative. What would her political calculus look like? 
 
  Recall that our $230,000 exemption level means that only 20 percent of Americans will 
be paying any wealth tax. This gives our progressive politician lots of room for creative 
maneuver as she seeks to mobilize majority support. She is not, to be sure, proposing to put cash 
directly in the hands of the present generation of voters -- who will not generally be  young 
enough to qualify for stakeholding themselves. She is instead appealing to larger concerns, most 
notably, the concern to build a more just society for our posterity. We ourselves will never reach 
the promised land. But shouldn’t we try to hand over a world that is moving in the right 
direction?  
 
 
                                                
Call this the desire for progress, and consider the subtle way in which stakeholding elicits 
this progressive motivation. It does not plead with citizens to sacrifice for some large abstraction  
- Social Justice  - that is projected onto the remote future and exists apart from their own 
concrete experience. It invites them to build on more proximate desires for human betterment. 
 
 
31 Statistical Abstract (1999), table 1373 (1996 data).  France collects a larger percentage of its revenue in 
social security wage taxes and in consumption taxes.  Id. Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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When confronting stakeholding, most voters will think of a favorite sister or son or 
granddaughter, and consider how much $80,000 would mean to these very particular people as 
they start off in life. They will reach more abstract principles through these more particular 
exercises in moral imagination: If stakeholding is good for my daughter, isn’t it good for all 
other children as well? 
 
   John Stuart Mill often spoke of the interests of a “progressive being,” and we propose to 
bring his talk down to earth to consider how progressive parents of young children might analyze 
their interest in stakeholding. Suppose that our family consists of two 35-year-old parents and 
two young children, and that the parents find themselves within the bottom 80% of the 
population. These voters are “progressive beings” in two senses: first, they don’t look upon their 
children as mere consumption goods, but care about their future development as autonomous 
human beings for their own sake; second, they are willing to look beyond their kin, and 
recognize a collective obligation, as citizens of a liberal state, to provide all of them with a fair 
start in life.  
 
  But needless to say, they are not willing to pay too big a price for progress -- after all, 
they have lives to live as well, and they are unwilling utterly to sacrifice their own moral 
ambitions for themselves simply to provide more justice for the next generation.  
 
 
                                                
Within this framework, stakeholding seems a very attractive proposition to our 
hypothetical 35 year olds. As they look ahead a decade or so, they consider how much money 
they are likely to have in their bank account -- and immediately recognize that they won’t be in a 
position to stake their kids to $80,000 apiece as they start out adult life. Better yet, they also 
figure that they won’t be paying any extra taxes for stakeholding over the next decade or two. It 
is only as they contemplate the “longer run” that our couple may begin to have doubts.  Perhaps 
when they reach 55 or 65, they may be accumulating sufficient wealth that they may have to pay 
a substantial wealth tax to finance the stakes for the next generation. But for the majority of 
citizens, even this is speculative: Isn’t the chance of bearing this tax worth the certainty of giving 
one’s children, and all other children, a solid head-start? 
32  
 
  It will take skill for progressive politicians to frame the issue in this way. But with the 
right kind of leadership, the AA package might generate  a broad positive response. We foresee a 
tougher time for the Van Parijs package. As we have seen, the income tax is already an 
overburdened instrument, and even if Van Parijs successfully uses it as primary funding source, 
the bottom 80 percent will be contributing a major share. While we would be happy if VP were 
 
 
32The age distribution of wealth is heavily skewed toward the middle-aged and elderly.  In 1998, 
households headed by someone under age 35 had average wealth of just 22 percent of mean wealth, while those 35-
44 had 68% of the mean.  Wealth is highest in the 55-74-year-old age group.  Wolff (2000), Table 10.  Younger 
voters, then, are likely to appraise their future wealth tax prospects in probabilistic terms.  Some, with secure jobs 
and good retirement plans, may count on being in the wealthy group burdened by the tax.  But others will take the 
security of a good start for their children against the gamble of future wealth. Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
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persuaded to adopt a wealth tax, the marriage of basic income to a wealth tax lacks the same 
symbolic meaning generated by our proposal. The AA combination of universal stake and 
focused wealth tax speaks a language that everybody immediately understands: The time has 
come to create a world in which inheritance is not merely a function of family but of citizenship 
– where all members of the commonwealth have a right to inherit a fair share of the material 
endowment created by previous generations, and are not merely forced to rely on the luck of 
inheriting wealth from a rich family.   
 
 ******************** 
 
  We close by sketching out some more common ground with Van Parijs -- this time 
emphasizing our common diagnosis of the distinctive intellectual predicament confronting 
progressivism in the new century.  From this perspective, we seem to be shadow-boxing against 
the same ghostly presences of the past.  
 
  Classical laissez faire provides a mirage of formal freedom that is a parody of liberal 
ideals.  Contemporary political philosophy makes this point, but through thought-experiments 
too utopian for real world implementation.  
 
  This is no news to old-time Marxists, who have disdained “bourgeois utopianism” and 
sought to displace it with a hard-headed analysis of class interests and historical dynamics. But 
these scientific pretensions have turned out to be pretentious:  the “working class” isn’t the 
locomotive of history. If classical liberalism gave us a bogus vision of liberal ideals, classical 
Marxism gave us a bogus understanding of historical causation. Worse yet, its emphasis on the 
causal agency of the working class tended to authorize much moralistic talk about the dignity of 
paid work, as if other activities were of lesser moral value.  
 
  We reject the labor theory of value –  normatively as well as positively. But we do not 
reject the left’s suspicion of liberal Utopianism as a feel-good mode of accommodation to the 
status quo. The liberal challenge is to make hard-headed appeals that channel politics toward the 
collective pursuit of real freedom in the real world.   
 
  Easier said than done. Both basic income and stakeholding suggest, however, that the 
effort may be worth making. Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
Ackerman and Alstott 
 
 
 
58
 
References 
 
Ackerman, Bruce, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980). 
 
Ackerman, Bruce, and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (1999). 
 
Alstott, Anne, Work Versus Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 Yale 
L.J. 967 (1999). 
 
Broder, David, Tony Blair’s Eye-Catchers, The Washington Post, p. A21 (May 2, 2001). 
 
Dworkin, Ronald, What Is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 185 
(1981a). 
 
Dworkin, Ronald, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 283 
(1981b). 
          
Keister, Lisa, Family Structure, Race, and Wealth Ownership: A Longitudinal Exploration of 
Wealth Accumulation Processes, Jerome Levy Economics Institute, No. 304 (May 2000). 
 
Lipsky, Michael Street-Level Bureaucracy (1980). 
 
Mashaw, Jerry L., Bureaucratic Justice (1983). 
 
Nissan, David, and Julian Le Grand, A Capital Idea: Start-Up Grants for Young People (2000). 
 
Pateman, Carole, The Patriarchal Welfare State, in Democracy and the Welfare State (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1998). 
           
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
 
Sen, Amartya, Inequality Reexamined (1992). 
 
Shakow, David, and Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 Tax L. Rev. 499 (2000). 
 
Slemrod, Joel, and Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves (1996). 
 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, U.S. Census Bureau (1999). 
 
Van Parijs, Philippe, Real Freedom for All (1995). 
 
Van Parijs, Philippe, Why Surfers Should Be Fed:  The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Chapter 2. Why Stakeholding? 
Ackerman and Alstott 
 
 
 
59
 
Income, 20 Philo. and Public Affairs 101 (1991). 
 
U.K. (HM) Treasury Consultative Document, Saving and Assets for All, The Modernisation of 
Britain’s Tax and Benefit System, No. 8, downloaded from http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk (2001). 
 
Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice (1983). 
 
Wilhelm, Mark, A Proposed Wealth Tax: Revenue Estimates and Distributional Analysis Using 
the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (April 2001) (unpublished paper on file with 
authors). 
 
Wolff, Edward N., Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, 1983-1998, Jerome Levy Economics 
Institute, Working Paper No. 300 (April 2000). 3 
The Citizen’s Stake and Paternalism 
Stuart White 
 
  ‘It was not the quantity of what I had which was striking, but the quality of what I 
could do and be by virtue of having a little. The difference between having twenty thousand a 
year and three hundred is as nothing compared with that between having three hundred and 
none.’ - Stephen Spender, 1951 
 
  ‘It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate [one’s] freedom.’ - John Stuart Mill, 1859 
 
1. Introduction: two objections 
 
  The first of these two remarks appears in Stephen Spender’s autobiography, World 
Within World. Spender is commenting on how even a modest financial inheritance meant that 
he had the freedom to think and act independently and creatively at the start of his working 
life: ‘...although I had comparatively little money, my whole position of independence 
depended on it’.
1 All those who inherit at least a certain modest amount have this 
independence, he implies, while those who inherit little or nothing do not. This division 
between the independent and the dependent is more striking and significant, Spender 
suggests, than inequalities within the class of fortunate independents. Spender’s insight leads 
directly to the question: Why not guarantee every citizen an inheritance sufficient to have this 
independence? Why not socialise the inheritance process so that, as a right of citizenship, 
everybody receives a modest, but not trivial, economic stake - a citizen’s stake, as we might 
call it? The proposals of Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott and of Philippe Van Parijs offer 
us two different models of how the citizen’s stake idea might be implemented. Ackerman and 
Alstott propose to implement the stake (largely) as a one-off, lump-sum capital grant on 
maturity, with no restrictions as to how people may use this grant.
2 I shall refer to this as the 
capital grant (CG) proposal. Van Parijs proposes to implement the stake as a periodic, but 
non-mortgageable income grant. I shall refer to this as the citizen’s income (CI) proposal.  
 
  At least two kinds of objection appear in the literature on these proposals. One 
objection, which is salient in the literature on CI, is that such polices will allow citizens to 
establish a morally troubling, parasitical relationship to their fellow citizens. A generous CI, 
it is argued, would allow citizens to free-ride on the productive efforts of other citizens, by 
guaranteeing them a share of the social product without demanding a productive contribution 
in return. A second objection, which applies more specifically to the CG proposal, is that the 
freedom secured by citizen’s stake policies is too easily alienated, too easily lost through 
careless employment of the stake. I have considered the former, exploitation objection at 
length in earlier work. In this short paper, I intend to switch focus to the second, alienation 
objection. 
 
                                                 
1 Stephen Spender, World Within World (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994 [1951]), p.119. 
2 I say ‘largely’ because the proposal set out in their 1999 book, when described in full, is not in fact a proposal 
for a CG rather than a CI, but for a hybrid form of citizen’s stake which combines a generous CG on maturity 
with an age-related CI (a ‘citizen’s pension’ of $670 paid to all from the age of sixty five). See Bruce Ackerman 
and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999), especially pp.129-154 
on the CI element of their proposal. Chapter 3. The Citizen’s Stake and Paternalism 
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  Specifically, I consider three responses to the objection. The first response, putting 
great emphasis on the distinction between disadvantage attributable to brute luck and that 
attributable to choice, denies that there really is an objection here at all. I argue that this 
response is unpersuasive. The second response emphasises the need to complement citizen’s 
stake policies with an appropriate kind of education in asset management. The third response 
is to propose, on paternalistic grounds, some kind of restriction on how stakes can be used. 
One direction this response points us in is CI as opposed to CG. But there are other directions 
it points us in that also warrant exploration, notably the proposal for enacting the stake as a 
development grant: a capital grant that may be used only for approved investment purposes 
such as education, training, house purchases, or establishing a new business. In concluding 
the paper, I defend this option as one that should inform the development of a citizen’s stake 
policy. 
 
2.   The alienation objection briefly stated 
 
  As suggested, a primary rationale for a generous citizen’s stake policy, and the one I 
shall focus on for purposes of this paper, is to help secure for each citizen (at least) a 
minimally decent degree of freedom.
3 To understand and respond to the alienation objection 
it will help to begin by clarifying this claim.  
 
  We are familiar with the view that someone is free when she is able to act as she 
wishes without being subject to interference by others. Many people claim that freedom in 
this sense is not diminished by poverty, by limited command over resources. But this appears 
to be mistaken. There is no action that can be performed without laying claim to some 
resource. All efforts to act thus involve claims on resources. If resources are privately owned, 
and one happens to lack property rights in resources, then there will be many actions one 
wishes to perform that one will not be able to perform without being subject to the legally-
sanctioned interference of others. Imagine, for example, that one is homeless and wishes to 
sleep. One identifies an area in which one would like to sleep. But this area is owned by 
Jones and if you move onto it to sleep, Jones will call the police and move you off. If you 
turn to Smith’s land, she will do the same. And so on, for every land-owner in the vicinity. 
Propertylessness directly affects the degree to which you are free to do as you wish without 
being subject to interference by others.
4 
 
  In reply, it might be argued that someone in the position of the homeless person we 
have imagined is not necessarily unfree, even if all the land is privately owned, because a 
given land-owner might give her permission to use his land to sleep. The homeless person is 
certainly  vulnerable to interference, but this vulnerability need not translate into actual 
interference. However, this does not seem to be a very forceful reply. Even if the homeless 
person is allowed to enter a given land-owner’s territory to sleep, she can be woken up in the 
middle of the night and moved on if the land-owner so chooses. She sleeps at his discretion, 
and it can be plausibly argued that to live under another’s power of discretionary interference 
 
3 See, in particular, Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society; Philippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: 
What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995); Van Parijs, ed., Arguing 
for Basic Income (London, Verso, 1992), especially pp.81-98; and Tony Fitzpatrick, Freedom and Security: An 
Introduction to the Basic Income Debate (London, Macmillan, 1999).  
4 Here I follow Jeremy Waldron, ‘Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom’, in Waldron, Liberal Rights 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.309-338. See also G.A. Cohen, ‘Back to Socialist Basics’, 
Appendix: ‘On Money and Liberty’, in Jane Franklin, ed., Equality (London, Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1997), pp.29-47, specifically pp.41-43. 
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like this is itself a significant curtailment of one’s freedom. Philip Pettit explains that to live 
subject to the will of another in this way ‘...is to suffer an extra malaise over and beyond that 
of having your choices intentionally curtailed. It is to have to endure a high level of 
uncertainty....[that] makes planning much more difficult....and [it] is to have strategic 
deference and anticipation forced upon you at every point...’
5 I shall refer to relationships like 
that just depicted between the homeless person and the land-owner as relationships of 
dependency. As the example of the homeless person illustrates, poverty can readily produce 
dependency of this kind, and, as Pettit suggests, thereby reduces freedom in a significant 
way.
6 Of course, such dependency may be considered a bad thing not simply because in itself 
it represents a diminution of personal freedom, but because people who are dependent in this 
way tend also to be vulnerable to various kinds of exploitation and abuse.
7 
 
  Citizen’s stake policies offer a form of protection against freedom-reducing 
dependency. Of course, a simple welfare safety-net will offer some protection of this kind. 
But conventional welfare policies often come with strings attached that may make it difficult 
to access resources at critical moments. CI and CG policies remove these strings and might 
therefore be thought to offer better protection.  
 
  At this point, however, the objection I wish to consider looms into view. Imagine that 
we could enact a truly radical citizen’s stake policy in which all existing wealth holdings are 
taxed at 100% and redistributed as lump-sum capital grants to individuals on a completely 
egalitarian basis. Critics will object, quite plausibly, that substantial wealth inequality will 
quickly reemerge, with some people dissipating their endowments and, thereby, the material 
basis of their freedom. In short, the objection is that citizens will be able quite readily to 
‘blow’ their stakes and so alienate the material basis of their freedom so that, under even the 
most radical citizen’s stake regime, we will still end up with a society divided between the 
free and the dependent. How might the proponent of the citizen’s stake reply to this 
alienation objection? 
 
3.  The ‘So What?’ response 
 
  The first response we must consider can be summed up in the phrase, So what? If a 
division between free and unfree arises as a result of the choices people have made, starting 
from a sufficiently equal place, then perhaps, morally speaking, there is nothing to worry 
about. What should concern us, it might be said, is disadvantage that is due to bad ‘brute 
luck’ rather than that due to choice.
8 I find this response to the alienation objection 
inadequate for two reasons. 
 
5 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997), 
pp.85-87. See also Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
6 Pettit also argues, in contrast to Skinner, that interference as such does not diminish the freedom of the person 
subject to this interference if it tracks the interests of this person. Thus, for Pettit, not only is the absence of 
interference not sufficient for personal freedom, but it is also not necessary for freedom. I do not follow Pettit in 
making this second claim. Nor do I follow either Pettit or Skinner is asserting that the conception of freedom as 
involving non-dependency is somehow outside the ‘liberal’ tradition of thinking about freedom. 
7 For relevant analysis of the concept of exploitation, see Robert E. Goodin, ‘Exploiting a Person and Exploiting 
a Situation’, in Andrew Reeves, ed., Modern Theories of Exploitation (London, Sage, 1987), pp.166-200. 
8 See G.A. Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics 99, 1989, pp.912-944, and Ronald Dworkin, 
‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, 1981, pp.283-345. I do not 
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  Firstly, I think we have reason to worry about situations of dependency even if they 
result unambiguously from choice rather than initial brute luck inequality. Consider the case 
of Rosa. Rosa lives in a society where all that citizens receive on maturity is a hefty capital 
grant. A few days after her eighteenth birthday she takes her stake and sets out to start her 
adult life in a new and fascinating city. However, within a few weeks of arriving in the city, 
she has spent her stake, losing most of it in foolish bets at a casino. Her immediate options 
are now such that she has no acceptable alternative but to take a job that one particular 
employer, Brian, a dodgy night-club owner, offers to her. Brian is well aware of her 
desperation and takes advantage of her resulting vulnerability to pay a very low wage 
(compared to the typical wage for the job). He also conditions her retention of the job on 
accepting a range of interferences in her life that she would not otherwise entertain. Surely 
Rosa suffers exploitation and a kind of unfreedom, and this is a proper matter of moral 
concern. Even if it is not intrinsically unjust for her to be relatively impoverished as a result 
of her foolish stakeblowing, Brian takes unfair advantage of her impoverishment. It seems 
implausible to say that Brian’s exploitation and domination of Rosa is somehow acceptable - 
somehow not really exploitation or domination - because Rosa is responsible for getting 
herself into a state where she is vulnerable to apparently exploitative and oppressive 
treatment.
9  
 
  Secondly, the argument that the loss of freedom following stakeblowing reflects 
choice rather than brute luck is anyway more problematic than we have thus far assumed. 
Choices are affected by a range of personal characteristics some of which are, in the 
circumstances of societies like our own, inheritances of social class. In the case of the utopian 
citizen’s stake policy we have just imagined, people who come from families with little 
wealth, and thus little experience of managing wealth, will be more likely to blow their 
generous stakes than those who come from wealthy families that have transmitted the 
attitudes and skills relevant to wealth accumulation. One of the ways in which social class 
affects outcomes, including wealth outcomes, is through the transmission of what we might 
call asset management capacity: the ability to manage assets effectively with a view to the 
maintenance of the material basis of one’s freedom (intuitively, the ability to manage assets 
so that one at least retains the equivalent of Spender’s ‘three hundred a year’). This capacity 
is in part a matter of knowing about and understanding investment options. It is also in part 
attitudinal: a matter of seeing the future as something for which plans can and should be 
made, and of being willing to defer immediate consumption in the interests of long-term 
security. It is both about having a certain kind of time preference and about having the 
knowledge and understanding necessary to act on this preference.  
 
  However, the fact that stakeblowing can frequently be seen as a matter of brute luck, 
grounded in class-based inequalities in asset management capacity, rather than as a simple 
matter of choice, does not necessarily rescue the citizen’s stake idea from the objection we 
started with. On the face of it, it seems in fact to add force to this objection: not only are 
some people going to end up unfree under the citizen’s stake regime, but many of them will 
be unfree due to accidents of birth for which they are not responsible. It is precisely this 
consideration which leads some radical egalitarians to reject citizen’s stake ideas. In this 
 
mean to imply that either Cohen or Dworkin would necessarily sympathise with the ‘So what?’ response to the 
alienation objection. 
9 This concern for vulnerability and resulting exploitation and domination is, I think, one of the considerations 
that Elizabeth Anderson advances for rejecting what she calls ‘luck egalitarianism’. See Elizabeth Anderson, 
‘What is the Point of Equality?’, Ethics 109, 1999, pp.287-337. 
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vein, for example, John Roemer has argued that we should reject what he terms people’s 
capitalist approaches to overcoming class inequality based on the simple redistribution of 
assets.
10 As Roemer says: 
 
  ‘Some people have learned to save under capitalism and have trained themselves in 
ways conducive to getting ahead in any society based on private ownership and markets. 
Others have learned behavior and values that are dysfunctional for success in a private 
ownership economy; one might argue that their behavior is well adapted to surviving on the 
margins of such a society but not to succeeding in its mainstream...From the ethical point of 
view, the goal of socialism is to annihilate the opportunities that are unequal as a 
consequence of unequal access to or ownership of the alienable means of production. Equal 
ownership rights in the means of production would go only part way toward rectifying those 
inequalities, because the skills and preferences of people are themselves a consequence of 
past unequal opportunities.’
11 
 
  This observation brings us to the second response to the alienation objection.  
 
4.  The educational response 
 
  The second response starts to come into view once we entertain the following 
thought: Why take the existing link between social class and asset management capacity as a 
given? Could the state not do things to weaken this link? The proposal, in other words, is to 
connect citizen’s stake initiatives with a concerted effort to break, or at least weaken, the link 
between class and asset management capacity. It is to design and complement such initiatives 
with a view to cultivating asset management capacity on the part of members of historically 
asset-poor groups.   
 
  Easily said, but how might this be done? I don’t have a definitive answer to this 
question, but there are some possibilities that we may note. One indication of how citizen’s 
stake-style policies might incorporate the concern to cultivate asset management capacity is 
provided by the recent experiments with so-called Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) 
in various parts of the United States.
12 IDA schemes originated in the non-profit sector but 
have now been given further support from states and federal government. A typical scheme 
works as follows. A community of eligible individuals, e.g., those with incomes below a 
specified threshold, is identified. Eligible individuals are offered the opportunity to set up 
individual accounts into which they will try to direct savings each month. Any saving they 
actually make is matched, e.g., the state may contribute $2 for every $1 the account-holder 
saves. Once a certain amount has been saved, individuals can withdraw their funds for 
approved investment purposes (such as courses of education, training, or putting a down-
payment on a house). The generous subsidies obviously make these schemes attractive and 
make it likely that they will result in an immediate improvement in the asset position of their 
beneficiaries. But typically the schemes are designed on the premise that beneficiaries will 
 
10 See John Roemer, Free to Lose: An Introduction to Marxist Economic Philosophy (London, Radius/Century 
Hutchinson, 1988), pp.152-153. 
11 Roemer, Free to Lose, pp.152-153. 
12 A particularly helpful survey is provided by Ray Boshara, ed., Building Assets: A Report on the Asset-
Development and IDA Field (Washington, D.C., Corporation for Enterprise Development, 2001). See also 
Larry W. Beeferman, Asset Development Policy: The New Opportunity (Waltham: MA, Heller School for 
Social Policy and Management, Brandeis University, 2001), especially pp.27-28, 85-87. 
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make better use of the opportunities they provide if they receive some training in the 
mechanics and logistics of saving. Thus, in many schemes individuals are required to attend 
financial education classes as a condition of receiving matching funds or withdrawing funds 
from their account. These classes include ‘diverse topics such as household budgeting, 
personal financial management, establishing and repairing credit, goal setting, and principles 
of investing’.
13 One cross-sectional survey of participants in the American Dream 
Demonstration IDA project found that 85% of participants completing the survey felt that the 
financial education classes helped them to save more, e.g., by identifying specific saving 
strategies suited to their circumstances. Another study found that the level of saving 
increased with hours of financial education, though only up to a point.
14  
 
  We do not have sufficient evidence as yet to assess whether these schemes are 
effective in developing the long-term asset management capacity of otherwise asset poor 
individuals. But if programmes of this kind are successful in this way, we should bear in 
mind that the effects may be felt not only by the immediate savers themselves but by others 
around them. Skills learned by a parent on an IDA programme might be conveyed to her 
children, so that they reach maturity with greater asset management capacity than they 
otherwise would have. In this way, such programmes might contribute to the breaking down 
of intergenerational cycles of asset poverty, and we might therefore consider them as a 
helpful complement to more universalistic citizen’s stake schemes. 
 
  Another possibility, which has been mooted in the British debate over the Labour 
government’s proposed Child Trust Fund (CTF), is to integrate financial education directly 
into universalistic capital grant schemes themselves.
15 Under the CTF scheme, each British 
child will receive a personal account at birth into which the state will pay, depending on 
parental income, an initial sum of between £250-500 (with further small sums being added to 
their accounts as they grow up). The money in the account will accummulate as the child 
grows up, giving her a modest capital stake on maturity that she will be free to use as she 
wishes. Now, could one not add an educational dimension to the CTF scheme? Lessons 
focusing on CTFs might be included as part of the curriculum. Children could perhaps track 
how their CTFs are growing. Teachers could ask children to explore how their accounts 
would have grown had the funds been invested in different ways, and could use this as a 
device for introducing children to different investment possibilities and to frame a discussion 
about their respective advantages and disadvantages. Teachers could organize discussions 
about what people might do with their accounts on maturity. Representatives of universities, 
vocational training schools, small business associations, trade unions, as well as financial 
institutions, could come into schools and offer advice on how stakes can be effectively used. 
 
  At the same time, it can plausibly be argued that it is only by promising every child a 
generous citizen’s stake that educators will be able to engage children from different social 
backgrounds with this topic. Schools could, after all, take it upon themselves to organize 
investment education classes for children in the absence of any citizen’s stake policy. For 
children from deprived social backgrounds, however, such classes would probably then have 
an air of unreality. Children are surely much more likely to be receptive to such classes if 
 
13 See Colleen Dailey, ‘IDA Practice’, in Boshara, ed., Building Assets, pp.51-64, specifically p.53. 
14 See Sondra G. Beverley and Michael Sherraden, ‘How People Save and the Role of IDAs’, in Boshara, ed., 
Building Assets, pp.65-80, specifically p.75. 
15 See Saving and Assets for All (London, HM Treasury, 2001). 
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they know that there is something like a decent capital stake there, in their name, waiting for 
them on maturity, than if they expect to inherit nothing.  
 
5.  The paternalism response 
 
  I turn now to the third response to the alienation objection: paternalism. The 
paternalist response is to place restrictions on how a citizen’s stake may be used so as to 
prevent individuals endangering the material basis of their freedom.  
 
  From a liberal standpoint - and citizen’s stake proponents like Ackerman, Alstott, and 
Van Parijs are self-consciously arguing from a liberal standpoint - paternalism is intrinsically 
suspect (not the same, of course, as being intrinsically and necessarily wrong). On the liberal 
view, for individuals to lead lives that are good, it is necessary that they live in accordance 
with their own judgements about what the good life is.
16 If, however, they are to be free to 
live in authentic accordance with their own conceptions of the good life, then they must be 
left free to take what risks they deem worthwhile. The state ought not, as a general matter, to 
substitute its judgement for that of the individual. The state’s task, in general, is to ensure 
sufficient equality in initial circumstances, and not to direct individuals as to how to make the 
best use of their endowments.  
  
  Having said that, few liberal thinkers are absolute in their opposition to paternalism. 
As the second quotation at the head of this paper indicates, John Stuart Mill famously argued 
that individuals should not have the freedom to alienate their own freedom through some 
kind of slavery contract, and this can reasonably be seen as a form of paternalism.
17 Mill’s 
comment draws attention to two fundamentally different ways in which we might manifest 
our concern for freedom. Stated in rough, shorthand terms, it is a difference between an end-
state and a side-constraint view of what it means to manifest concern for freedom. In the first 
case, we treat freedom, and thus, a degree of non-dependency, as an end-state. We do not 
necessarily seek to maximize the sum of end-state freedom, aggregated across all people; but 
we do at least seek to ensure that each person always has a certain minimum amount of end-
state freedom, and this goal admits, indeed mandates, some paternalism aimed at preventing 
people from subverting this end-state through their own imprudent choices. In the second 
case, we treat freedom of choice as a side-constraint.
18 The state may not act in ways that 
violate this side-constraint, even to prevent people from doing things that would render them 
dependent and thereby deny them freedom in the future. Mill, in his comments on slavery, 
commits himself to a version of the first view. Mill’s position finds a clear echo, moreover, in 
the view that many contemporary liberals take about the limits of freedom of association. 
Many liberals argue that the freedom to join a given association, such as a church, should be 
balanced by adequate freedom to exit this association. On this basis, it is argued that 
members of religious associations should not be allowed, as some churches have demanded 
of their members, to waive their social security contributions and consequent rights to state 
welfare benefits, for this would make the members in question so reliant on their church for 
future material support as to fatally compromise their freedom to exit the church in the 
 
16 This view has been most explicitly and systematically defended by Ronald Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin, 
‘Foundations of Liberal Equality’, in Stephen Drawall, ed., Equal Freedom: Selected Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995), pp.190-306, especially pp.262-273. 
17 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985 [1859]), p.173. 
18 I take the notion of a side-constraint, of course, from Robert Nozick. See Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1974), pp.28-30.  
   Chapter 3. The Citizen’s Stake and Paternalism 
Stuart White 
68
 
 
                                                
future.
19 In this view we see, again, a degree of paternalism aimed at protecting the individual 
from relationships of dependency that would undermine her freedom and expose her to 
exploitative and abusive treatment.  
 
  Turning to the debate over the appropriate form of the citizen’s stake, advocacy of a 
CI, as opposed to a CG, seems to rest much more easily with the first, Millian view of how 
we appropriately manifest our concern for freedom, than with the second, more Nozickian 
view. And, indeed, an appeal to a Millian paternalism plays an important role in Van Parijs’s 
argument for implementing the citizen’s stake as a CI rather than a CG.
20 As presented in his 
book, Real Freedom for All, Van Parijs’s case for a CI proceeds from the claim that each 
citizen has, in principle, a right to an equal share of certain external assets, notably ‘job 
assets’.
21 In practice, we cannot literally give people equal amounts of these assets, but we 
can equivalently give them each a sum of money equal to the per capita value of these assets, 
financed from a tax on their value; or, if the policy of strict equalization would have large 
disincentive effects, we can and should give each person the highest sustainable sum of 
money we can from the taxation of these assets. Van Parijs argues that this sum should be 
paid as a periodic and non-mortgageable income grant. But there is nothing in the logic of the 
external assets argument which implies the grant should be non-mortgageable. What 
considerations justify this stipulation? The non-mortgageability of the income grant means 
that it cannot be converted into a lump-sum and then ‘blown’. And, as Van Parijs 
acknowledges in Real Freedom for All
22, the obvious rationale for preventing this would 
seem to be a paternalistic one: specifically, to restrict people’s freedom to act in ways that 
would alienate the material basis of their freedom. In Van Parijs’s words:  
 
  ‘...a mildly paternalistic concern for people’s real freedom throughout their lives, not 
just ‘at the start’, makes it sensible to hand out the [citizen’s stake] in the form of a (non-
mortgageable) regular [income] stream - just as a mildly paternalistic concern for their formal 
freedom makes it reasonable to prohibit the permanent alienation of self-ownership...’
23 
 
  However, another way in which we might structure the citizen’s stake so as to reduce 
the likelihood that people will alienate the material basis of their freedom is, of course, to 
restrict the range of purposes for which citizens will be able to use an initial lump-sum grant. 
We can make it less likely that they will blow their grant, and thus endanger their future 
freedom, by insisting that the grant be used only for specific, developmental, asset-building 
purposes. The kind of freedom-preserving paternalism that I have said supports a CI over a 
simple one-off, lump-sum grant does not, in fact, point unequivocally toward CI as opposed 
to this third type of citizen’s stake which we might call a development grant.  
 
 
19 For relevant discussion, see Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Oxford, Polity, 2000), pp.155-193, especially 
pp.163-164.  
20 In view of Erik Olin Wright’s class-power argument for CI over CG, I am not sure that only an appeal to 
Millian paternalism will settle the issue in favour of CI. This is, however, the appeal that Van Parijs makes in 
his book, Real Freedom for All. See Erik Olin Wright, ‘Basic Income, Stakeholder Grants, and Class Analysis’, 
paper prepared for the Real Utopias conference, ‘Rethinking Redistribution: Designs for a More Egalitarian 
Capitalism’, A. E. Havens Center for the Study of Social Structure and Social Change, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, May 2-5, 2002. 
21 See Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All, especially pp.89-130. 
22 Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All, pp.45-48.  
23 Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All, pp.47-48. 
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  A number of proposals for this type of citizen’s stake have been made in recent years. 
One example is the scheme recently proposed in Britain by David Nissan and Julian Le 
Grand.
24 They propose that all citizens be endowed on maturity with a grant of some £10,000 
which would go into an individual Accumulation of Capital and Education (‘ACE’) account, 
financed from a revamped inheritance tax. Each ACE account ‘would be handled by a set of 
trustees, whose purpose would be to approve the spending plans of individuals before 
releasing any capital.’
25 Nissan and Le Grand mention education, training, business start-up 
costs, and housing down-payments as possible approved uses for the grant. This proposal has 
much in common with Robert Haveman’s earlier proposal for a ‘universal personal capital 
account for youths’.
26 Development grants have also been proposed in recent books by 
Roberto Unger and Cornel West
27 and by Ted Halstead and Michael Lind.
28 Halstead and 
Lind propose giving every newborn citizen of the United States a grant of $6,000 ‘as a 
downpayment on a productive life’. As with the CTF proposed by the British government, 
the sum would be invested and would grow as the child matures. On reaching adulthood, ‘the 
use of these special trust funds would be restricted to various types of personal investments, 
such as: paying for the costs of higher education or vocational training, putting a down 
payment on a first home, covering serious health emergencies, or starting a legitimate 
business.’
29 
 
6.   Is paternalism justified? 
 
  Let us now briefly recap. We have seen, firstly, that the alienation objection to the 
idea of a citizen’s stake (in the form of a CG) is a genuine objection, one which cannot be 
defused by invoking a distinction between choice-based and brute luck disadvantage, 
especially in the circumstances of societies like our own in which an individual’s capacity to 
manage assets effectively is so influenced by class background. Secondly, there would seem 
to be two ways of reducing the problem to which the objection points: education and 
paternalism. The first approach will lead us to concentrate on developing strong ‘preventive’ 
social policies to complement a citizen’s stake. The second approach will incline us to 
restructure the citizen’s stake itself, moving away from the CG model towards a CI or, 
perhaps, toward what I have termed a development grant. Two further questions must now be 
considered: 
 
24 See David Nissan and Julian Le Grand, A Capital Idea: Start-up Grants for Young People (London, Fabian 
Society, 2000). 
25 Nissan and Le Grand, Capital Idea, pp.12-13. 
26 See Robert Haveman, Starting Even: An Equal Opportunity Program to Combat the Nation’s New Poverty 
(New York, Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp.168-171. 
27 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Cornel West, The Future of American Progressivism: An Initiative for 
Political and Economic Reform (Boston, Beacon Press, 1998), p.62. Unger and West write: ‘American 
democracy should work toward the generalization of a principle of social inheritance. Everyone should be able 
to count on a minimum of resources. These resources are the tools of self-reliance, not an alternative to self-
reliance. People should have a social-endowment account so that society can do for everyone a little bit of what 
family inheritance does for a few. At major moments in their lives - when they go to college, make a down 
payment on a house, or open a business - they should be able to draw on this account.’ I interpret Unger and 
West to mean that the account should be geared specifically to these investment purposes, though, strictly 
speaking, what they say here does not rule out use of the account for other purposes. 
28 See Ted Halstead and Michael Lind, The Radical Center: The Future of American Politics (New York, 
Doubleday, 2001), p.101.  
29 Halstead and Lind, The Radical Center, p.101. They estimate that their proposed scheme would cost $24 
billion annually.  
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  (1) Would adoption of the first, educational approach render unimportant the second, 
paternalist approach? 
 
  (2) To the extent that the paternalist approach retains relevance, do we have good 
reason to prefer a CI to a development grant or vice versa? 
 
  As regards the first question, there is no doubt that the absence of the educational 
measures associated with the first approach makes the paternalist measures associated with 
the second approach much more urgent. However, even if educational measures of the 
relevant kind are in place, I am not sure that the case for a supplementary paternalism 
evaporates. As Gerald Dworkin points out in an influential article on paternalism, just about 
everyone is capable of moments of irrationality or weakness of will in which they commit 
themselves to courses of action that risk tragic and irreversible consequences. Even the solid, 
sensible middle-class citizen, as it were, can make a fatal decision not to wear a seat-belt in 
the car, or a safety-helmet when inspecting a building site.
30 In this article, Dworkin suggests 
that solid, sensible citizens will be aware of this potentially tragic fallibility on their part, and, 
wishing to protect themselves against it, may well desire various kinds of paternalistic 
intervention as a kind of insurance policy against their less rational, weaker selves. This leads 
to the following thought: a given paternalistic intervention is justifiable if it commands what 
one might call, with apologies to Rousseau, a prudential general will. That is, a given 
paternalistic intervention is justifiable if it is a restriction that all citizens would agree to, 
when in a state of sober reflection on what really conduces to their own individual good, as a 
way of insuring themselves against individual weaknesses of rationality and/or will that 
might have significantly bad and irreversible consequences for their own welfare or 
freedom.
31 The intervention is then something which supports people in the pursuit of their 
goals, rather than an alien imposition on them.
32 
  Viewed in this light, the case for a supplementary paternalism in the design of 
citizen’s stake policies does not seem unreasonable. Some paternalistic restrictions can surely 
be defended as restrictions that citizens would impose on themselves as an insurance policy 
 
30 For an excellent discussion of these problems, see Michael Lewis, ‘Perhaps There Can be Too Much 
Freedom’, paper prepared for the Real Utopias conference, ‘Rethinking Redistribution: Designs for a More 
Egalitarian Capitalism’, A. E. Havens Center for the Study of Social Structure and Social Change, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, May 2-5, 2002. 
31 See Gerald Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’, in Richard Wasserstrom, ed., Morality and the Law (Belmont: CA, 
Wadsworth, 1971), pp.107-126, especially pp.120-123.  
32 The idea of a prudential general will probably has to be qualified to some extent. In any given case, it is 
possible that a minority has values such that they would reject a proposed paternalistic intervention even in the 
state of sober, considered judgement we here imagine - for example, a religious group might regard the wearing 
of seat belts in cars as contrary to God’s will. Can paternalistic measures still be justified in view of the possible 
burden to such minorities? Adopting a Rawlsian approach to the question, we might ask whether parties in an 
original position, behind a veil of ignorance, would consent to a degree of paternalism as a way of protecting 
their long-term interests given this risk of burden. I think that a reasonable balancing of interests by parties in 
the original position would suggest something like a principle of supermajoritarian paternalism: measures are 
justified if a sufficiently large majority regard the measures as restrictions they would consent to in a state of 
considered judgement. The parties might also consider supplementary principles, such as one aimed at 
compensating minorities for their burdens based on how costly it is for members of the minority groups to 
pursue their goals as a result paternalistic measures. I do not think the parties would choose a complete rejection 
of paternalism, for that would be to give effectively no weight to their very real interest in being able to enact 
laws to protect themselves against their fallible selves. For Rawls’s own discussion of the issue, see John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge: MA, Harvard University Press, 1999 [1971]), pp.218-
220. 
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against the stakeblowing potential of periods of irrationality and/or weakness of will. Van 
Parijs, we should note, explicitly invokes the prudential general will idea in defending the 
‘mildly paternalistic’ CI option over the alternative of a CG. He writes that the justification 
for preferring a CI ‘...consists in assuming a universal desire on people’s part, when ‘in their 
right minds’, to protect their real freedom at older ages against weakness of their will at 
younger ages and to do so pretty homogeneously throughout their lifetimes.’
33 Ackerman and 
Alstott are not as far removed from this position, moreover, as they might at first sight 
appear. As noted above, their proposal is not, in fact, for a CG pure and simple, but for a 
hybrid form of citizen’s stake which combines a CG on maturity with an age-related CI (a 
‘citizen’s pension’ for which people are eligible at age sixty five). They insist that citizens 
not be allowed to capitalize their citizen’s pension entitlements when young.
34 People in their 
youth cannot be expected to have a full appreciation of the interests of their aged selves, so 
far into the future, and so, they argue, we are justified in ring-fencing the citizen’s pension 
from the ambitions of youth. This specific paternalistically-motivated qualification of the CG 
proposal in its simplest form is perfectly plausible, but, by itself, it leaves individuals with a 
very large chunk of their lives in which to suffer the freedom-scuppering consequences of 
youthful irrationality and/or weakness of will. Given this fact, I find it no less plausible to 
think that additional paternalistically-motivated departures from the pure and simple CG 
proposal would command a prudential general will.  
 
7.  The case for a hybrid stake incorporating a development grant 
 
  Turning now to our second question, if we were to move in a more paternalistic 
direction, which direction should it be? Should we move in the direction of a CI, in which 
citizens receive their stake as a non-mortgageable income stream, or in the direction of a 
development grant, in which citizens receive their stake as capital but subject to restrictions 
on how they may use their capital? I am not sure that either option, taken by itself, could 
command a prudential general will. On the one hand, I find it implausible that citizens - that 
is, the sober, sensible citizens whom we imagine as formulating this prudential general will - 
would really want to give up the option of starting their working life with an account that 
they can use for important investment purposes, as, presumably, they would if they were to 
choose to take their citizen’s stake wholly in the form of a non-mortgageable CI. On the other 
hand, I find it no less implausible that such citizens would want to tie all of their stake up in a 
grant that can be accessed only for major investment purposes. Someone who is soberly, 
sensibly looking ahead, as we imagine these citizens to be, will anticipate not only 
investment needs that should be catered for, but also possible emergency needs that ought to 
be catered for. By emergency needs, I mean needs that have to do with the management of 
periods of crisis and transition in one’s life, e.g., after the break-up of a marriage or following 
the loss of a job or the death of a loved one. These are situations in which we may be 
particularly vulnerable, emotionally and often also economically, and so at particular risk of 
dependency. To help cope with these needs, and to minimize the economic pressures 
generated by such situations, citizens may wish to keep a portion of their stake as cash that 
they can access unconditionally, i.e., as something more like a CI or a CG than a 
development grant.  
 
  These points suggest that we should give more thought to possible hybrid forms of 
citizen’s stake. One possibility, which speaks to the investment and emergency needs that 
 
33 Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All, p.47. 
34 See Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society, pp.133-142. 
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sober, prudential citizens like those depicted above will anticipate, is to establish a universal 
citizen’s account which combines a generous development grant with what I have elsewhere 
termed a time-limited citizen’s income. A time-limited CI is an income grant that one can 
choose to draw on without satisfying a work-test (or means-test) but which can only be 
enjoyed for a fixed number of years (one, two, three?) over the whole course of one’s 
working life. For example, individuals might have a right to draw up to a maximum of 
£20,000 in CI over the course of a working-life, with, perhaps, a maximum of £8,000 
drawable in any given year. A time-limited CI of this kind - obviously the figures I cite are 
purely illustrative - could then be combined with a capital grant of, say, £30,000 initial value, 
which citizens would be free to use for specified investment purposes such as higher 
education, vocational training, setting up a new business, and so on. The development grant 
speaks to anticipated investment needs; the time-limited CI to anticipated emergency needs. 
Prudently managed, a time-limited CI could provide individuals with crucial financial 
independence in periods of difficulty which might otherwise expose them to dependency. I 
would not claim, of course, to have demonstrated here the unique desirability of this hybrid 
type of citizen’s stake. But, having once admitted paternalistic considerations into the 
analysis (at least along the lines proposed in Dworkin’s influential article), I think it has some 
clear strengths that make it preferable to either the pure CI or pure CG models.
35  
 
  Having said that, one must acknowledge that the proposal to implement the stake in 
part as a development grant, rather than as a CG or wholly as a CI, is subject to some forceful 
objections. For one thing, the development grant is likely to be more costly to administer than 
a CI or a CG; it costs resources to monitor that the stake is being used for the approved 
investment purposes.
36 Because of this some might object that it would be irrational of 
citizens to prefer this type of stake to a simple CG or CI. Why pour some of your precious 
stake into bureaucrats’ salaries when you could take it as extra cash in hand? 
 
  There are, I think, two replies to this objection. Firstly, while the administrative costs 
are real, and imply that citizens will have to pay a price for taking their stake as a 
development grant, we must not forget that according to the argument made above citizens 
also stand to gain some benefit from taking the stake in this form: the benefit of of being able 
to access directly a large portion of their stake for investment purposes while also being 
protected from the possibility of stakeblowing. If citizens value this benefit enough, then they 
may be quite willing to pay the price implicit in taking the stake as a development grant. It is 
not necessarily irrational to invest a portion of the stake in the sort of monitoring 
arrangements associated with the development grant if one values the combination of 
investment freedom and insurance against stakeblowing that this provides: the accessible 
cash value of the stake is lower, but there may be an offsetting welfare gain. Secondly, we 
should consider how the restrictions associated with the development grant will affect 
behaviour and economic outcomes, and, thereby, the sustainable level of the stake itself. 
Imagine, for example, that the effect of taking the stake as a development grant, rather than 
 
35 I should add that I think a hybrid citizen’s stake with a similar struture can also be defended on non-
paternalistic grounds, as a way of balancing justice-related concerns for freedom and reciprocity. I have 
developed this argument in another paper, ‘Freedom, Reciprocity, and the Citizen’s Stake’, in Keith Dowding, 
Jurgen De Wispelaere, and Stuart White, eds., The Ethics of Stakeholding (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 
forthcoming), and available from the author on request. 
36 In discussion at the conference for which this paper was originally written, Julian Le Grand indicated that 
monitoring the use of development grants for the purpose of establishing a new business was particularly tricky, 
and that this problem had discouraged the British government from structuring the Child Trust Fund on the 
model of a development grant. 
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as a pure CG, is to raise the level of investment in human capital, and that this, in turn, lowers 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment, or raises the rate of growth of the economy. As a 
result, it may be possible to sustain the stake at a higher overall level so that, even after 
allowing for higher administrative costs, the accessible cash value of the stake to the citizen 
is as great under the development grant option as under a pure CG. Of course, it is hard to 
judge the strength of these replies without hard data on the relevant administrative costs, on 
citizens’ considered, self-regarding valuations of the benefits of the development grant, and 
on the aggregate economic impact of development grants relative to other forms of citizen’s 
stake. But I think these replies suffice to show that the administrative costs objection to 
taking the stake (at least in part) as a development grant is not necessarily decisive.
37 
 
  A second forceful objection to the development grant proposal focuses on 
‘stakelosers’ as opposed to stakeblowers. Whereas stakeblowers use their stakes in imprudent 
ways, stakelosers use their stakes in ex ante sensible ways, but just have bad luck in their 
investment decisions, e.g., use their stake to purchase training in skills that become outmoded 
in a way that could not reasonably have been anticipated.  Taking the stake as a development 
grant will insure you against stakeblowing, but not against stakelosing. By contrast, taking 
the state as a CI will also insure you against the freedom-scuppering consequences of 
stakelosing. Doesn’t this suggest that the sober, sensible citizens we have thus far imagined, 
concerned to protect their long-term interests, should lean more toward the CI option that the 
development grant? In reply, one can say that while there is, in this respect, a greater degree 
of risk attached the development grant option, there is also something intrinsically attractive 
about taking the stake as a capital grant, immediately available for major investment 
purposes, and citizens will naturally wish to strike a balance between this consideration and 
the risks attendant upon taking the stake as some form of capital grant. The possibility of 
stakelosing reinforces the point that prudent citizens will probably not want to take all of 
their stake as a development grant rather than a CI, but this does not mean that they would or, 
as prudent people, should elect to take all of their stake as a CI to the exclusion of a 
development grant. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
  I have argued that we should give attention to hybrid forms of citizen’s stake which 
combine capital grants and CI components. And I have argued that in thinking about hybrids, 
we should give attention to development grants as well as pure capital grants of the kind 
proposed by Ackerman and Alstott. One possibility I have suggested is to combine a 
development grant with a modest, time-limited CI. Even with a citizen’s stake of this kind, 
however, it will be far from impossible for people to blow their stakes and so alienate the 
material basis of their freedom. People could squander their time-limited CI so that no 
entitlement remains when they most need it. People could draw their development grants for 
ill-chosen educational purposes, or to finance ill-considered business ventures. They might 
use the grant to help buy a house, then sell the house, and lose the proceeds on a foolish 
gamble. This is one reason why I envisage a stake of this kind functioning alongside more 
 
37 A further point to bear in mind concerns the degree to which there are administrative economies in 
stakeholder schemes: that is to say, the extent to which the cost of administering a single dollar of a 
development grant varies with the level of the grant. If there are economies of scale in the sense that the unit 
administrative cost falls as the average grant level rises, then the relative desirability of taking some of the stake 
as a development grant may increase as the generosity of the grant increases. Citizens may quite reasonably feel 
that it not worth paying, say, twenty five cents to administer each dollar of a very modest development grant, 
but that it is worth paying, say, five cents to administer each dollar of a large development grant.  
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conventional welfare state policies, and not as a full replacement for them.
38 And it is also 
why, in closing, I think it important to stress once more the importance of the educational 
response to the alienation objection, the response which calls for an effort to cultivate the 
asset management capacity of citizens.  
 
  To some on the left, this will doubtless seem a nauseating prospect, an aspiration to 
turn every child into a good little bourgeois. If, however, we are aiming, in the name of 
freedom, at what John Rawls calls a property-owning democracy
39, then we must indeed 
aspire to a society in which citizens have the characteristic skills and virtues of property-
owners (or at least those skills and virtues of property-owners that are necessary for the long-
term reproduction of personal freedom). In the long-run, it may be that the relevant skills and 
virtues will percolate through a ‘stakeholder society’ without the need for a conscious state 
policy aimed at cultivating these skills and virtues. But in the circumstances of our societies 
today, there is arguably a need for a strong proactive policy in this area to combat the 
existing link between the capacity for asset management and social class. To this extent, 
while redistribution is essential to the goal of a free society, it may well not be enough. 
 
 
                                                 
38 See Will Paxton, ‘Assets: a third pillar of welfare’, in Sue Regan, ed., Assets and Progressive Welfare 
(London, Institute for Public Policy Research, 2001), pp.17-33. 
39 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, pp.xiv-xvi, and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 
(Cambridge: MA, Harvard University Press, 2001), pp.135-140. 4 
Basic Income, Stakeholder Grants, and Class Analysis 
Erik Olin Wright 
 
 
At the core of the class analysis of capitalist society in both the Marxian and Weberian traditions 
is a simple idea: workers are separated from the means of production and, by virtue of that, from 
their means of subsistence. As a result, they must enter the labor market and seek employment in 
order to acquire the means of life. This double separation – from the means of production and the 
means of subsistence – is the material basis for the basic power imbalance between capital and 
labor in capitalism: workers must sell their labor power in order to live and thus, ultimately, are 
forced to accept terms of exchange and working conditions which they would not if they had 
viable options.
1 
 
  This characterization of the power imbalance in the core class relations of capitalism is 
generally associated with Marxist class analysis, but the same basic idea is present in Weber as 
well. Weber writes that for workers in a capitalist economy:  
 
....the inclination to work [depends on] the probability that unsatisfactory performance  
will have an adverse effect on earnings....[This] presupposes [that] the expropriation of 
the workers from the means of production by owners is protected by force” (Weber 1922 
[1978]: 151).....  willingness to work on the part of factory labor has been primarily 
determined by a combination of the transfer of responsibility for maintenance to the 
workers personally and the corresponding powerful indirect compulsion to work, as 
symbolized in the English workhouse system, and it has permanently remained oriented 
to the compulsory guarantee of the property system. (Weber 1922 [1978]: 153) 
 
  In the Marxist tradition, two of the central indictments of capitalism stem from this class  
relation: first, workers are exploited because they must work harder and longer for capitalists 
than is needed simply to provide for their own standard of living; and second, they are alienated 
because they enter into employment relations within which they are deprived of power over both 
their laboring activities and the fruits of that activity. Both of these properties of the class 
relations of capitalism are rooted in the core power imbalance that accompanies private 
ownership of the means of production in capitalism. These indictments of capitalism are not, in 
                                                 
1 The claim that this relation is properly described as embodying a “power imbalance” may be contentious to some 
economists, since many economists see the labor exchange as a purely voluntary contract within which power is 
absent. Capitalists do not really have power over workers, the arguments go, because workers are always free to quit 
if they do not like what they are told to do. The counter-argument is that the capitalist ownership of the means of 
production is backed by force in the form of state-enforced property rights, and this gives them effective power over 
workers given the basic scarcity of capital and the necessity for workers to seek employment from some employer. 
For contemporary discussions of the power dimension of the relation between labor and capital that are addressed to 
the skepticism of neoclassical economists, see Bowles and Gintis (1990) and Bartlett (1989). Chapter 4. Basic Income, Stakeholders Grants, and Class Analysis 
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the first instance, claims about injustices in capitalism. They are claims about how a particular 
form of class relations imposes harms on people. The thesis is that the lives of most people 
would go better if the exploitation and alienation generated by private ownership of the means of 
production were reduced or eliminated.
2 
 
  The traditional Marxist remedy for this power imbalance was socialism. Socialism 
reunited workers with the means of production – and thus with their means of subsistence – in 
the form of collective ownership of the means of production organized through state. This, it was 
thought, would end capitalist exploitation, since workers would democratically control the 
surplus generated by production, and it would end alienation, since workers would control the 
conditions of production. 
3 
 
  Critics of the power imbalances of capitalist class relations are now much less sanguine 
about the possibility of comprehensive socialism as a solution to the harms generated by 
capitalist relations.
4 While the historic experience of the Soviet Union is not decisive proof of the 
impossibility of comprehensive economic planning, it now seems to most critics of capitalism 
that markets cannot be dispensed with, and thus alternatives to “actually existing capitalism” 
need to be compatible with well-functioning market institutions. 
 
 
                                                
In this theoretical and normative context, both Stakeholder Grants and Unconditional 
Basic Income (UBI) can be thought of as strategies of potentially transforming class relations 
within capitalism in ways that partially counteract the power imbalances of those relations.
5 Both 
of these proposals accept the basic economic framework of capitalist society – private ownership 
 
2 It may also be the case, of course, that issues of justice and fairness are closely linked to these indictments of 
capitalist class relations. The language of “exploitation” certainly has a connotation of injustice even if, on closer 
inspection, it is not a simple manner to link a class analytic concept of exploitation to philosophically rigorous 
understandings of justice.   
3 Socialism was also seen as a remedy for a third traditional Marxist indictment of capitalism: the “anarchy of the 
market” in capitalism generates various forms of waste, inefficiency and negative externalities. Socialism, as a 
system of democratic economic planning, was thought to be a solution to these macro-economic problems as well as 
the micro-economic issues of exploitation and alienation in the lives of workers.  
4 By “comprehensive socialism” I mean an economy within which private ownership of the means of production has 
been largely abolished and markets have been replaced with democratic planning as the basis for economic 
regulation and coordination. One can, of course, be a skeptic of comprehensive socialism and remain a socialist 
critic of capitalism. The problem then becomes thinking through the ways in which socialist elements can be infused 
into capitalist relations in ways which neutralize the power imbalances of capitalism. Whether the limits on such a 
process mean that the amalgam in an optimal institutional equilibrium would be more socialistic or capitalistic is not 
something, I believe, which can be known in advance of institutional experiments. 
5  In one of the earliest systematic defenses of basic income, Philippe van Parijs and Robert Van der Veen (1985) 
characterized unconditional basic income as “A Capitalist Road to Communism” which would by-pass socialism as 
a way of neutralizing the undesirable consequences of capitalist class relations for individual autonomy and 
freedom. 
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of the means of production, robust markets, investment driven by profit maximization, and so on. 
Both of these proposals see the efficiency properties of markets as sufficiently important that any 
redistributive project must operate within constraints imposed by well-functioning markets. But 
both proposals also believe that quite substantial redistribution is possible within these 
constraints. What I will argue is that while both of these proposals, if sufficiently generous, 
would impact the power imbalances of capitalist class relations, basic income does so in a way 
which is likely to have more profound consequences for the character of class relations in 
capitalist society. This is not a claim that with respect to the arguments of liberal-egalitarian 
theories of justice basic income better satisfies principles of justice than do stakeholder grants, 
nor is it a claim that on pragmatic grounds basic income is either more efficient or more 
politically feasible than stakeholder grants. These are important issues, but I will not address 
them. What I will try to show is that with respect to the goal of redressing the power imbalance 
between labor and capital, basic income is likely to have more profound effects than stakeholder 
grants. 
 
  Stakeholder grants give each citizen, upon reaching the age of adulthood, a lump-sum 
grant of assets that they can use for any purpose they choose. Ackerman and Alstott propose that 
this stake be $80,000. From the point of view of its impact on class relations, the critical issue is 
whether the stake is sufficiently large to enable the recipient to realistically begin a small 
business (perhaps by leveraging additional funds from credit institutions).
6 If the stake makes 
this possible, then it effectively makes it possible for workers to acquire their own “means of 
production” thus potentially breaking their dependency on selling their labor power in order to 
acquire their means of subsistence. Unconditional Basic Income gives each person a monthly 
stipend sufficiently high to live at what might be considered the no-frills respectable economic 
level. It thus challenges the power imbalance within class relations of capitalist economies by 
directly reuniting people with the means of subsistence rather than with the means of production 
needed to generate their means of subsistence. 
 
 
                                                
In one sense, of course, basic income and stakeholder grants are convertible one into the 
other: If a person put the $80,000 stake into a low-risk account of some sort that yielded 6% 
return a year, then in about 20 years it would yield an income of over $1000/month. Similarly, if 
a person received a basic income and simply saved it in a low-risk account while continuing to 
work in the ordinary labor market then eventually it would become a stake. The difference, then, 
between the two programs is that in a basic income system you are guaranteed a flow of 
resources, but must take initiative and wait to acquire a stake, whereas in a stakeholder grant 
system you are guaranteed a stake, but must take initiative and wait to acquire an income. 
 
6 In Ackerman and Alstott’s proposal, the central rationale for stakeholder grants is to remedy as much as possible a 
problem of inequality of opportunity generated by the fact that some young adults receive substantial inter-
generational transfers of wealth and others – the large majority – do not. While using the assets from a stakeholder 
grant to underwrite self-employment is one of the uses to which the grants can be put, people are free to use the 
opportunity afforded by the grant in any way they see fit. 
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  In the discussion that follows I will bracket the question of the economic feasibility of 
either a system of stakeholder grant or basic income. In both cases this obviously depends upon 
the level of generosity of the program. I will assume that the sustainable level of stakeholder 
grants is sufficiently high to make self-employment a feasible option for virtually everyone and 
that the monthly stipend of a basic income is sufficiently high to provide for culturally 
acceptable modest standard of living. The question, then, is which of these would, in the long 
run, have the deepest ramifications for class relations in capitalism. 
 
Stakeholder grants 
 
Being one’s own boss is certainly a core aspiration of many workers in the United States. In my 
1980 comparative class analysis survey, 58% of employees in the United States (66% of male 
employees and 47% of female employees) say that they would like to be self-employed someday 
(Wright: 1997: 116).
7 Stakeholder grants would certainly increase the proportion of employees 
who would attempt this, and probably the proportion who would succeed as well. So, generous 
stakeholder grants are likely to have some real impact on capitalist class structures: a higher 
proportion of the population will be able to “be their own boss” in a capitalism with stakeholder 
grants than in one without. 
 
 
                                                
Nevertheless, there are three main reasons why one would expect that the overall impact 
of stakeholder grants on the power imbalances of capitalist class relations to be relatively 
modest. First, a certain proportion of recipients of stakeholder grants will simply use the grants 
for short-run enhanced consumption. From the point of view of the equal opportunity rationale of 
stakeholder grants this is perhaps unfortunate, but it is not a fundamental problem. The premise 
of the stakeholder grant program is that people should have the opportunity to take responsibility 
for their own futures and that giving people a stake significantly equalizes this opportunity. If 
some people are imprudent, this does not undermine the “starting gate equality” objectives of 
stakeholder grants.  Still, it does reduce the impact of stakes on class structure.  
 
  Second, a very high proportion of small businesses fail, typically within a year. There is 
little reason to assume that there will be a higher success rate in businesses started by young 
adults with stakeholder grants than currently exists among people who start small businesses out 
of their savings, and perhaps reasons to expect a higher failure rate (because of inexperience). In 
any case, most people who attempt to create small businesses with their stakes will fail. This 
does not mean, of course, that the equal-opportunity rationale of stakeholder grants is vacuous – 
 
7 The proportions of male and female workers – rather than all employees – who would like to be self-employed in 
the United States are virtually the same as for all employees: 66% of male workers and 46% of female workers in 
the US report that they would like to be self-employed.. The proportions of employees  in other countries who want 
to be selfemployed are generally much lower than in the US: 49% in Canada, 40% in Sweden, 31% in Japan, and 
20% in Norway. 
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the opportunity to fail is an inherent feature of the opportunity to compete in a market economy. 
But it does limit the breadth of the impact on relations of class power of stakeholder grants. 
 
  Third, even for those small business which succeed, many will exist within various kinds 
of social relations that subordinate them to capital through credit markets or contractual relations 
such as franchises, suppliers, subcontractors and so on. This does not imply that the situation of a 
self-employed person in a small business embedded in such relations is no different from that of 
an ordinary worker: self-employment still gives most people some measure of real autonomy. 
Still, for many people, being self-employed only modestly equalizes the power relations to 
capital within which they gain a living. 
         
Basic Income 
 
A generous, unconditional basic income which would allow employees a meaningful exit option 
from the employment relation directly transforms the character of power within the class 
relations of capitalist society. First, in a capitalism with basic income people are free to engage in 
noncommodified forms of socially-productive activity, that is, productive activity which is not 
oriented towards the market.  There is a wide range of activities which many people want to do 
but which are badly organized by either capitalist markets or public institutions. Prominent 
among these is care-giving labor – of children, of the elderly, and in many situations, of the ill. 
Noncommodified forms of engagement in the arts, in politics and in various kinds of community 
service would also be facilitated by UBI. Frequently people with serious interests in these kinds 
of activities would be willing to do them at relatively modest earnings if they were provided 
through markets – witness the very low standards of living accepted (if reluctantly) by actors, 
musicians, political activists, and community organizers. The problem for many people is not so 
much the low earnings, but the inability to find employment in these kinds of activities. 
Unconditional Basic Income makes it possible for people to choose to do this kind of activity 
without having to enter into an employment relation. It this way it contributes to a shift in the 
balance of power within class relations. 
 
  Second, for those people who still enter into ordinary capitalist employment relations, 
UBI would contribute to a greater symmetry of power between labor and capital even in the 
absence of collective organization on the part of workers. This would be particularly salient for 
workers in low-skilled, low wage jobs. Often workers in such jobs suffer both from low wages 
and from miserable working conditions. The realistic exit options of low wage workers under a 
UBI system would increase their bargaining power with employers. Of course, this might mean 
that many such low-skill jobs would disappear, but since many low-skilled people will still want 
discretionary income above the no-frills UBI level, there will still be potential workers willing to 
take such jobs. The difference is that balance of power within which the attributes of such jobs 
are determined would be shifted towards workers. 
 
  Third, an Unconditional Basic Income could also contribute in various ways to increasing 
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the collective strength of workers, not just their individual leverage within employment relations. 
One of the factors which defines the context for the formation of working class collective 
organization is the extent to which unions help employers solve various kinds of problems. As 
has been noted in discussions of union density, there seem to be two equilibria in these terms: 
capitalism appears to operate best under either high union density or low union density 
(Calmfors and Driffill,1988; Wright, 2000). One of the contexts in which high union density is 
advantageous for employers is when there are chronically tight labor markets. In such situations, 
employers face the problem of escalating wages as firms bid up wages to poach employed 
workers from other firms. From the point of view of individual workers such wage escalation 
might seem like a good thing in the short run, but if this bidding process mean that wages rise 
more rapidly than productivity, then in the longer run this is unsustainable and leads to a general 
destabilization of capitalist labor markets. In these contexts, then, a strong labor movement can 
enforce wage-restraint on employers and workers in exchange for greater economic security and 
a more stable economic setting for productivity-enhancing technical change. 
 
  Unconditional Basic Income generates some of the same pressures as tight labor markets 
and thus may lead employers to be more receptive to the high union density equilibrium. Where 
workers individually have easier exit options, employers may have greater incentives to agree to 
new forms of collective cooperation with organizations of workers. Such collective cooperation 
is an element in what is sometimes called “high road” capitalism, a model of capitalism in which 
labor and capital engage in much closer collaboration over the design and regulation of work, 
production and innovation than is characteristic of conventional capitalist organization in which 
employers have more or less unilateral control over basic production decisions. Such closer 
collaboration, if it is stably institutionalized, constitutes a relative equalization of power within 
capitalist class relations. Insofar as UBI makes such a high cooperation equilibrium more 
feasible, therefore, it contributes to a shift in the balance of class power towards workers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Taking these considerations together, if it is economically sustainable, Unconditional Basic 
Income seems likely to underwrite a set of social and institutional changes which more 
profoundly reshape the power relations of capitalism than will a program of stakeholder grants. 
The argument for basic income, in these terms, is more like a public goods argument than a 
simple individual social justice argument, since changes in power relations affect the overall 
dynamics and conditions everyone experiences in a society not simply those immediately party 
to the power relation. Let me explain.  
 
  The ideal of “Equality of opportunity”, as it is conceived in much liberal egalitarian 
discussion of justice, involves trying to distinguish between those conditions of life for which 
people can reasonably be held responsible and those for which they cannot. Social justice 
requires trying to minimize those inequalities outside of individual control, and redistribution is 
one way of accomplishing this. Both UBI and stakeholder grants can be defended as significant 
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steps the direction of remedying unjust failures of such equality of opportunity. On these 
grounds, in fact, some people might prefer generous a stakeholder grant system to UBI insofar as 
it might be thought as better embodying the responsibility ideal of equal opportunity. In some 
ways UBI looks like a paternalistic program in which, to avoid the risk of individuals 
squandering redistributed resources, the state doles out a stipend to people rather than giving 
them a single, large lump-sum payment. In a UBI program people can still squander their BI, but 
they can only do so one month at a time. If avoiding paternalism is a high priority within a 
conception of equality of opportunity, and if equality of opportunity is the central justification 
for redistribution, then stakeholder grants might be preferred over UBI. 
 
  The defense of UBI offered here is not, however, primarily about social justice as such. It 
is about creating the conditions under which a stable move towards more equal power within 
class relations can be achieved. The issue of equality of power has strong public goods features. 
Consider another context in which we worry about equality of power: the right to vote. We don’t 
allow people to sell their right to vote to anyone even though many people would want to do so if 
given the opportunity and there surely would be market for such sales if they were permitted. It 
could be argued that this too is paternalism: the state prevents people from engaging in a 
voluntary transaction in order to prevent them from doing things which, in the long run, would 
cause harms. The justification for this prohibition is not simply that it would ultimately harmful 
to the particular persons who sell their right to vote in the same sense that taking an addictive 
drug might be harmful. Rather the argument is that selling votes would undermine democracy 
and be harmful even to those who did not sell their votes: it would be harmful because of the 
concentrations of power that a free market in votes would create and this, ultimately undermines 
the political ideal of political equality of citizens. Legal prohibitions on the selling of votes 
therefore is defended above all because of a judgement about the collective consequences of 
alternative distributions of power within our political institutions. 
 
  Power within class relations have some of these same public goods qualities. And in 
these terms, a relatively generous universal basic income – if it were sustainable – is likely to 
contribute to an equalization of such class power more than a generous lump-sum grant to young 
adults. The monthly flow of income that is an essential part of UBI, therefore, is not simply a 
form of paternalism designed to prevent individuals from squandering their resources, but a way 
of insuring the stability of the social process by which power relations are shifted. 
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Democratizing Citizenship: 
Some Advantages of a Basic Income 
Carole Pateman 
 
 
The essays by Philippe Van Parijs on basic income and Bruce Ackerman and Anne 
Alstott on a stake (or capital grant) contain very valuable insights into both these ideas. 
They also provide arguments about feasibility and the best way to present stakeholding or 
a basic income to gain public support. I am going to focus on the reasons for advocating a 
basic income, and how a theoretical argument for it should be framed. By a “basic 
income” I am referring to the payment of a regular sum by a government to each 
individual (citizen) over an adult life-time, with no conditions attached. “A stake” means 
a one-time unconditional capital grant from a government to all individuals (citizens) at, 
say, age 21.
1  
 
My view is that in the current political climate in the United States and Britain a 
stake is likely to prove more acceptable to public opinion than a basic income. The Blair 
government in Britain has already committed itself to a variant of stakeholding, the Baby 
Bond. Under this proposal the government will open a capital account for each child at 
birth, to be available with the accrued interest when the child is eighteen. A basic income 
stands more chance of being introduced in Europe where, as Van Parijs illustrates in his 
essay, income support policies have already moved in a direction where a basic income, 
albeit probably of a partial character, could be seen as a logical “next step”.  
 
Stakeholding, I agree, would be an advance over current arrangements in the 
United States and in Britain. But which is to be preferred; a capital grant or a basic 
income?  
 
The answer to that question depends upon the reasons why each of these ideas is 
being advocated. All ideas and policies are invariably put forward for a variety of 
different reasons and involve different hopes about what might be achieved. The reasons 
that eventually become most prominent in public debate then help shape practical 
outcomes. All human activities have unintended and unforeseen consequences, so we 
cannot be certain of the results of introducing either a basic income or stakeholding, not 
least since a great deal hinges on the level of the income or capital grant. But because the 
direction of change depends, among other things, on the reasons why the change is 
advocated and what it is expected to achieve, the manner in which the theoretical case is 
made for a basic income or a stake is crucial. 
 
I became interested in the idea of a basic income some years ago for two main 
reasons. First, because of the part that basic income could play in furthering 
                     
1  I am focusing on adults and citizens here; a more complete account would also discuss non-citizen 
residents and children. 
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democratization, i.e. the creation of a more democratic society in which individual 
freedom and citizenship are of equal worth for everyone. The second, and closely related, 
reason is because of its potential in advancing women’s freedom. My argument is that in 
light of these reasons a basic income is preferable to a stake. A basic income is a crucial 
part of any strategy for democratic social change because, unlike a capital grant, it could 
help break the long-standing link between income and employment, and end the mutual 
reinforcement of the institutions of marriage, employment, and citizenship. In the early 
twentieth century, Bertram Pickard declared that a state bonus (a forerunner of a basic 
income) “must be deemed the monetary equivalent of the right to land, of the right to life 
and liberty” (1919, p. 21). My conception of the democratic significance of a basic 
income is in the spirit of Pickard’s statement. 
 
In what follows I will first outline the general case for Basic Income as a central 
component of a project of pervasive democratization and show why it better serves this 
end than does a capital stake. This will be followed by a discussion of how Basic Income 
potentially could impact on the specific problem of women’s freedom, particularly in 
terms of the forms of dependency women experience within households.  
 
he general case for Basic Income and Democratization 
 
My argument for a basic income shares the view of Van Parijs and Ackerman and 
Alstott that both a basic income and a stake expand individual freedom. However, our 
reasons for holding this view and our conceptions of individual freedom are very 
different. Basic income in Van Parijs’s Real Freedom for All and stakeholding in 
Ackerman and Alstott’s The Stakeholder Society are justified in terms of freedom as 
individual opportunity. Despite the many other differences between the form and content 
of their arguments, they agree about the conception of freedom to be promoted. I am 
concerned with another conception of freedom, individual freedom as self-government or 
autonomy, which I see as a political form and as central to democracy. In Real Freedom 
for All Van Parijs explicitly rejects any necessary connection between individual freedom 
and democracy; if there is a connection it is merely contingent (1995, pp8-9, 15-17).
2  
 
Individual freedom as autonomy or self-government has been neglected in the 
academic debates about stakeholding, but it is central to democracy. Modern (universal) 
democracy rests on the premise that individuals are born, or are naturally, free and are 
equal to each other. That is to say, they are self-governing or autonomous. If their self-
government is to be maintained they must become citizens with rights, and interact within 
institutions that further autonomy. In this conception, freedom includes not only 
individual economic (private) opportunities, and the opportunity to participate in 
collective self-government, but also individual autonomy. The latter tends to be 
overlooked, in part because “democracy” has become identified with collective (national) 
self-government, especially through “free and fair elections”. Other forms of government 
 
2  Van Parijs’ argument is libertarian, or, more exactly, a “real libertarian” argument that departs in some 
significant respects from typical libertarianism. I comment further on Van Parijs in Pateman, forthcoming. 
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that deny or limit individuals’ freedom fall out of the picture, such as government in 
marriage, or the workplace. In so far as self-government in these areas has received 
attention in political theory it has been directed to the workplace rather than to marriage, 
despite three centuries of feminist analysis that has highlighted the denial or limitation of 
wives’ self-government and the political significance of the institution of marriage.  
 
Individual self-government depends not only on the opportunities available but 
also on the form of authority structure within which individuals interact with one another 
in their daily lives. Self-government requires that individuals both go about their lives 
within democratic authority structures that enhance their autonomy, and that they have 
the standing, and are able (have the opportunities and means), to enjoy and safeguard 
their freedom. A basic income - set at the appropriate level - is preferable to a stake 
because it helps create the circumstances for democracy and individual self-government.  
 
Little attention has been paid in recent academic debates to the democratic 
significance of a stake or a basic income. Participants have tended to focus on such 
questions as social justice, relief of poverty, equality of opportunity, or promotion of 
flexible labor markets, rather than democracy. I do not want to downplay the importance 
of these questions, or suggest that they are irrelevant to democracy, but they involve 
different concerns and arguments than explicit attention to democratization. Academic 
discussion today is too often conducted in a series of separate compartments, each with 
its own frame of reference. In political theory, for instance, discussion of social justice 
has usually been undertaken by one set of theorists and democratic theory by others, with 
the two discussions seldom intersecting. The terms of the debate about stakeholding have 
tended to be confined within the framework provided by republicanism, libertarianism, 
utilitarianism, and liberalism. And, rather oddly in ostensibly “political” theory (though 
in keeping with the times) political argument is being displaced by neo-classical 
economic concepts and theories. 
 
The narrowness of the debate is exacerbated by the striking absence of the 
arguments and insights provided by feminist scholars. Some feminists are opposed to a 
basic income but their arguments are absent too. Many years of scholarship about 
marriage, employment, and citizenship is virtually ignored in debates about basic income 
and stakeholding, and women’s freedom (self-government) and its implications for a 
democratic social transformation has hardly been mentioned.  
 
Now that the nostrums of neo-classical economics that have been enshrined in 
national and international policy making have begun to look a little tattered, the way is 
being opened for some new ideas. The idea of a basic income is not, strictly speaking, 
new; advocates usually trace it back to Tom Paine, and I have mentioned one of its earlier 
incarnations as a state bonus. But it is now being more widely discussed, and current 
circumstances (as I shall discuss below) offer a much more favorable environment than in 
years past. A basic income offers not just an an alternative to highly bureaucratized 
public provision, and to the less eligibility doctrines that have been resurrected in recent 
years, but an opportunity to move out of the very well worn ruts of current discussions of 
welfare policy. As Brian Barry has stated, “basic income is not just another idea for Chapter 5. Democratizing Citizenship 
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rejigging the existing system”. Rather, it has the potential to lead to “a different way of 
relating individual and society” (1997, p.161). Or, at least, it has that potential if it is 
argued for in terms of democratization and women’s freedom.  
 
One reason for the democratic potential of a basic income is that it would provide 
an important opportunity; namely, the freedom not to be employed. Participants in the 
debates about a basic income tend to skirt round this distinctive implication, but, as I 
shall argue, it is central to its democratizing possibilities – providing that the income is 
set at an appropriate level. Neither the idea of a basic income or a capital grant say 
anything about the level at which they should be set. The level proposed will depend on 
the reasons for supporting such proposals. My assumption is that, for a basic income to 
be relevant for democratization, it should be adequate to provide what I call a modest but 
decent standard of life. This is a level sufficient to allow individuals to have some control 
over the course of their lives, and to participate to the extent that they wish in the cultural, 
economic, social, and political life of their polity. 
 
It might be objected that the level of basic income has more to do with practical 
feasibility than why the proposal should be supported. The objection always raised when 
basic income or stakeholding is mentioned is that both schemes would cost far too much, 
but political imagination is required here.
3 Besides, before turning to problems of 
implementation and cost we need to know why a basic income or stakeholding should be 
introduced at all, and what level of income or grant is entailed, given those reasons.  
 
If interest in a basic income is, say, as a means to relieve poverty - a goal that I 
certainly share - then the level of income will differ from the level required when a basic 
income is advocated as part of a wider strategy for democratization. Van Parijs remarks 
that the fight for a basic income “is no game for purists”. But if we are going to be 
“tinkerers and opportunists” (p. 16) in attempts to get a basic income squarely on the 
political agenda, we need to be clear about what we are being opportunistic about, 
including wider goals and the level of the income. What is it that we shall be sacrificing 
if, as no doubt will be the case, compromises are necessary in practice? Perhaps my 
notion of a level of basic income sufficient for a modest but decent standard of life makes 
me a “purist”, but this is necessary to appreciate the differences between arguing for 
basic income as an element in a democratic social transformation, or advocating it as a 
means of improving existing systems of income support. The latter is no doubt more 
politically feasible, but a great deal of democratic value in the idea of a basic income is 
lost if immediate political feasibility dominates the academic discussion. 
 
3  Others are much more qualified than I to discuss this aspect, but how public monies are allocated – guns 
or butter - is as much a political as an economic question. Ackerman and Alstott (1999) provide a detailed 
discussion of how a capital grant could be financed through a wealth tax. However, neither wealth taxes nor 
income taxes are popular at present, so I would suggest consideration of an alternative, hypothecated, form 
of taxation, such as a Tobin tax on speculative financial trading, or a tax on polluting and other 
environmentally destructive activities. Or, even better, I would advocate far less guns and much more 
butter. 
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The idea of a basic income has much less political and theoretical interest if the 
payment is assumed to be below subsistence level and seen merely as a way to alleviate 
poverty. Thus I would take issue with Van Parijs when he states that “the central case” 
for a basic income is as a “specific way of handling the joint challenge of poverty and 
unemployment”. To be sure, a basic income is a way of handling this challenge, but this 
is not, I would argue, the central reason to be interested in the idea. On the face of it, 
Ackerman and Alstott’s case for stakeholding seems much closer to my own argument. 
They focus not on poverty or unemployment but on citizenship: “Stakeholding is not a 
poverty program. It is a citizenship program” (1999, p.197). A capital grant, they write, 
creates a “proud culture of free citizenship” (p.14). But the citizenship in question is 
economic citizenship; a stake is an “economic birthright”.
4 In The Stakeholder Society 
they state that “just as one person-one vote expresses political citizenship, an equal stake 
expresses economic citizenship” (1999, p.33). The comparison between a basic income 
and universal suffrage is instructive, but I part company with Ackerman and Alstott in 
their bifurcation of citizenship. 
 
When I first began to think about basic income I was alerted to the comparison 
between the suffrage and a basic income by a little-noticed passage in T. H. Marshall’s 
famous Citizenship and Social Class: “to have to bargain for a living wage in a society 
which accepts the living wage as a social right is as absurd as to have to haggle for a vote 
in a society which accepts the vote as a political right” (1963, p. 116). There are, 
however, two problems with Marshall’s argument that are pertinent here. First, as is well 
known, he separated citizenship into three different components, civil, political and social 
rights. But whether the division is into three parts, or Ackerman and Alstott’s two-part 
economic and political citizenship, the result is the same; attention gets diverted into 
endless wrangles about which category is primary, and which category can properly be 
seen as “rights” (do social rights count?). Second, Marshall linked standard of life to 
employment, by which he meant male employment, a matter I shall discuss shortly.  
 
Van Parijs also refers to universal suffrage. In making his comment about purism 
and tinkering, he compares the fight for a basic income to the fight for universal suffrage, 
and neither, he states, is an “all-or-nothing affair”. This is a curious comment. Countries 
with restricted suffrage – even restricted to the male half of the population – are often 
called “democracies”, but that reveals less about the suffrage than about a more general 
wariness of the full implications of democratization. The suffrage it is either universal, 
i.e, encompassing all adults, or it is not. Partial enfranchisement means that there are 
qualifying conditions that only some of the adult population can meet (typically, owning 
property, being male, having a white skin, or belonging to a certain ethnic group). Where 
such eligibility conditions exist a vote is a privilege, not a right. Universal suffrage is 
democratic precisely because the vote ceases to be the privilege of a part of the 
population and becomes a right of all adults. To be universal, qualifying criteria for the 
suffrage have to be reduced to the bare minimum that everyone can meet with time, such 
 
4  Claus Offe (2000) also argues in terms of universal economic citizenship in his proposal for sabbatical 
accounts, which he presents as a gradualist and experimental approach to basic income. Chapter 5. Democratizing Citizenship 
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as an age requirement and length of residence for naturalization, or that all can meet 
barring accidents of nature, such as being of sound mind.  
 
My argument is that a basic income should be seen, like the suffrage, as a 
democratic right, or a political birthright. By a “democratic” right I have in mind a 
fundamental right in Henry Shue’s sense of a “basic right”. Basic rights “specify the line 
beneath which no one is to be allowed to sink”. Rights are basic “if enjoyment of them is 
essential to the enjoyment of all other rights” (1996, p18; p.19). Subsistence is one of 
Shue’s basic rights, which he defines as “what is needed for a decent chance at a 
reasonably healthy and active life of more or less normal length, barring tragic 
interventions” (1996, p.23). Building on this line of argument, a basic income, at a level 
sufficient for a modest but decent standard of life, can be seen as a fundamental or 
democratic right. Such an income is necessary to enable all citizens to participate as fully 
as they wish in all aspects of the life of their society. 
 
A basic income as a fundamental right can more reasonably be compared to the 
suffrage than can a stake. Citizenship and the suffrage are for life, and a basic income is a 
right that also exists over a citizen’s life-time, whereas a capital grant is a one-off 
payment at the beginning of adulthood. A stake provides young people with a valuable 
start, but what of the rest of their life as citizens? A basic income provides the life-long 
security that helps safeguard other rights. Universal suffrage is the emblem of equal 
citizenship, and underpins an orderly change of government through free and fair 
elections, so enhancing citizens’ security. A basic income is the emblem of full 
citizenship, and provides the security required to maintain that political standing. Another 
way of making this point is that a basic income as a democratic right is necessary for 
individual freedom as self-government, a political freedom.  
 
One of the major disagreements between Ackerman and Alstott and Van Parijs in 
their essays is over the latter’s prohibition on the capitalization of (future) basic income 
into a single payment. Van Parijs minimizes the difference between basic income and a 
capital grant, and remarks that the difference between the two “would be essentially 
annulled if the recipients could freely borrow against their future basic income stream” 
(p.1). I shall leave aside the issue of whether the future income stream can be used as 
collateral for, e.g., a mortgage on a house, and concentrate on prohibition against 
conversion of a basic income into a single lump-sum. The question is whether this 
constitutes a significant limitation on individual freedom.  
 
Ackerman and Alstott argue that it does; a basic income stands in the way of 
individual freedom. Young people are hindered in achieving their goals if they cannot 
choose to capitalize their basic income as a capital grant. Ackerman and Alstott, 
therefore, see a basic income as “a fancy name for a restraint on alienation” (p. 8). The 
restriction on conversion, they argue, makes basic income into the equivalent of a 
“spend-thrift trust”, the beneficiary of which has to apply to a trustee, who administers 
the trust according to a set of conditions, in order to be able to use the money. They see 
basic income as a “universal spendthift trust” (p.9). To treat adults as potential Chapter 5. Democratizing Citizenship 
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spendthrifts “demeans their standing as autonomous citizens” (p.9). In contrast a stake 
would “promote the real freedom of young adults on the threshold of life” (p. 20) 
 
It might; but the most obvious problem is that a lump-sum capital grant could 
very easily and quickly be squandered or lost. Many responsible individuals could lose 
their capital even if they avoided Las Vegas or drugs. Small businesses have a high 
failure rate despite the best efforts of their owners, and stock markets crash. Of course, 
Ackerman and Alstott are aware of the problem of stakeblowing and they supplement the 
individual stake with an old-age pension that is provided, unconditionally, as right of 
citizenship. But stakeholding plus a retirement pension is insufficient for democratic 
citizenship. Too long a period of citizens’ lives is open to the vagaries of chance and the 
market. 
 
For individuals to be able to decide in which form to receive their income means 
that entrepreneurial activities would no doubt be encouraged as well as trips to Las 
Vegas. Ackerman and Alstott see the risk of individuals losing their lump-sum as part of 
individual freedom. As they write in The Stakeholding Society, they are “interested in 
opportunities, not outcomes”, and they present a basic income as a cushion for failure, 
whereas a stake “is launching pad for success” (1999, p.24, p.215). But the launch might 
well end in a crash. Equality of opportunity is a democratic principle, but the freedom 
involved in young people being able to convert a basic income to a capital stake hardly 
looms large from the perspective of democratization and individual freedom as self-
government. 
 
Ackerman and Alstott also criticize a basic income on the grounds that it 
“encourages a short-term consumerist perspective” (p. 10). The only sense in which, as 
far as I can see, a basic income might do this is if it were introduced at a level below that 
required for a modest but decent standard of life. A payment below subsistence level 
might be seen, at least by those well above the poverty level, as merely an extra bit of 
discretionary income available for immediate spending. But even this would be mitigated 
if the tax system came into play for those at higher income levels. There seems no good 
reason why a basic income implemented at the level I am suggesting would encourage 
consumerism. Indeed, one could make the opposite case; by breaking the link between 
income and the labor market it would allow individuals, if they so wished, to abstain 
from the race to accumulate ever more material goods, and help combat the identification 
of freedom with consumerism. 
 
A basic income would have two important consequences for democratization. 
First, it would allow individuals more easily to refuse to enter or to leave relationships 
that violate individual self-government, or that involve unsafe, unhealthy, or demeaning 
conditions. It would, as Van Parijs states, endow “the weakest with bargaining power” 
(p.10), but the bargaining power is a by-product of the full standing as citizens that a 
basic income helps create. Basic income is not (as Marshall saw) about bargaining but 
self-government, rights, and democratic citizenship. A basic income would also support 
citizens’ participation in collective self-government by opening up opportunities for 
citizens to develop their political capacities and skills. A guaranteed standard of life Chapter 5. Democratizing Citizenship 
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would mean that participation in social and political life would not require heroic efforts 
on the part of any citizens. 
 
The second consequence, and a crucial difference between basic income and 
stakeholding, is that a basic income would give citizens the freedom not to be employed. 
Both a basic income, if set at the appropriate level, and a capital grant would provide 
enlarged opportunities for individuals, but the opportunities provided by a basic income 
would be far wider than those offered by a stake, since the new opportunities would not 
be confined to the competitive market. A basic income, like a stake, would make it 
possible for anyone (at any point in their life, not merely while they are young) to go 
back to school, to retrain for a new occupation, or to open a business. But a basic income 
providing a modest but decent standard of living would do much more.  
 
In the Constitution of Liberty, Friedrich von Hayek – like G.D.H. Cole from a 
very different point on the political spectrum - argued that employment fostered an 
outlook among employees that was an impediment to freedom. The employed, he wrote, 
are “in many respects alien and often inimical to much that constitutes the driving force 
of a free society” (1960, p.119). His solution was that there should be as many gentlemen 
of private means as possible to counteract the deleterious effect of employment. In effect, 
such gentlemen have large basic incomes, albeit not provided by a government. At a very 
much lower level of resources a basic income democratizes the freedom open to a 
gentlemen of private means to spend time in scholarly pursuits, good works, writing 
poetry, cultivating friendships, hunting, or being a drone or a wastrel. A basic income 
would allow individuals at any time to do voluntary or political work, for example, to 
learn to surf, to write or paint, to devote themselves to family life, or have a quiet period 
of self-reassessment or contemplation. 
 
By opening up this range of opportunities and uncoupling income and standard of 
life from employment, a basic income has the potential both to encourage critical 
reassessment of the mutually reinforcing structures of marriage, employment and 
citizenship, and to open the possibility that these institutions could be re-made in a new, 
more democratic form. A capital grant given to young people with the aim of assisting 
individual economic success lacks the same potential. In The Stakeholding Society, 
Ackerman and Alstott argue that a stake encourages individuals, in a way that a basic 
income cannot, to reflect upon what they want to do with their lives, and appraise their 
situation. “Civic reflection” and attention to “the fate of the nation” become possible 
when economic anxieties are lifted (1999, p.185). A “purer form of patriotism” will arise 
out of the “simple gratitude to the nation” that citizens will feel as they think about their 
capital grant and the debt that they owe to their country for the economic citizenship that 
comes with stakeholding (1999, p186; see also pp.43-44).  
 
Patriotism and gratitude, however, have only a tenuous connection to individual 
freedom. Provision of a one-time capital grant will no doubt encourage individuals to 
consider what courses of action are open to them, and might even foster reflection on the 
debt they owe to their country. But it seems implausible that it would help promote 
reflection on the political implications of the structural connections between marriage, Chapter 5. Democratizing Citizenship 
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employment and citizenship. Both the wide variety of opportunities made possible when 
employment become truly voluntary, and the fact that women’s freedom would be greatly 
enhanced, mean that, unlike a stake, a basic income has the potential to open the door to 
institutional change - providing that democratization is at the forefront of discussion and 
that feminist arguments are taken seriously.  
 
The freedom not to be employed runs counter to the direction of much recent 
public policy and political rhetoric (especially in Anglo-American countries, though the 
policies are international), and this makes stakeholding more palatable than basic income 
in the current political climate. The effect of such policies and rhetoric is to draw even 
tighter the long-standing link between employment and citizenship, at the very time when 
a reassessment has been made possible by changing circumstances. The institution of 
employment is a barrier to democratic freedom and citizenship in two ways. First, 
economic enterprises have an undemocratic structure, a point that I shall not pursue here.
5 
Second, as feminist scholars have demonstrated, the relationship between the institutions 
of marriage, employment, and citizenship has meant that the standing of wives as citizens 
has always been, and remains, problematic.  
 
Basic Income and the Autonomy of Women 
 
The Anglo-American social insurance system was constructed on the assumption 
that wives not only were their husbands’ economic dependents, but lesser citizens whose 
entitlement to benefits depended on their private status, not on their citizenship. Male 
“breadwinners”, who made a contribution from their earnings to “insure” that they 
received benefits in the event of unemployment or sickness, and in their old age, were the 
primary citizens. Their employment was treated as the contribution that a citizen could 
make to the well-being of the community. Ackerman and Alstott acknowledge this in 
their criticism of “workplace justice” (pp.6-7), and their recognition that unconditional 
retirement pensions would be particularly important for the many older women whose 
benefits still largely derive from their husbands’ employment record (1999, pp.145-46). 
That is to say, only paid employment has been seen as “work”, as involving the tasks that 
are the mark of a productive citizen and contributor to the polity. Other contributions, 
notably all the work required to reproduce and maintain a healthy population, and care 
for infants, the elderly, the sick and infirm – the caring tasks, most of which are not paid 
for and are undertaken by women – have been seen as irrelevant to citizenship.  
 
The debates about basic income also center on the figure of a man in – or 
avoiding - paid employment. This is very clear in one of the major criticisms of, and 
apprehensions about, the idea of a basic income; that is, that it would encourage free-
riding and idleness. Free-riders breach the principle of reciprocity by obtaining the fruits 
of the efforts of others and contributing nothing themselves in return; a basic income, it is 
charged, would “inspire a segment of the able population . . . to abjure work for a life of 
idle fun”(Anderson, 2000, p.16). But who is being seen as so prone to idleness and fun? 
 
5 see Pateman, 1970 and 2002. 
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The assumption guiding the discussion of basic income is that the problem is about men 
and employment.
 6 A much greater problem about male free-riding to which a basic 
income is directly relevant, but a problem about the household, not employment, is 
therefore ignored.  
 
Van Parijs appears to be an exception to the prevailing view of free-riding. Unlike 
most other participants in discussions of basic income he has noticed that free-riding 
exists “on a massive scale” in household interactions (1995, p.143). But who are the free 
riders in the household? Barry notes that full-time housewives can be seen as free-riders 
(1996, p245). But they can only be seen in that way if “work” is taken to mean paid 
employment.
 7 As feminist scholars have emphasized for a very long time, housewives 
are working (unpaid) by undertaking the necessary caring work. Given the major 
contribution they already make for no monetary return at all, wives (women) are hardly 
likely to be the target of the objection that a basic income would lead to idleness and fun. 
 
The majority of wives are now in some form of paid employment, but their labor 
force participation is usually different from that of men. This reflects the legacy of a 
wage-system that enshrined the belief that husbands (men) not wives (women) are 
“breadwinners”.
8 Many more women than men work part-time, and women earn less than 
men. The private and public sexual division of labor, that is to say, continues to be 
structured so that men monopolize full-time, higher paying, and more prestigious paid 
employment, and wives do a disproportionate share of unpaid work in the home. Given 
the structure of institutions and social beliefs, this appears as a “rational” arrangement. 
The mutual reinforcement of marriage and employment explains why husbands can take 
advantage of the unpaid work of wives, and avoid doing their fair share of the caring 
work. That is why there is massive free-riding in the household – by husbands. 
 
Neither free-riding by husbands, nor its scale, is usually acknowledged in 
discussions of basic income and stakeholding. This is because marriage and the 
household rarely enter the argument. The narrow parameters of discussion, and the 
influence of the assumptions of neo-classical economics, preclude attention to 
institutional structures and their interrelationships. Van Parijs is an exception in 
recognizing that a problem of free-riding exists in households, but his neo-classical 
theoretical apparatus leaves him unable to acknowledge that the problem is one of men 
(husbands) and the work of caring for household members. His argument is that free-
 
6 The consequence for employment rates of a basic income is hard to determine in the abstract. On the one 
hand, it would act as a disincentive for individuals to be employed, since, ex hypothesis, they could live on 
the income. On the other hand, precisely because the income is paid whether or not individuals are 
employed, they could enjoy a better standard of life by taking a low paid job than living on a basic income 
alone. It would thus act as an incentive to employment, and improve the flexibility of the labor market.  
 
7  McKay and VanEvery (2000, p. 281) remark that critics of the free-rider objection argue in “masculinist 
terms which ignore the implicit relegation of family carers to this category”.  
 
8  For a discussion of support for the legacy in the Netherlands, see Plantenga, Schippers and Siegers, 1999 
 Chapter 5. Democratizing Citizenship 
Carole Pateman 
93
 
 
riding arises merely because of differences in individual tastes or preferences. Free-
riding, Van Parijs states, occurs when benefits enjoyed by both partners in a household 
are produced by only one of them, the partner who happens to care most about the 
particular benefit. His example is that the partner who most strongly prefers tidiness will 
make sure that the home is tidy.  
 
“Tidiness” is part of the more general work of housekeeping, and there is 
abundant empirical evidence that shows that the female partner is most likely to do the 
housework, including tidying up. The empirical data do not show this pattern just by 
chance - female partners do not by some quirk happen to prefer tidiness more strongly 
than their male partners. The institution of marriage, and social beliefs about what it 
means to be a “wife” or “husband”, have vanished in Van Parijs’s analysis and there are 
merely two individuals, indistinguishable except for their different tastes for tidy 
surroundings. His theoretical approach in Real Freedom for All precludes analysis of the 
structure of relations between the sexes, and a crucial area of debate is, therefore, 
removed from discussion of basic income. 
 
Indeed, some advocates of a basic income argue that it would make it easier for 
women to do “their” work in the home.
 Van Parijs remarks (2000, p.7) that some women 
would probably use their basic income to “lighten the ‘double shift’ at certain periods of 
their lives”. But, he continues, “who can sincerely believe that working subject to the 
dictates of a boss for forty hours a week is a path to liberation?” One can have grave 
doubts on the latter score – but also ask, first, whether working for a husband at home is 
the right path either, and, second, ask why men might not use their basic income to take 
on their fair share of the caring work.  
 
Now is the time to ask the second question. The conditions under which the 
institution of employment and the Anglo-American social insurance system was 
constructed have now crumbled. “Old economy” male breadwinner jobs are being swept 
away in global economic restructuring and “downsizing”. New jobs have been created 
but many are low paid, lacking benefits, and temporary, and economic insecurity is 
widespread. Views about femininity, masculinity, and marriage are changing too, but 
since we are still in the midst of all these changes it is hard to know what the eventual 
outcome will be. Still, times of rapid change provide opportunities to investigate new 
ideas and look critically at old arrangements – including the moral hazard of institutions 
that give incentives to men to avoid their fair share of the unpaid work of caring for 
others. It has now become possible to rethink the connections between income and paid 
employment, between marriage, employment and citizenship, between the private and 
public division of labor, between caring work and other work, and reconsider the 
meaning of “work”. But such rethinking requires a different approach from that taken by 
many participants in the debate about stakeholding and basic income. This is crucial if 
proper account is to be taken of women’s freedom, which has received rather short shrift 
in discussions of a basic income. 
 
As early as 1792, Mary Wollstonecraft argued in A Vindication of the Rights of 
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independence, whether a woman was married or single. As Ackerman and Alstott 
emphasize, a capital grant would be a step in this direction, but a basic income would for 
the first time provide all women with life-long economic independence. Thus feminists 
might be expected strongly to support the introduction of a basic income.
 9  
 
Yet this is not the case. Some feminists are critical of the idea because they fear a 
basic income would reinforce the existing sexual division of labor and women’s lesser 
citizenship. They argue that the provision of an income without having to engage in paid 
employment would, in light of women’s position in the labor market combined with 
lingering beliefs about the proper place and tasks of women and men, give women an 
even greater incentive to undertake more unpaid caring work in the household, and, 
conversely, men would have another incentive to free-ride. A basic income, that is, would 
reinforce existing limitations on women’s freedom.
10  
 
This objection illustrates the importance of the reasons advanced for supporting a 
basic income. The probability of feminist fears being borne out is higher, for example, 
when the argument is made that to avoid weakening the “incentive to work” a basic 
income should below subsistence level. This “incentive” is promoted with men and paid 
employment in mind. A basic income at this level provides no incentive for wives to 
“work” (i.e. enter paid employment); rather it would encourage them to do more unpaid 
caring work. Again, to support basic income on the grounds that it would improve the 
living standards of the poorest sectors of the population does not promote consideration 
of the structural connections between marriage, employment, and citizenship, and the 
private and public sexual division of labor. Without the debates about basic income being 
informed by feminist arguments, and a concern for democratization (and genuine 
democratization necessarily includes women’s freedom and standing as citizens), the 
discussion will revolve around ways of tinkering with the existing system rather than 
encouraging thinking about how it might be made more democratic.  
 
Putting democratization at the center requires attention to institutional structures, 
especially the institutions of marriage and employment. For instance, Ackerman and 
Alstott remark in The Stakeholder Society that the “case for stakeholding does not 
ultimately rest on its effects on employment, marriage, or crime. It rests on each 
American‘s claim to respect as a free and equal citizen” (1999, p.209). However (leaving 
crime aside), the respect accorded to women and men as free and equal citizen has a great 
deal to do the institutions of marriage and employment. It is not possible to understand 
women’s lesser citizenship, as Ackerman and Alstott show in their discussion of social 
security, without understanding the relationship between their position as wives and 
men’s position as workers.  
 
 
9  For some examples of discussion of the importance of a basic income for women, see Walter 1989, 
Parker 1993, McKay and Vanevery 2000, McKay 2002, and on stakeholding Alstott 2000. 
 
10 Like Robeyns (2001) I have frequently encountered this objection when I have talked about a basic 
income. It is less often seen in academic discussions. 
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Similarly, Van Parijs argues that while “a defensible long term vision” of an 
unconditional basic income at the highest sustainable level is vital, nevertheless more 
limited and politically feasible proposals are also essential. He states that a household-
based guaranteed minimum income “would definitely be a major change in the right 
direction” (pp.16-17) - but the right direction according to which reasons? Household-
based schemes disregard not only all the problems about the sexual division of labor, and 
the fact that women earn less than men, but also income distribution within households. 
Can it be confidently assumed that income would be distributed equally between husband 
and wife? A basic income is important for feminism and democratization precisely 
because it is paid not to households but individuals as citizens. 
 
A focus on individuals does not imply resort to the atomistic individualism of 
neo-classical economics. The problem of women’s self-government and full standing as 
citizens is visible only when individuals are conceptualized within the context of social 
relations and institutions. A household-based basic income allows the problem of 
marriage, employment, and citizenship to be avoided since wives (women) disappear into 
the category of “the family” or “household”. To treat a basic income as a payment to 
households rather than individuals ignores the question of who performs the work of 
caring for household members. That is, it is tacitly assumed that reciprocity exists and 
that free-riding is only a problem about men avoiding employment.  
 
This assumption is nicely illustrated by the picture of a male surfer on the cover 
of Real Freedom for All. In academic discussions the surfer is used to represent non-
contributors. But in the popular political imagination and the media other symbols of 
free-riding are present, such as the African American “welfare queen”, or, more recently, 
the “illegal immigrant” or the “asylum seeker”.
11 The figure of the surfer not only 
obscures the problem for democratization of popular attitudes embodied in these other 
symbols, but also obliterates the systematic avoidance of one form of contribution, the 
vital caring work, by men who are in employment.  
 
  Nor do the numerous suggestions for conditions to be placed on payment of a 
basic income as a solution to free-riding -- Atkinson’s (1996) “participation income” is a 
well-known example
12 -- get to grips with free-riding by men in the household. While the 
notion of a “contribution” may be broadened to include, e.g., the work of caring for 
others, as in Atkinson’s proposal, this is insufficient to focus attention on the structural 
problem of the connections between marriage, employment, and free-riding by husbands. 
While payment of a basic income to a husband for his “contribution” through 
employment, and to his wife for her “contribution” in the home is to recognize that she 
does indeed make a socially valuable contribution, this does little to calm the fears of 
 
11  My thanks to Harvey Goldman for his comments about the surfer at a talk I gave at UC San Diego in 
2001. 
 
12 for a conditional stake see Goodin, forthcoming 
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some feminists that a basic income will merely reinforce women’s lesser standing and the 
idleness of husbands in the household.  
 
An adequate discussion of free-riding and reciprocity in debates about basic 
income is hampered by, on the one hand, the prevalence of an economistic or contractual 
sense of “reciprocity”. In this interpretation of the term the recipient must make a 
contribution directly in return for every benefit received, a view that magnifies the 
problem of free-riding. On the other hand, by ignoring the household, participants in the 
debate tacitly presuppose that “reciprocity” in another sense, i.e., mutual aid, 
characterizes domestic interactions.
 13 To refocus the debate about basic income around 
its significance for democratization would mean replacing the preoccupation with one 
kind of free-riding with an examination of how to reinforce reciprocity in the sense of 
mutual aid across the social order. And that, in turn, would require widening the terms of 
debate, engaging with the large body of feminist analysis, moving away from the 
assumptions of neo-classical economics, and developing a political argument. 
 
* 
In conclusion I want to make two further points. First, schemes for a conditional basic 
income raise another problem. In effect, these proposals declare irrelevant the 
comparison of basic income with universal suffrage as a democratic right. The criteria for 
eligibility for a conditional income may be very generously interpreted, but there are 
always likely to be individuals who fail, or refuse, to meet the conditions. What, then, is 
their status? Are they, like individuals who lack the franchise, to become second-class 
citizens? All the time that a basic income is conditional, a privilege not a right, the 
problem of second-class and lesser citizenship cannot be avoided. The use that citizens 
make of their freedom is open to no guarantees. Democratic self-government entails that 
they decide for themselves how and when they will contribute, or whether they will 
contribute at all. If the cost of improving democratic freedom for all citizens is the 
existence of some drones, then, I submit, it is a cost worth paying. 
 
Second, let me emphasize that a basic income is not a panacea. In itself, a basic 
income would not, for instance, provide an adequate stock of affordable housing, 
sufficient good quality education, adequate health-care, an end to racism or to violence-
free neighborhoods. Yet if a genuinely democratic society in which the freedom of 
women is as important as that of men remains an aspiration, it is hard to see that there is a 
substitute for an unconditional basic income. 
 
 
13 To apply “reciprocity” in the first sense to the household would have dire consequences, not least for 
infants. Political theorists in an earlier saw era reciprocity in my second sense as the primary law of nature. 
That is, they recognized that a social order is a system of generalized mutual aid and mutual forbearance, or 
a system of reciprocity. If reciprocity in this sense of the term breaks down, social order begins to 
disintegrate.  Chapter 5. Democratizing Citizenship 
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 6 
Implementing Stakeholder Grants: the British Case 
Julian Le Grand 
 
 
Britain is the first country actually to begin the process of implementing the idea of 
stakeholding grants.  The Government of Tony Blair has committed itself to 
introducing what it calls a Child Trust Fund. This is a universal grant, topped up by a 
means-tested addition, given to every baby at birth, invested in a fund and available 
for use when the child reaches eighteen.  The Fund was promised in the Labour 
Party’s Manifesto for the 2001 general election; the proposals have not yet reached 
the statute book, but the Government has issued two consultation papers about how 
the Fund might be implemented. Together with other contributions to the British 
debate, these raise a number of issues, both theoretical and practical, which are of 
more general interest and form the focus of this short paper.  
 
The Precursors 
 
As Ackerman and Alstott have noted, the pioneer in this area was Tom Paine, who 
suggested that every 21 year-old man and woman should receive an endowment of 
£15, financed from an inheritance tax. 'The subtraction will be made at the time that 
best admits it, which is, at the moment that property is passing by the death of one 
person to the possession of another….The monopoly of natural inheritance to which 
there never was a right, begins to cease’
1  
 
In more modern times in the UK a similar idea was put forward by the economist 
Cedric Sandford in the early 1970s and discussed by A. B. Atkinson in his 
pioneering work on wealth inequality
2. Both explored the idea of a capital grant, 
although nor one necessarily connected with the inheritance tax and not necessarily 
provided at the age of majority: Atkinson, for instance, discusses the possibility of 
including a capital element in the state pension. 
 
Unaware of these predecessors, over ten years ago I published a proposal for a grant 
to everyone on reaching the age of majority financed out of a reformed inheritance 
tax, terming the idea a ‘poll grant’
3.  More recently, influenced by  developments in 
the US, especially the work of Michael Sherradon and Bruce Ackerman with Anne 
Alstott, similar ideas have acquired momentum in British policy circles
4.  In 1999, a 
capital grant at the age of majority was discussed in several contributions to the New 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Ackerman and Alstott (1999), p.182.  
 
2 Sandford (1971), pp. 250-254; Atkinson (1972) pp. 233-236. 
 
3 Le Grand (1989), p.210. 
 
4 Sherradon (1991), Ackerman and Alstott (1991). 
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Statesman magazine
5.  In 2000 Gavin Kelly and Rachel Lissauer of the influential 
centre-left think-tank the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) reviewed 
schemes designed to promote asset ownership and proposed a 'baby bond': a grant of 
£1000 made at birth
6.  And in the same year, the Fabian Society produced a pamphlet 
by myself and David Nissan advocating a capital grant of £10,000 to every eighteen 
year old
7.  
 
This momentum has carried through to government.  Just before the election of June 
2001, in a star-studded event at No.10 Downing Street, Prime Minister Blair, the 
Chancellor of  the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, and the Secretaries of State for 
Education and Social Security, David Blunkett and Alistair Darling, launched 
proposals for a  ‘child trust fund’ and a ‘savings gateway’.  These have been the 
subject of two consultation documents and a consultation period, which has just 
finished.  They should be incorporated into legislation within the next few months.  
 
The Proposals   
 
The Government’s consultation documents
8 propose that the setting up a Child Trust 
Fund for each newborn child into which the government will pay £400 in tranches: 
£250 at birth, followed by three payments at 5, 11 and 16.  Children born to parents 
below a thresh-hold income will receive more – up to £800. Parents can pay into the 
fund, which will be invested in a wide range of vehicles including equities.  Neither 
parents nor children will have access to the Fund until the child reaches eighteen; 
there will then be no restrictions as to use. Financial education would be provided to 
both parents and children. 
 
New proposals are also directed at encouraging adult savings. Specifically, a ‘Savings 
Gateway’ will be set up with a single interest-earning cash account targeted at low 
income individuals. The government will match any deposits made by the account 
holder at a rate to be decided up to a maximum. The consultation document 
illustration suggests a 1:1 matching rate up to a £50 maximum per month and £1000 
in total.  The account would be time-limited; the second consultation document 
suggests five years. 
 
Issues 
The Government’s proposals, together with the other contributions to the US and 
British debates, raise a number of issues, especially with respect to the Child Trust 
Fund, that need resolution before the idea can become practical policy. They include 
 
5 These included an article by the ex-US Secretary of Labor Robert Reich (14 June), an editorial 
endorsing the idea (13 September) and articles by the present author and David Nissan (26 July, 4 
October) 
 
6  Kelly and Lissauer (2000) 
 
7 Nissan and Le Grand (2000) 
 
8 HM Treasury (2001a, 2001b) 
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timing, finance, universality and possible restrictions on use.  Some comments on 
each follow.  
 
Timing 
Should the grant be given at birth in the form of a’ baby bond’, as the Government 
and the IPPR have proposed, or at the age of majority, as Paine, Ackerman and Alstott 
and I have argued?  There are arguments on both sides.  In favour of a grant at birth, 
since the money is to be invested for eighteen years, less can be given up-front.  This 
would make the grant allocation easier politically, because it apparently saves the 
government money (in reality, of course there is no saving, since the government is 
simply losing the income that it could have earned by investing the grant itself). 
Another advantage is that the fund can be seen to accumulate by both parent and 
child, thus serving a useful financial educational purpose.  On the negative side, this 
very visibility may make the fund unpopular with parents, especially poor ones, who 
will see money accumulating that they might feel they could have put to good use, but 
which they are unable to touch.  Also, depending on how each of the funds is 
invested, children may end up with different amounts on reaching the age of majority 
– an outcome that could be regarded as unfair.   
 
This last point raises questions as to the appropriate investment strategy for a ‘baby 
bond’, and the related issue as to whom would manage the investment.  Should the 
funds be invested in savings accounts, equities or government bonds?  Should 
government or private sector financial institutions manage the fund?  What should be 
the role of the parents in managing the investment – or indeed of the children? 
 
As yet these questions have not all been settled in the British case. The government 
would prefer the private sector to manage the funds; the private sector, although 
interested for long-term reasons, is worried about the small size of the amounts 
involved and the difficulty of covering their fixed costs. This may be resolved by 
confining fund management to a few finance institutions, from whose offerings  
parents would choose. 
 
Finance 
Where would the money to finance the staekeholding grant come from?  The British 
Government does not specify this in its proposals. Ackerman and Alstott finance their 
much more generous scheme from an annual wealth tax.  Kelly and Lissauer finance 
their baby bond through reducing tax reliefs for pensions. 
 
I have argued that the best way to finance this potentially popular spending proposal 
is by linking it to reforms to a hitherto unpopular and inefficient tax - inheritance tax
9.  
Hypothecating, or earmarking, inheritance tax revenues to capital grants could 
provide the means for rehabilitating a much despised tax.  It also has an obvious 
popular appeal: the wealth of one generation is visibly spread around so as to fertilise 
the growth of the next. 
 
Inheritance tax is a misnomer in the UK. What we have is a tax on estates that bears 
 
9  Le Grand (1989); Nissan and Le Grand (2000). 
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no relation to the amount any individual inherits, either from the estate in question, or 
over a lifetime.  And the tax is largely voluntary.  The Inland Revenue estimated that 
in 1995 total marketable personal wealth stood at £2013bn.  This measure excludes 
wealth that cannot be realised, such as accrued pension rights.  In contrast, the yield 
from inheritance tax is pitiful, just £1.7bn in 1997-8.  Wealth passes almost untaxed 
between generations through lifetime gifts, through exempt items such as agricultural 
land and forestry, and through devices such as discretionary trusts which can defer tax 
liabilities for decades. 
 
It is against this scale of wealth transfer that suggestions such as capital grants should 
be measured. There are approximately 650,000 eighteen year olds in Britain, so it 
would cost £6.5 billion to give them each £10,000.  The current yield of £1.7bn would 
pay for about £2,500 per recipient. 
  
Yields, and hence the grant, could be increased in subsequent years by reforms that 
have long been on economists' agendas, but that have lacked political support. These 
include shifting the basis for the tax from the donor to the recipient, and extending it 
to include lifetime inheritances and gifts.  This would encourage the wealthy to pass 
on their wealth to those who have not already been substantial beneficiaries, as by so 
doing they could reduce the taxman's take.  The system would require that everybody 
had a lifetime gift and inheritance allowance, say of £50,000, which could be received 
free of tax. Thereafter tax could be levied at progressive rates to maintain incentives 
for wealth to be spread around.  A review of exempt items and Trust law should also 
be undertaken to broaden the base of the tax. 
 
In theory receipts could collapse with such a tax if bequests were directed only to 
those who had not used up their inheritance tax allowance.  However, if that occurred 
a fairer distribution of inherited wealth would have been achieved, and there would be 
less need of an additional system of grants.  More likely, however, is that wider 
bequests would happen mainly at the margins, as people would continue to want to 
help their own children first.  As they did so they would be taxed to pay for grants for 
those less fortunate. 
 
It would not be necessary to impose penal rates of inheritance tax to finance a 
substantial reallocation of capital. Indeed an ideal system would have rates that most 
regarded as reasonable, to minimise incentives for avoidance or evasion. 
 
What might such rates be? The inadequacies of the existing inheritance tax mean we 
have very limited information indeed about the extent of wealth bequeathed or given 
on a year by year basis.  But a crude estimate by Le Grand and Nissan suggested that 
a reformed inheritance tax would need to be levied at an average rate of around 15% 
to finance £10,000 per young adult. If higher education subsidies were reduced pari 
passu (as they should be if equity is to be maintained), the savings from this could 
also be used to finance the grant and the inheritance tax rate could be lowered yet 
further. Since the participation rate of the relevant age group in higher education is 
now running at around one third, this means that the inheritance tax rate could be 
lowered to 10%.  Alternatively, the rate could be kept at 15% and the savings in 
higher education spending could be used elsewhere within the education budget or for 
other public services.  In short, there is every opportunity here to levy a modest tax on 
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gifts and bequests, and still make sure every young person has the capital needed to 
get off to a good start. 
 
The insignificant contribution of inheritance tax to financing public spending, and the 
sense of the state as inherently wasteful, have meant that avoiding such tax has never 
attracted much moral opprobrium.  The ease of avoidance of inheritance tax reflects 
the lack of public support for it. But if the proceeds of the tax were visibly distributed 
through stakeholding grants, perhaps that perception could change. 
 
Universality 
Should the grant be universal or means-tested? The British Government’s 
proposals involve both a universal and a means-tested element, where the 
relevant ’means’ are parental income.  
 
The case for a universal grant is part of the more general case for universal benefits 
over ones targeted on the poor.  Universal benefits contribute to the sense of national 
community, whereas targeted ones can be socially divisive.  Also targeted benefits 
require a cumbersome apparatus for determining eligibility: one that is expensive to 
administer and can be demeaning to the recipient. In contrast universal benefits require 
only the information necessary to determine that the individuals concerned falls into 
the relevant category: in this case, simply their age. 
 
But there is an additional, more fundamental reason for a universal grant.  Everyone 
born into a developed country benefits from a share in a common inheritance: a set of 
capital assets, including buildings and other physical infrastructure, transport links, 
capital equipment and agricultural land.  The vast majority of these are the results of 
the labours and efforts of previous generations, the members of which have struggled 
together to produce what is in effect a gift of wealth to the next.  It is largely because 
of this inheritance that the current inhabitants of any developed country are as wealthy 
as they are; without that enormous accumulation of capital over the centuries, no 
amount of efforts by the current generation could generate the levels of current 
production that maintain our standards of living. 
 
This idea, that the wealth of one generation is a common asset to the next, is important 
for it cuts across the argument that individuals who have created wealth should be free 
to give it all to their children.  Ownership gives personal command of resources, but it 
is not easy to justify this persisting beyond the grave, especially when, as we have 
seen, the life chances for many are reduced by lack of access to start up capital.  How 
can one argue that people have as great a right to inherited wealth as to, for instance, 
the income or profits that result from their own efforts?  It would seem fairer if the 
right to our national patrimony was more equally distributed - as would happen if our 
proposal for a universal capital grant was implemented. 
 
A standard argument used against any universal benefit is what we might call the 
'Prince William' objection: should the benefit be paid to the better off who are unlikely 
really to need it, such as Prince William, as well as to the really needy?  The answer is, 
in general, yes: for this is a price that has to be paid if the other advantages of 
universality are to be obtained and the problems of means-tested targeting avoided. 
Moreover, if the grant is financed through inheritance tax then, so parents pay the tax, 
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a significant portion of their wealth will now be going to pay for the start-up costs for 
thousands of other children, as well as their own.  In the prince’s case, an exception 
may be made as long as his family, uniquely, are exempt from inheritance tax. 
 
It is also worth noting that the children of the better off already receive a form of grant 
through subsidies to higher education.  Although with the recent introduction of tuition 
fees and student loans these subsidies are being reduced, they remain considerable.  
Most students come from middle class backgrounds. Hence the proposal can be 
viewed as simply a means of extending an already existing subsidy to the better off to 
those less fortunate.  It also has the implication that higher education subsidies can be 
further reduced without making anyone worse off, since one potential use for the grant 
could be to pay for tuition and living expenses while acquiring further education.   
 
Restrictions on use and eligibility  
Political support for the scheme would depend not only on its method of finance but 
also on what happens at the other end: what the recipients of the grant did with the 
money.  The intention of these schemes is to encourage investment and hence the 
accumulation of capital (financial, physical or human).  Hence it would be desirable 
for grants must be spent on investment opportunities.  There would be no surer way 
to lose popular and political support for a system of capital grants than a few well-
publicised cases of young people blowing their grants on cocaine or wild holidays. 
 
The size of the grant may in itself be of importance here.  While it may be tempting 
to launch such a scheme with a small grant to introduce the idea, as the British 
Government is doing, there is a danger then that it is seen to be insignificant by the 
recipient, who might then feel quite justified in blowing it for a bit of fun.  The sum 
needs to be seen as significant, providing a one-off opportunity that justifies careful 
consideration.  Instinct says that a grant of a thousand or two may fall between 
stools, being insufficient for most worthwhile investments.  Hence my and David 
Nissan’s suggestion of a £10,000 grant. 
 
It would be possible to make a respectable case for this level of grant to be given 
unconditionally on the grounds that ultimately adults do have to take responsibility 
for their own lives, and that young adults have to learn to do so.  As it is, there would 
be plenty of social pressure on eighteen year-olds not to blow their grants; to add to 
that pressure by confining the grants to only certain kinds of spending might be seen 
as unacceptable state paternalism. 
 
Indeed, this is the argument put forward by Ackerman and Alstott, who do not put 
any restrictions on how their grant is to be used. However, they do restrict the 
recipients to those with a high school diploma and without a criminal record. 
Interestingly, the possibility of these kinds of restrictions has not been raised in the 
British case. This is perhaps because it is felt that they would exclude precisely those 
who would most benefit from the scheme.  
 
Currently the British Government is proposing no restrictions on the use of its child 
trust fund. This is largely for practical reasons: the impossibility of policing the 
restrictions.  So it is important for those who advocate restricting use to spell out how 
the restriction process might work. Nissan and I  have suggested that the grants could 
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be paid into a special account held in the individual recipient's name either in a local 
commercial bank or in a local branch of a network of publicly owned savings 
institutions set up by the Government specifically for this purpose.  The account 
would have a special name: since its purpose is for the (A)ccumulation of (C)apital 
and (E)ducation, this suggests the simple acronym ACE. ACE accounts would be 
handled by a set of trustees, whose purpose would be to approve the spending plans 
of individuals before releasing any capital; hence individuals would only be able to 
draw money from the account to spend on approved purposes, as defined by the 
trustees. 
 
Having quality ACE trustees would clearly be important to this aspect of the scheme.  
For they would not only have to vet the spending plans, but also ensure that the 
money was spent in the way proposed.  They could be specially employed by the 
local institution to vet the spending plans of all the grants being given out by that 
branch; alternatively they could be drawn from panels of local business people and 
other community leaders, on a voluntary basis, perhaps through the Business in 
Community scheme. 
 
What sort of investment purposes should they approve?  One obvious possibility is 
higher and further education: a way of accumulating human capital and hence 
increasing an individual's value to the labour market.  The grant could be used to 
contribute to the fees and maintenance costs for a university education, or to the costs 
of more vocational forms of training.  To ensure compliance, it could be paid through 
the educational institution concerned, in much the same way as the present student 
grant and loan scheme. 
 
Another use for the grant might be for the down-payment on a house or flat purchase. 
Unpublished research by Gavin Smart suggests that for many poor people the down 
payment is the biggest obstacle to home-ownership; once the down payment is made, 
people have a commitment to their homes and usually manage to keep up the 
mortgage payments regardless of any income or employment problems they 
encounter.  Again to ensure compliance the payment could be made directly to the 
vendor. 
 
The grant could also form part of the start-up costs of a small business.  The 
development of a business plan and its approval by the trustees would be essential - 
which makes it the more desirable to include local business people among the 
trustees. 
 
What should happen if no worthwhile uses are proposed for an individual’s ACE 
account?  One option would be for the grant to be put towards a personal or 
stakeholder pension.  The pension schemes could be drawn from an approved list, 
and payment made directly from the ACE account to the scheme. 
 
Such arrangements could not prevent all abuse, and it would be pointless to pretend 
otherwise.  Assets bought through trustee approved distributions must at some future 
date be saleable, and use of the proceeds could not easily be monitored.  It is not 
unheard of for the offspring of the wealthy to fritter away their fortunes; and it will 
always be in the nature of some of the recipients of our capital grant to do so.  What 
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counts is for everyone to get his or her opportunity. Thereafter, as in many other 
aspects of life, it should be up to them. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Stakeholding grants are an idea whose time has come - at least in Britain. As we have 
seen, there are implementation issues to be overcome, and the Government’s 
proposals have yet to be incorporated into legislation. But the signs are good. It is to 
be hoped that some at least of the British discussions will be of use to other countries 
that may be considering going down this road.    
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  7 
A Swedish-Style Welfare State Or Basic Income: 
Which Should Have Priority? 
Barbara R. Bergmann 
 
 
The Stakeholding and Basic Income proposals (Ackerman and Alstott, 2001; Van Parijs, 
2001) both involve taxing large amounts from some citizens to finance large cash 
payments to all citizens. I take the major aim of both to be to make living standards more 
equal than they otherwise would be, to reduce individuals’ dependence on the labor 
market, and to provide more choices, greater opportunities, and more security, 
particularly to those who happen to be born to low-income parents. While these are 
desirable ends, I am going to argue that, for people holding progressive views, a 
Swedish-style welfare state, with state provision of a long list of expensive services, plus 
targeted cash payments to those in special circumstances, has higher priority. As an 
analysis of the Swedish budget will show, we cannot do both at current levels of per 
capita income. A generous welfare state is currently incompatible with large universal 
cash payments because of the problems that accumulate as the rate of taxation is pushed 
to very high levels. The time to consider introducing Universal Basic Income in each 
country is after the establishment of a well-funded welfare state. It could then be phased 
in slowly, as productivity rises and the labor needed to produce a given level of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) falls. 
 
The funds that Universal Basic Income or Stakeholder grants would require 
currently have alternative uses that are of higher priority. In particular, there is a class of 
“merit goods”--goods and services that it is in the public interest that every citizen have 
access to–that are best provided universally by government. Cash payments that are 
targeted toward people in particularly needy circumstances might also have higher 
priority than Basic Income or Stakeholder grants. These include children’s allowances 
and unemployment insurance, and above-subsistence-level pensions to the elderly and to 
the disabled. There is a practical limit to the portion of the GDP that can be taken by 
taxes. If the list of merit goods and targeted cash payments that progressives would have 
good reason to endorse is long and expensive, then at current levels of GDP little or no 
taxing capacity may be left over to finance the large cash payments required by the Basic 
Income or Stakeholder schemes. Which goods deserve to be placed in the class of merit 
goods, what targeted cash payments are of high priority, how much it would cost to 
provide these things, and what the limits of taxation should be taken to be are, of course, 
issues that need explicit discussion.  
 
If the list of merit goods is taken to be short and the cost (plus the cost of other 
government functions and cash payments to those in special circumstances such as old 
age or disability) are well inside the taxation limit, then their provision need not interfere 
with the financing of a sizeable Basic Income or Stakeholder scheme. But if, as I shall 
argue, the list of such goods is taken to include those currently provided to citizens of the 
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sizeable universal cash grants at current per capita income levels. 
 
Apart from the problem of finance, there are other disadvantages to the near-term 
all-at-once adoption of these schemes. The disincentives to work they entail would make 
the taxation problem even more acute. Under present conditions, they probably entail 
retrograde effects on gender equality. They would reduce the power of parents vis-a-vis 
their teenage children. 
 
The Stakeholder proposal has severe disadvantages beyond those which both cash 
grant schemes share. The most obvious is the possibility that a not insubstantial portion 
of the citizenry would put large sums of money to uses that most people, quite 
reasonably, would not want to subsidize out of public funds raised from taxpayers: 
gambling, drugs, alcohol, fancy cars and clothing, jewelry. The Stakeholder proposal 
would be likely to cause dissaving, and a reduction in the capital stock below what it 
otherwise might be. 
 
In the United States, it makes political sense for progressives to put their limited 
energy toward advancing welfare state provisions before attempting to sell Basic Income. 
Even with the ascendancy of the right wing in the U.S., it is possible to add government-
provided services to the budget, as the debate about drug benefits for the elderly suggests. 
It is likely that it is more feasible politically to add to the list of government-funded 
goods and services than it is to institute and maintain a program of large cash payments to 
all citizens, since waste and reduced work effort are the probable result of such payments. 
Both in terms of politics and in terms of human needs, putting the achievement of Basic 
Income ahead of the achievement of the welfare state is putting the cart before the horse. 
 
Merit Goods 
 
We label a good or service a “merit good” when (a) we decide that everyone who is in a 
position to utilize it should have access to it and (b) when, in the absence of government 
provision, there are people who would not or could not acquire it on their own. The 
decision that all should have access to a good may be based on expected benefits to 
society, or on humanitarian considerations, or some combination of both. The worry that 
at least part of the population will not buy a sufficient quantity and quality of a high-
priority good out of their own income will most often arise in the case of a good that is 
expensive relative to households’ income, which may totally preclude some from buying 
it, or might force them to make inordinate sacrifices of even higher-priority goods if they 
are to buy it. The worry may also arise from a paternalistic judgment that households will 
not choose the right thing.  
 
Obviously, different individuals will have different lists of merit goods. The 
extreme libertarians of the Cato Institute would have an empty list. But most people 
would have at least some things on their list. Here are mine. 
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Schooling 
 
The most obvious case of a merit good, and one that is in effect recognized as such by 
liberals and most conservatives alike, is elementary and secondary schooling. Even those 
conservatives in the United States who would like to see many or most children educated 
in privately run schools do not question that the public purse should pay for at least a 
major part of the cost of that education. Schooling is a merit good because (a) it is 
perceived as something no child should be denied, for the child’s own sake, for the 
economy’s sake and as the foundation of the kind of social and political life we desire, 
and (b) because we have good reason to fear that some parents would fail to provide it in 
the quality and quantity deemed necessary. 
 
Nobody would contemplate reducing or eliminating the government’s funding for 
schooling and distributing the funds to the citizenry as a cash grant that could be used for 
anything the recipient chose.
1
 Thus, including an item on your list of merit goods entails 
your deciding that it has higher priority for the funds it requires than a cash grant that 
would cost the same amount. 
 
Schooling also illustrates an important issue relating to quality. Low-quality and 
high-quality schooling are really two different services, and it is high-quality schooling 
that is clearly the merit good we should aim for. That quality is not currently provided in 
many countries. In the United States, higher salaries for teachers, which would allow for 
a far more rigorous process of teacher selection and training, would be a necessary 
condition for more adequate quality, as would reduced class size, better provision for 
dealing with disruptive students, and more funds for schools with a high concentration of 
students needing special services. Such quality-enhancing reforms might well require a 
doubling of current education budgets. 
 
Health Care 
 
A second obvious candidate for merit good status is health care, including access to 
dental care and pharmaceuticals. Most developed countries do provide this on a universal 
basis, and therefore treat it as a merit good. However, as in the case of schooling, there is 
a quality issue that needs to be attended to. In Great Britain, people with painful and 
disabling conditions must wait years for medical treatment, and older people are excluded 
from certain treatments. Britain’s current Prime Minister, who in his first four years of 
office did not find his way clear to allocate enough money to put the health service on a 
decent footing, has proposed establishing a Stakeholder scheme, awarding considerable 
sums of money to healthy people in their early twenties. This would be a truly feckless 
policy. The situation in the United States is even worse, with 40 million people with no 
health insurance. To be campaigning for a program of large cash payments in a country 
 
1 I am not, of course, suggesting that the proponents of cash grant schemes would favor doing this, or that 
doing it would be necessary if we were to want to fund a cash-grant scheme. I am merely trying to 
demonstrate that publicly funded schooling has higher priority than cash grants. 
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where this is the case would be a striking inversion of priorities.
2
 Another quality issue 
that needs addressing is nursing home care for the disabled elderly. 
 
If better schooling and high-quality timely health services were the only goods 
judged to be “merit goods”, then we might well have room for greatly expanded cash 
grants. However, there are arguably others with higher priority than cash grants. 
 
Childcare 
 
A family with two pre-school children in the U.S. needs to spend $12,000-20,000 a year 
to buy care in a childcare center. School-age children with working parents need after-
school care, and recreation programs during the summer. Many parents buy relatively 
cheap “informal” care of probably inferior quality and safety, but even that takes a big 
share of the income of low-wage parents. A program offering free, universal care would 
cost upwards of $120 billion a year; a program with copayments from higher-income 
parents might cost $60 billion. If the very low salaries currently provided to childcare 
workers were to be improved, an additional 20 percent would be added to the cost. 
 
While a generous Basic Income allowance might be used to pay for childcare, 
families with preschool children who used it that way would be living at a considerably 
lower standard than other families. Government provision of child care as a service 
allows families with pre-schoolers to live at the same standard as those of the same 
income who do not need to buy care. Moreover, the Basic Income grant would do 
nothing to upgrade childcare quality. Most parents would spend much of it on other 
things. The provision of childcare would significantly raise the standard of living of low-
wage families with children, as the money they currently spend on care could be used to 
buy other things. 
 
Free or Partially Subsidized College Expenses 
 
Nobody with the ability to take advantage of higher education, including graduate 
education, should be precluded from doing so by financial considerations, as many are 
now. 
 
Mental Health Care 
 
The large number of homeless people testifies to the need for more residential facilities 
for people with mental problems. Previously provided facilities were of low quality, and 
that contributed to the indifference of the public toward closing them. The community-
based mental health facilities that were promised in their place never materialized. We 
should be providing treatment on demand, much of it residential, for drug, alcohol, and 
gambling addiction . For those not needing care in therapeutic facilities, generously 
subsidized access to pharmaceutical and talking therapies should be provided. Parents 
 
2 Nobody would consider it sensible to say that we could make sure everybody had health insurance by 
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with children with developmental deficits and people taking care of parents with 
Alzheimers need special help. 
 
Decent Housing 
 
The United States currently has a program helping low-income people with their housing 
costs. It works on the principle that families should not have to spend more than 30 
percent of their income for housing. But the program is not an entitlement so limited 
appropriations allow only a small percentage of families eligible for this kind of aid to 
receive subsidies. In an adequate welfare state, the program would be fully funded. 
 
Public Transportation 
 
Public transportation requires at least partial subsidization. Greater provision would slow 
global warming, reduce sprawl, preserve green spaces, save energy, revitalize city 
centers. 
 
Social Work Services 
 
Far more generous funding of child protection services would be desirable, as well as 
services that work with troubled youth, released offenders, people with trouble managing 
their family lives or finances. 
 
Basic Income Would Not Insure the Private Purchase of Merit Goods 
 
One thing to notice about the menu of merit goods I have outlined is that the Basic 
Income and Stakeholder schemes would not by themselves insure the provision any of 
these things to all citizens. Unless a well-developed welfare state were established first, 
those people who currently lack these kinds of merit goods, as many do today in the 
United States, would remain without them despite their Basic Income grants. While under 
such schemes, lower-income citizens who took jobs would be more affluent than they are 
now, many would (as they do now) fail to buy health insurance, suffer with poor quality 
public schools, send their children to low-quality care, fail to get the mental health 
treatment they need, live in slummy dwelling units, and so on. 
 
Most of these goods and services are very expensive, relative to income, and the 
boost that Basic Income would give to the income of low-earners would not suffice to 
insure that everybody would choose to include them in their household budget, or indeed 
could do so. The situation would be even worse for those who chose to refrain from paid 
work. In the case of many of these merit goods, such as high quality education and health 
insurance, the failure of a family to include them may be without obvious immediate 
negative consequences to the family, so the temptation to exclude them will be high. 
 
Under a welfare state, with the provision of all of the merit goods I have listed, 
plus cash grants to citizens with special needs, even those with jobs with a relatively low 
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living. If instead we provide only the Basic Income and few or no merit goods beyond 
education, then many will still lack important ingredients of decency. 
 
The Problem in Financing Basic Income 
 
If one agrees that it is a high priority to provide a substantial and expensive list of good 
quality merit goods to all citizens, then Basic Income or Stakeholder’s payments, if 
adopted, must be in addition to the provision of merit goods, not instead of such 
provision. Is this possible under current conditions? One way to consider this question is 
to look at Sweden’s welfare state, which provides most if not all of the merit goods listed 
above. We can then ask whether it would be feasible for Sweden to tack a Basic Income 
scheme onto its existing budget. Relevant magnitudes are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Swedish Gross Domestic Product, year 2000 
(percent share) 
 
Consumption expenditure by households:  51% 
                  financed by income from wages and 
                  other personal after-tax income 
            32% 
 
                   financed by government cash benefits 
                   to households* 
            19 
 
 
Consumption expenditures, public sector* 
 
 
26 
Non-consumption portion of GDP (Investment, 
net inventory change, net exports, other): 
23 
                   financed by public sector*                15 
                   financed by private sector  
 
               8 
TOTAL GDP   100% 
total public sector (sum of * items)   60% 
Source: Calculations based on data from the Swedish Ministry of Finance. 
 
Government revenue in Sweden totals 60 percent of Gross Domestic Product, as 
compared with about 30 percent in the United States. Of this, Swedish government cash 
payments to households with special characteristics (old-age pensions, payments to the 
disabled, unemployment insurance, child allowances, paid parental leave, etc.) take up 19 
percent of GDP. Another 26 percent of GDP goes for the purchase or production of goods 
and services provided by government to citizens. These include the kinds of merit goods I 
listed in the previous section, as well as services like garbage collection, defense, 
policing, inspection, administration, etc. The remaining 15 percent of GDP in the 
government’s budget is used to finance items considered to be fixed capital investments, 
such as roads and other permanent structures. 
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GDP, of which, as we have seen, 19 percent of GDP is financed from government cash 
payments. The remaining 32 percent of GDP that households spend for consumption is 
financed by the wage and property income that is left to households after they pay their 
taxes.  
 
Adding a Basic Income to the Swedish budget would require large cash payments 
to the sizeable body of people not currently receiving any such payments from 
government, namely the citizens who are not unemployed, not retired, without young 
children, not disabled, etc. Sending a check equal to a poverty line income to every adult 
between the ages of 20 and 65 would take about 15 percent of the GDP of a country with 
a per capita income like that of Sweden or the United States.
3
 Some of those currently 
receiving cash payments from government would receive more than they now do under 
a Basic Income scheme. It is unlikely that any would receive less.  
 
Assuming that no diminution is desired in public sector consumption 
expenditures, the funds to finance the additional cash payments to households would 
have to come from an increase in government revenue. The precise amount required 
would depend on the characteristics of the scheme that was adopted, including the extent 
to which the current cash payments to households in special circumstances were 
discontinued or diminished. However, the amount of the increase could not be small, and 
the reward in terms of after-tax income that came to those participating in production 
would be considerably lowered. 
 
A Basic Income in a country with a welfare state as developed as Sweden’s would 
have to be financed by a shift of funds from the first category in Table 1 to the second.  
 
For example, if an extra 15 percent of GDP were added to cash payments by 
government to households, those extra funds would have to be taxed away from 
households’ wage and property income now devoted to buying consumer goods, now 32 
percent of GDP, leaving households just 17 percent of GDP as their net reward for their 
participation in the production of the entire GDP.
4
 That could hardly be tolerated. 
 
So at present levels of per capita GDP, we must choose between the list of merit 
goods and cash payments for those in special circumstances (the welfare state) on the one 
hand and the Basic Income scheme on the other. You cannot have both. Some 
compromise might be possible–a smaller Basic Income combined with a stripped down 
list of merit goods. Those who advocate the Basic Income scheme should indicate which 
of the menu of merit goods they propose to do without. 
 
3 I have used American magnitudes to estimate this. The poverty line income for an individual under 65 
was $8,959 in the year 2000. There were 162.6 million people between 20 and 65, and GDP was $10,000 
billion. The calculation is roughly applicable to countries like Sweden that have similar levels of per-capita 
GDP to the United States. 
 
4 I am ignoring here the amount of wage and property income that households use for investment, that is 
presumably included in the 8 percent of GDP the private sector uses to finance such expenditure. 
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If we choose to develop the welfare state first, then at a later date, as productivity 
growth occurs it will be possible to use some of the additional resources to phase in 
universal cash payments. However, it is not necessarily true that in the near future such 
payments would be judged to be the best use of the additional resources generated by 
growth. Additional or better quality goods that might be provided by government, and 
greater payments to citizens in special situations might take priority. Sweden, for 
example, currently has plans to augment the welfare state they already have by increasing 
subsidies for child care from their present level. 
 
However, we may reach a stage where people feel content with the already 
achieved the list of government-provided goods and the special needs cash grants. Then 
as the economy grows, the absolute level of spending on them could be maintained, but 
that would amount to progressively smaller percentages of GDP being spent that way. 
Some of the additional income could be distributed as a tax-financed uniform payment to 
all citizens. These payments could start small and grow over time. 
 
Pros and Cons of the Welfare State 
 
Those of us who favor giving merit goods priority over Basic Income have to face the 
fact that like any other human system, the welfare state is subject to problems and abuses. 
A government service that starts out as adequately financed may through time be allowed 
to deteriorate through a failure to continue to allocate sufficient resources, as the case of 
the British health service shows. The distribution of government expenditures may 
unduly reflect the clout of certain parts of the electorate (the elderly, for example), or be 
the result of energetic lobbying by the small self-interested groups, rather than the result 
of a rational assessment of needs based on humanitarian considerations.
5
  
 
Lack of competition may cause public authorities to produce a narrow range of 
unattractive goods and services, which poorly meet the needs and tastes of the 
population. In the United States, there is a tendency for government-provided goods to be 
unevenly distributed. Less resources go to public schools in low-income neighborhoods 
than to those in higher-income neighborhoods. The corps of civil servants that 
administers programs may grow to excessive size and become dictatorial, inefficient, 
dilatory, and corrupt, tendencies that were in full flower in the Soviet Union. All of these 
possibilities certainly exist. 
 
The experience of France, the Low Countries, and the Scandinavian countries 
suggest, however, that these tendencies can, at least in certain contexts, be overcome. It is 
certainly simpler to administer a Basic Income scheme than it is to see to the production 
of a whole raft of government provided services, or for government to fund and supervise 
the provision of such services by private firms. But these countries have shown that high 
quality government provision is possible. 
 
5 “Tax expenditures”, the tax breaks to particular groups, are also pertinent. 
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Work Incentive and Gender Issues 
 
For many of its adherents a major attraction of Basic Income is that the guarantee would 
allow those who wished to refrain from working at a paid job to do so. If a sizeable Basic 
Income benefit were to be introduced, and significant numbers were to decide to do 
without earned income, the supply of goods and services traded for money would 
suddenly fall. Yet the number of claimants on that supply would stay the same. There 
might be an increase in the amount of unpaid work, but the net effect on the average 
standard of living would most likely be negative. Per capita consumption and per capita 
income would fall. Presumably, only people working for wages would pay income and 
payroll taxes, and so a reduction in their numbers would reduce tax revenues, just as the 
need would be arising for increased tax revenue to finance the Basic Income grants. 
 
The fewer people there are to pay taxes, the higher must tax rates be to achieve 
any particular amount of revenue. The higher the tax rate on earned income the less the 
reward from working for pay. This looks like a vicious circle: fewer working for pay, 
causing lower tax revenues, requiring an increase in tax rates, causing fewer to work for 
pay, and so on. 
 
Van Parijs discusses at some length the possibility that Basic Income provision 
could be structured so as to make work for pay rewarding, by keeping the marginal tax 
rate low. However even at a zero tax rate for the lower income ranges, the “income 
effect” of receiving a sizeable cash grant will reduce the incentive to take a paid job. 
 
A second, and even more serious effect, and one that would probably be fatal to 
continuance of the scheme, if not to its adoption, would be resentment of those publicly 
supported with no special circumstances like disability or old age to justify that support.
6
 
For better or worse, the activity of supporting oneself through paid work is now a 
requirement for respect in Western society, for rich and poor alike. Being a non-
jobholding person supported by the paid work of other family members still brings 
respectability, but not full respect, as men’s and women’s roles in the economy become 
more alike. Being on the public dole without having some disability that justifies it brings 
no respect whatever.  
 
One frequently mentioned aim by proponents of Basic Income would be to allow 
parents to stay home with young children. Under current cultural conditions, the vast 
 
6 The resentment shown in the United States in the last few decades against those single mothers receiving 
cash welfare grants predicts the state of public opinion under a Basic Income scheme. Single mothers’ 
welfare payments were considered to be justified, at least by some, on the grounds that they were doing 
valuable work by taking care of their own children. But that justification did not prevent vitriolic and 
eventually successful attacks on the system of cash welfare grants, attacks that were probably supported by 
a majority of American voters. Those without children who wanted to depend on public support would not 
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majority of those who would do that would be women. As Ingrid Robeyns (2000) argues, 
a withdrawal from the labor force by many women would be likely to reverse at least 
some of the progress that women have made in status and wages in the last half of the 
twentieth century. Many if not most employers have come to see women as likely to be 
continuous labor force participants, not inevitably destined to leave the work force, and 
therefore as people worth training, worth putting into jobs leading to promotion, worth 
considering for promotion. This kind of progress would be reversed if a higher proportion 
of women withdrew from the labor force when their first child was born. For this reason, 
the full-blown implementation of Basic Income schemes in the near future should not 
appeal to those for whom gender equality is an important goal. Perhaps in the future 
economic, housekeeping, and parenting activities will have become less differentiated by 
gender. Then Basic Income would affect the behavior of both sexes more equally, and 
would have lost its anti-equality effect. 
 
A final problem with Basic Income would be a loss of power over children by 
their parents. If children’s payments were large enough to allow them to live apart from 
their parents (perhaps with other teens), parents might be under pressure to let teenagers 
live separately on “their own” money. The availability of Basic Income for life would 
make the prospect of taking up a career less attractive, and reduce some teens’ 
educational efforts. For modern parents, getting children through the teenage years 
without major damage is difficult enough now. Basic Income might well make it a 
nightmare. This is  not a problem that is likely to diminish through time. 
 
Conclusion 
 
At current levels of per-capita income and production there is no room in the budget for 
both the Swedish welfare state and Basic Income. One must choose one or the other to do 
first. The fully developed welfare state deserves priority over Basic Income because it 
accomplishes what Basic Income does not: it guarantees that certain specific human 
needs will be met. Both the welfare state and Basic Income reduce inequality of 
condition. But the welfare state does so with greater efficiency, because it takes better 
account of inequalities due to differences in needs. If I need an expensive operation and 
you don’t, giving both of us a Basic Income grant will not go far to make our situations 
more equal. Only the provision of health services has the chance of doing that.  
 
People on the left, who have limited energy, should in the immediate future 
concentrate on achieving provision of a satisfactory menu of government-provided merit 
goods. When this has been accomplished, then will be the time to consider starting to 
phase in Basic Income. If through time the capital intensity of production and 
productivity rise, then as a result the demand for labor may shrink.
7
 A progressively 
lower labor force may become desirable, and Basic Income grants may be the best way of 
 
7 A rise in productivity through time is by no means guaranteed forever. A big rise in demand for the kinds 
of personal services that cannot be assisted by capital goods is possible, reducing the ratio of the value of 
output to labor. 
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distributing an increasing share of the national income. But in the near and medium-term 
future, in a country like the United States which is very far from providing a decent list of 
high priority merit goods, Basic Incomes’ attractive features don’t trump extending the 
guarantee of merit goods to all citizens. 
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The Effects of a Basic Income Guarantee on Poverty and Income 
Distribution
∗ 
Irwin Garfinkel, Chien-Chung Huang, Wendy Naidich 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A universal demogrant, credit income tax (Garfinkel, 1983), or to use the current term, a Basic 
Income Guarantee (Van Parijs, 1992, 2001) is a universal cash benefit paid to all citizens.  
Entitlement is based only on citizenship.  The same benefit is paid to all regardless of income, 
wealth, or work history.  Benefit amounts vary only with age.   
 
  Advocates of BIG stress different justifications, including promotion of freedom, 
increased economic efficiency, and reduction in poverty.  For example, Wilderquist and Lewis 
(1997) in good Rawlsian fashion asserts that the ultimate goal of social policy is to reduce 
poverty to the greatest extent possible, and goes on to argue that Guaranteed Income “ is the 
most efficient and comprehensive method to attack poverty” (pg. 1).  Research supports this 
claim. Programs aimed directly at poor people via income-testing have done little to alleviate 
poverty (Burtless, 1994).  These programs create strong disincentives to work in the legitimate 
labor market, are stigmatizing, and promote divisions among population groups rather than 
solidarity (Garfinkel, 1982).  Non-income tested programs, on the other hand have been highly 
effective in lifting people out of poverty as well as in serving non-poor people. Entitlement to 
BIG is based on citizenship rather than income. As such, BIG does not involve a separate income 
test with an implicit marginal tax rate on income that is higher than marginal rates in the positive 
tax system.  This is a special appeal of BIG.  Under the present system, as our poorest citizens 
who are aided by our safety net programs begin to earn income, they must forfeit a large portion 
of their means-tested transfers as their income rises.  The rate of this marginal tax is significantly 
higher than the highest rates in income tax rate — 50% to 60% is common, and, if the loss of 
Medicaid is at stake, over 100% — making it difficult for a family to work itself out of poverty, 
and discouraging low income persons from supplementing their income by working. 
 
  As detailed by Van Parijs (1992, 2001) Widerquist (2001a, 2001b), proposals for BIG 
range from very small (Friedman, 1966) to so big as to be unachievable (Schutz, 1996).   In the 
1960’s a number of economists, including three future Nobel Prize winners proposed variants of 
BIG, which in those days was referred to as the Negative Income Tax (NIT).  Milton Friedman 
(1966) advocated a very small NIT—a refund of unused income tax deductions--as a substitute 
for all other social welfare programs.  James Tobin advocated a far more generous NIT—a 
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universal tax credit or demogrant—as a substitute for only a limited set of existing programs.  
James Meade’s proposal for Great Britain was similar to Tobin’s.  A fourth economist, Robert 
Lampman (1971), who unlike the other three specialized in income transfer policy, advocated a 
modest NIT not as a substitute for, but rather as an addition to, the existing set of income transfer 
programs.  The range of generosity in today’s proposals for a BIG is equally impressive.   At the 
same time, there is little empirical evidence on the effects of variations in generosity on costs 
and poverty reduction. 
 
  Whether described as a demogrant, a guaranteed income, or one of a number of other 
labels, most advocates believe that BIG should be judged by the degree to which it reduces 
poverty.  Surprisingly, however, there are few empirical estimates of the extent to which various 
BIG proposals reduce poverty.  This paper is designed to fill that gap.  In the next section of the 
paper, we describe the benefit structure and financing of four different BIG Plans.  In sections 
three and four respectively, we describe the data and methodology and report our estimates of 
poverty reduction and costs. In section five, we discuss a few considerations for the optimal size 
of a BIG. The paper ends with a brief summary and conclusion.  
    
THE BIG PLANS 
 
Benefit Structure 
 
The BIG alternatives examined in this simulation are designed to place a high percentage of 
families above the poverty threshold, whether the family has a productive (working) adult or not.  
For families in which there are members who can work, the BIG amounts will be given to help 
them escape from poverty through their endeavors to work.   
 
  We simulate four different BIG plans that we have named as follows:  Standard Plan, 
Children Plus Plan, Single-Parent Plus Plan, and the Adult Plus Plan.The first plan, the 
Standard Plan, provides a baseline from which the other plans depart.  In the Standard Plan, all 
children up to age 18 receive a BIG of $2,175 per year; all adults between the age of 18 and 65 
receive a $4,000 per year BIG.  The elderly receive $8,000 or their social security payment.  In 
all plans OASDI beneficiaries are held harmless, meaning that OASDI recipients receive either 
their OASDI benefit or BIG, whichever is higher. The benefit structure of the four plans are 
summarized succinctly in Table 1. 
 
  The BIG, in all plans, is taxable.  The net gain for people with higher incomes is smaller 
than for people who are poor.  For example, if a person pays a federal income tax rate of 40%, 
the net gain of the BIG of $4,000 is only $2,400.  
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Table 1 
The Basic Income Guarantee Plans 
 
Plan Name  Benefits  Financing 
Standard Plan  Elderly (E) $8,000; 
Adult (A) $4,000;  
Children (C) $2,175 
 
OASDI kept harmless. 
Offsets from OASDI. 
Elimination of 115 programs. 
Elimination of personal 
exemptions. 
Taxation of BIG benefits. 
Children Plus Plan  E $8,000; A $3,150;  
C $4,000 
 
OASDI kept harmless. 
Offsets from OASDI. 
Elimination of 115 programs. 
Elimination of personal 
exemptions. 
Taxation of BIG benefits. 
Single-Parent Plus Plan  E $8,000  
First A with children $6,000 
Other A $3,000 
C $2,700 
 
OASDI kept harmless. 
Offsets from OASDI. 
Elimination of 115 programs. 
Elimination of personal 
exemptions. 
Taxation of BIG benefits. 
Adult Plus Plan  E $8,000; A $6,000;  
C $2,000 
 
OASDI kept harmless. 
Offsets from OASDI. 
Elimination of 115 programs. 
Elimination of personal 
exemptions. 
Taxation of BIG benefits. 
Imposition of a federal 
contribution equal to a 
proportional tax rate of  0.0548. 
  The Children Plus, Adult Plus, and Single Parent Plus plans, respectively, focus higher 
benefits on children, prime age adults, and single parents.  Note from Table 1 that the Children 
Plus Plan not only raises the benefits per child from $2,175 to $4,000, but also lowers the benefit 
per adult from $4,000 to $3,150.  Similarly, the Single Parent Plus Plan not only raises the 
benefit to a single parent from $4,000 to $6,000, but also raises the benefit to all children from 
$2,175 to $3,000, and lowers the benefit for all other adults to $3,000.   
 
Financing of The BIG Plans 
 
Three of the four BIG plans are paid for solely by offsets from Old Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI) and the elimination of 115 other existing federal programs.  The 
Adult Plus Plan, the most generous of the plans, requires additional taxation of all citizens 
amounting to slightly over 5 percent of gross income for all citizens. Table 2 illustrates how the 
Standard Plan is financed.  In 1994, there were approximately 70 million children, 160 million 
non-aged adults, and 30 million aged adults.  Thus, the gross costs of the Standard Plan equal 70 Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  120
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million times $2,175, plus 160 million times $4,000, plus 30 million times $8,000, or $1,032 
billion.  Making the BIG taxable and eliminating exemptions raises $170 and $118 billion in tax, 
reducing the net cost of the BIG to $743 billion.  
 
  As described above, recipients of OASDI  receive either their existing OASDI benefits, 
or the BIG, whichever is higher.  As of 1994, OASDI beneficiaries received $313 billion. 
Because they can receive either the BIG or their OASDI benefit, but not both, most of the cost of 
the BIG for these beneficiaries is offset by existing OASDI benefits.  Indeed, as Table 2 shows, 
all but $37 billion of the current costs of OASDI, or $276 billion, offset the costs of the BIG.  
 
Table 2 
Financing The BIG Plan 
 
PROGRAM   1994 Budget 
    (Million) 
 
I.    Gross Costs of BIG  1,030,888
 
II.   Financing  1,031,418
 1.   Revenue from Taxing BIG   169,851
 2.   Eliminating Personal Exemptions  118,227
 3.   Offsets in Social Security: The amounts of Old Age, Survivors,  275,694
       and Disability Insurance ($312.84 billion) minus harmlessness costs 
       Of standard plan ($37.15 billion). 
 4.   Elimination of Federal Programs  467,646
      A. Tax Exemption/Exclusions  256,400
      B. Direct Income Support Programs  89,845
      C. Special Needs/Social Services  48,057
      D. Housing  36,406
      E. Business/Economic Development  14,883
      F. Student Loans  9,033
      G. Farm Subsidies/Price Supports  8,616
      H. Employment Programs  4,406
 
 The last section of Table 2 contains a list of the eliminated programs.  The budget 
numbers included in this part of the table are taken from one of two government-published 
records that reflect actual expenses:  the 1993 Green Book or the 1995 Catalog of Federal 
Domestic Assistance. As indicated in the  Table 2, the total expenditures for the excluded 
programs were $467 billion in 1994, including $256 billion of Tax Expenditures programs, $90 
billion of Direct Income Support Programs, $48 billion of Special Needs and Social Service 
Programs, $36 billion of Housing Subsidies, $14 billion of Business and Economic 
Development, $9 billion of Student  Loans, $9 billion of Farm Subsidies and Price Supports, and 
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categories is provided in Appendix A.   The Adult Plus Plan requires additional financing 
equivalent to a proportional tax on all income of .0548 percentage points. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Microsimulation models provide useful tools for analyzing the effects of proposed changes in 
government programs especially when the changes involve interactions among more than one 
government program, and behavioral responses such as decisions to work.  Therefore, we use a 
microsimulation model to estimate the effectiveness, first, of existing anti-poverty measures and, 
then, of four proposed BIG plans, in reducing poverty, decreasing the poverty gap, and 
redistributing income.  The approach takes data on a large number of families and mimics the 
way that current and then alternative government programs would apply to each individual 
described in the records.  (Citro and Hanushek, 1991)  
 
  The micro-simulation model that we use does not incorporate behavioral changes that 
might result from changes in the transfer structure.  For example, low income mothers dependent 
on TANF would be encouraged to work because unlike TANF, their BIG would not be reduced 
if they worked.  The effect on low income men could go the other way. That is to the extent that 
most such men are not now receiving benefits, BIG will provide them with more income and 
thereby increase their ability to work less if they so choose.  Low income men currently 
receiving benefits, like low income mothers, will work more because unlike their current 
benefits, BIG would not be reduced if they earned more.  BIG may also increase marriage.  But 
none of these effects are captured by our micro-simulation.  The no behavioral change micro-
simulation that we employ measures the first round effects before anyone changes their 
behaviors.  Some related micro-simulation work which incorporates changes in work effort finds 
that the first round effects on poverty and costs are very good estimates of the final total effects 
after taking account of changes in work. (Meyer and Kim, 1998).  
 
  Using specific employment, income, and demographic data on each of the 63,756 
families in the 1995 March Current  Population Survey (CPS) sample, the micro-simulation 
replaces the reported level for 1994 of cash, in-kind and other programs, and tax benefits 
(including personal exemptions) for each family in the sample with a BIG.  In a simplistic 
example, if a family of three receives AFDC, Food Stamps, and a housing subsidy, the income 
from these benefits would be subtracted from their current total income and replaced, in the 
Standard Plan, with $4,000 for the adult and $2,175 for each child for a total of an $8,350 BIG to 
this family.  Each family in the sample is treated individually, and the data is maintained as part 
of the total.   This is a far more exacting way of examining the effects of policy on poverty than 
techniques based on aggregate information.   
 
  Since we first ran these simulations, there have been significant changes in the welfare 
laws, the way the welfare benefits are funded, and in the extent to which people participate in the 
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job training programs.  Also, use of the EITC increased as more people went to work in the late-
nineties and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 improved its enforcement; and, the tax laws have 
changed.  Despite these numerous shifts, we have chosen to stay with the original 1995 data.  If 
we had used a later year in the 1990’s, we would expect that the simulation results might show 
smaller losses at the bottom, however we do not think that the results would be dramatically 
different for a number of reasons. The programs that have changed are relatively small programs;  
changes in some programs are offset by changes in others (e.g., while TANF recipients have 
decreased, EITC recipients have increased); and, many of recent tax changes are set for the 
future.   Additionally, remaining with the 1995 data provides more conservative estimates of the 
benefits of the BIG simulations.  Data from 2000, at the peak of the business cycle, would likely 
result in overestimating how well the BIG plans would do in more typical times. 
 
  We used a six-step procedure in each simulation, except for the Adult Plus Plan in which 
an seventh was added.  The steps of the microsimulation model are:   
 
1.  Select Representative Population Data Base, 1995 March CPS 
 
2.  Reconcile the Microdata from the CPS with Administrative Record Data 
 
3.  Impute the Value of the In-Kind and Other Programs 
 
4.  Calculate the Value of the Current System (Posttransfer and Posttax Income Plus In-
Kind and Imputed Benefits) from Pretransfer and Pretax Income 
 
5.  Eliminate the Current System 
 
6.  Simulate the BIG Plans 
 
7.  For Adult Plus Plan: Add In the Financing of the System 
 
Step 1: Select Representative Population Data Base 
 
This simulation is based on the 1995 March CPS.  The CPS, conducted by the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, is a monthly cross-sectional survey of a large sample of the U.S. population.  In 
the 1995 survey, CPS interviewed 63,756 families, which included 149,642 people.  This 
sample is drawn from the U.S. population of  69 million families or 262 million people.  The 
survey contains data on labor force status and income for people, ages 15 and older.  Data 
collected for the basic CPS include demographic characteristics such as age, gender, race, 
marital status and educational attainment; and, labor force participation data such as usual 
weekly earnings, number of hours worked, and type of work.  Annually, in March, 
supplemental employment and income-related data are collected including use of public and 
private transfer programs and receipt of non-cash benefits, such as food stamps.  Income-
related data is based upon income from the prior year. Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  123
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Step 2:  Reconcile the Microdata (CPS) with Administrative Record Data 
 
For the AFDC and Food Stamps programs, for example, discrepancies were noted in both the 
number of recipients and the aggregate costs between the data from the CPS and the 
administrative data recorded in the 1996 Green Book and the 1995 Catalogue of Federal 
Domestic Programs.  We, therefore, reconciled the data using the eligibility criteria described 
in the 1996 Green Book.  Discrepancies are due, we believe, to the underreporting of the 
receipt of benefits.  Underreporting occurs when recipients do not report the benefit at all, or 
report an amount lower than the actual amount of the benefit received.  It may be the result of 
the stigma attached to receiving income-tested benefits. 
 
  If the number of recipients reported in CPS data was less than the number reported in 
the 1996 Green Book, we examined the CPS data to determine how many people who were 
eligible to receive the benefit did not report receiving it.  If the number of recipients 
reporting the benefit plus the number of eligible people-not reporting was equal to or slightly 
higher than the number reported in the administrative data, we assumed conformity.  CPS 
data counts the number of recipients during the previous year; Green Book data is based on 
the average monthly recipients. We expected, therefore, that the imputed CPS data would be 
somewhat higher than Green Book data.  See Appendix B for additional detail on other 
programs. 
 
Step 3: Allocate the Value of the In-Kind and Other Programs to the CPS Data 
 
The value of most in-kind programs and some other programs is not included in the CPS 
data.  We, therefore, estimated the value of the benefits from these programs.  This value was 
then added to each family’s posttransfer and posttax income to get the income of 
posttransfer, posttax, and in-kind and imputed benefits.  There are two parts to the 
calculation of in-kind and other programs:   
 
  (1)  Determine the amount of in-kind and other program benefits that each family is 
likely to receive based on the budgeted amount.  The allocation is based on the incidence 
assumption of each program as indicated  in Column 2 of Appendix A.  Six different 
allocation methods were assumed because of the different methods that the programs use to 
distribute funds.  Where CPS is indicated in the incidence assumption column of an in-kind 
benefit, the allocation method is described in Appendix B. 
 
  (2)  Discount the amount calculated in the first step by a percent to reflect the actual 
value of the benefit received.  This reflects a discount for administrative costs and the fact 
that the actual value of in-kind benefits and services is lower than the value of cash.  The 
Food Stamps program in 1993 was $26 billion, of which $3.2 billion were for administration 
costs.  In addition, in-kind benefits or services are worth less to recipients than cash because 
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less than $22.8 billion.  To determine what percent would show up in the family income of 
recipients, we estimated the value of the in-kind and other programs at three levels: 100%, 
75%, and 50% (see Table 3).  The 100% and 50% assumptions allowed us to bracket the 
high and low projections respectively.  We used the 75% assumption, the intermediate 
projection, for the microsimulations believing that this most accurately reflected the actual 
benefit. 
 
Step 4:  Calculate the Value of the Current System (Posttransfer and Posttax Income 
Plus In-Kind and Imputed Benefits) from Pretransfer and Pretax Income 
 
The family income presented in the CPS data reflects all cash-transfers, without 
incorporating tax liability.  This is the posttransfer, pretax income.  In this step, we first  
calculate the pretransfer, pretax income by subtracting all the cash-transfer benefits.  Then, 
each family’s tax liability for federal income tax, earned income tax credit (EITC), and 
payroll tax is deducted from the posttransfer, pretax income.  We then distribute the in-kind 
benefits and other program benefits into posttax, posttransfer income.  This gives us the 
Current System, each family’s posttransfer, posttax income plus in-kind and imputed benefits 
at the 100%, 75%, and 50% levels.   
 
Step 5: Eliminate the Current System 
  
In this step, we removed all the benefits of the current system from family income.  We 
started by removing in-kind benefits and benefits from other programs from the current 
system income at the 75% assumption.  Then, we took away the tax exemptions and 
exclusions.  Since the cash-transfer benefits were included in the CPS data, we deducted the 
value of the benefit at the micro level directly, using CPS data. 
 
Step 6: Simulate the BIG Plans 
 
In this step, we allotted the BIG benefits to each person.  The criteria to determine the 
amount of BIG was based on age and family status, that is, whether you are an adult in a one- 
or a two-parent family.  Recipients of OASDI are treated differentially depending on whether 
the BIG amounts exceed their OASDI benefits.     
 
Step 7 (for the Adult Plus Plan): Add In the Financing of the System 
  
In the Adult Plus Plan, the cost of the BIG exceeded the cost of the current system by $233 
billion.  In order to finance this system, an increase in income tax rates of 0.0548 is imposed. 
   
  We make a number of assumptions that merit further examination.  For example, the 
values attributed to in-kind benefits may vary from the actual value of these benefits.  
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To place our results for poverty reduction in historical perspective, we begin this section with 
a brief review of the recent trend in US social welfare expenditures and poverty rates. Then 
we present our simulation estimates of the effects of various BIG proposals on poverty, and 
the vertical and horizontal distribution of income.  
 
The US context  
 
After a sharp drop between 1959 and 1969, when the economy boomed and social spending 
increased substantially, the US poverty rate reached a low point of 11.1% in 1973 and leveled off 
through the decade (Danziger, Sandefur, and Weinberg, 1994).  Social spending continued to 
grow during the 1970’s even as the economy slowed, so that the poverty rate was kept in check 
(Burtless, 1994).  The rate began climbing again in the 1980’s and into the 1990’s (U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, 1995) as real wages of low income people continued to fall, real government 
social spending declined, especially in programs directed at the poor, and the number of female-
headed single-parent families increased (Burtless, 1994).   
 
  In 1994, the year we use as the point of departure for our simulations, the poverty 
threshold for a family of four was $15,141
1 and the percentage of people living in poverty 
was as high as in the late 1960’s.  The poverty gap, the amount by which the income of a 
poor family falls below the poverty line, for the median poor family had increased from 
about $1,300 to over $5,000, in 1990 dollars (Danziger and Weinberg,1994).  And, the 
distribution of wealth in the U.S. had become increasingly concentrated among the wealthiest 
Americans (Danziger and Weinberg, 1994).  In 1994, the poverty rate after accounting for 
cash transfers was 14.4% for adults, 21.2% for children and 11.7% for the elderly, with 
female-headed single-parent families and minority households struggling disproportionately. 
 
  As the economy strengthened in the mid-nineties, the poverty rate peaked and then 
began to decline.  By 2000, the percentage of people living in poverty had declined to 11% 
from its high of 15% in 1994; and, the poverty rate for children had declined to 16.2% after 
being as high as 22% in the mid-nineties.  The poverty threshold in 2000 was $17,603.  
The Effect of BIG on poverty 
 
 
1 The poverty threshold is a measure “developed in the early 1960’s as a indicator of the number and proportion of 
people with inadequate family incomes for needed consumption of food and other goods and services” (Citro and 
Michael, 1995).  It is based on the assumption that an adequate family income is three times the cost of the 
minimum diet.  The poverty threshold is adjusted for family size and, for some family types, it is adjusted based on 
the age of the head of the household.  The current method of calculating the poverty threshold does not incorporate 
the value of in-kind benefits, certain expenses incurred by families such as child care, or regional differences in cost 
of living   The poverty threshold is also infrequently reassessed and does not take into account current economic 
conditions.  Although using three times the minimum food budget as a standard when the poverty rate was first 
developed raised people out of poverty, under current conditions in which housing costs are the most significant 
part of family budgets, the food standard is questionable. Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  126
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All four BIG plans reduce the aggregate poverty rate and the aggregate poverty gap.  This is 
true no matter which assumption is made about the value of in kind benefits to recipients.  In 
a few cases, some subgroups are made worse off, if we assume that the worth of in-kind 
benefits to recipients is 100% of its cost to taxpayers.  This assumption is clearly false.  
Recipients gain nothing from administrative costs. We confine the rest of the comparisons to 
the assumption that recipients value the benefits at only 75% of cost.  We believe to be the 
most scientifically accurate of the assumptions.  
 
  All plans provide the elderly with an $8,000 benefit; this immediately raises all 
recipients above the poverty line.  Hence, aged poverty rates fall to 0.3% or less. 
Table 3 
The Effects of the Current Tax Transfer System and BIG Plans on Poverty 
  Poverty Rate 
of Persons 
Poverty Rate 
of Children 
Poverty Rate 
of Elderly 
Poverty Gap 
(billion) 
Pretransfer 
1, Pretax
 2  0.2243 0.2572 0.5038 189.68
Posttransfer, Pretax  0.1437 0.2170 0.1159  79.75
Posttransfer, Posttax  0.1441 0.2121 0.1166  78.06
Current System 
3  (100%)  0.0859 0.1206 0.0588  34.05
Current System 
4  (75%)  0.1001 0.1455 0.0682  42.15
Current System 
5  (50%)  0.1168 0.1729 0.0817  52.27
BIG Plans   
Standard Plan  
6  0.0783 0.1347 0.0029 28.97
Child Plus Plan 
7  0.0605 0.0809 0.0000 23.66
Single Parent Plus Plan 
8  0.0681 0.1026 0.0013 25.25
Adult Plus Plan 
9  0.0581 0.1128 0.0030 17.42
Notes:  
1.  Pretransfer: Before any Cash Transfer (including General Assistance) Programs. 
2.  Pretax: Before Federal Income Tax,  Payroll Tax, and Earned Income Tax Credit. 
3.  Current System: Posttransfer, Posttax, and in-kind and all other Programs except tax expenditures.  The assumption  is that the 
actual value of benefits from in-kind and other  programs is 100 percent of face value of the benefit. 
4.  Same as 3, but the assumption is 75 percent of the face value. 
5.  Same as 3, but the assumption is 50 percent of the face value. 
6.  Standard Plan: Elderly $8,000, Adult $4,000, and Child $2,175 per year.  OASDI kept harmless, i.e., people receive the BIG or 
OASDI, which ever is higher. 
7.  Child Plus Plan: Elderly $8,000, Adult $3,150,  and Child $4,000 per year.  OASDI kept harmless. 
8.  Single Parent Plus Plan: Elderly $8,000, First Adult with children $6,000, other adult  $3,000, and Child $2,700 per year.  OASDI 
kept harmless. 
9.Adult Plus: Elderly $8,000, Adult $6,000,  and Child $2,000 per year.  OASDI kept harmless. Since the plan's cost exceeded the 
eliminated amounts by $233 billion. The authors finance it through a proportional tax rate of 0.0548.  
 
  The adult plus plan does the best job of reducing the overall poverty rate--from 10% 
to under 6%.  These are very significant improvements.  Similarly, the poverty gap would be 
cut by more than half --from $42 billion to $17 billion.  It is not surprising that the Adult Plus 
Plan does the best job of combating poverty.  It is the most expensive to finance.   Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  127
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  The Child Plus Plan, which requires the same financing as the Standard Plan, does 
virtually as good a job as the Adult Plus Plan in reducing overall poverty rates and nearly as 
well in reducing the overall poverty gap.   The Child Plus Plan also does a better job of 
reducing child poverty down to 8% as compared to 11% for the Adult Plus Plan.  
Furthermore the child plus plan does more to reduce poverty than the single parent plus plan.  
If we enriched the financing of the Child Plus Plan by the same 5% of taxable income that 
was done for the Adult Plus Plan and targeted all the extra funds on children, child poverty 
could be nearly wiped out.    
 
The Effect on the Vertical Distribution Of Income  
 
The redistribution effect of the current system on income shares is significant in comparison 
to the pre-transfer, pretax system.  This is particularly true in the lowest and highest 
quintiles.  Before transfer and tax, the lowest 20% of earners received less than 1% of the 
income; the highest received 50%.  The current system raises the lowest quintile to 5% and 
reduces the highest quintile to 43%.   
 
  As indicated in Table 4, all of the BIG plans favor the first three quintiles.  However, 
the degree of additional redistribution is small compared to the redistribution already 
achieved by the current system -- less than a 1 percentage point increase in the first quintile 
in almost all cases.   (The Adult Plus Plan is slightly higher at 1.24%).  In comparison, the 
two highest quintiles do not benefit under the BIG plan.  The fourth quintile receives a 
slightly higher share (never more than 0.2%).  The highest quintile receives a lower portion.  
Under the Adult Plus Plan, in which we impose a tax on the states which is assumed to be 
equivalent to a proportional income tax on individuals, the income share in the highest 
quintile decreases more than 2%.   
 
The Effect on the Horizontal Distribution of Income 
 
Table 5 presents the results of BIG plans on horizontal distribution of income.  Perhaps the 
most striking aspect of Table 5 is the large percentage of families in the first four income 
quintiles who experience either significant increases or decreases in their incomes.  In the 
standard plan, for example, over 80% of families in the bottom quintile gain or lose 10% or 
more, and the figures for the next three quintiles are 71%, 61%, and 46%.  Note that within 
the first three quintile, while more families gain than lose, a large minority of families in 
these quintiles experience significant losses.  The BIG plans redistribute a lot of money even 
within quintiles because they are much less discriminatory than the current mix of programs.   
 
 
 Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  128
Irwin Garfinkel, Chien-Chung Huang, Wendy Naidich 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
The Effects of the Current Tax Transfer System and BIG Plans  
on the Vertical Income Distribution 
 
  1
st Quintile 2
nd Quintile 3rd Quintile  4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Pretransfer,
 Pretax
         0.0085        0.0716        0.1530         0.2632        0.5038 
Current System 
1          0.0511        0.1060        0.1648         0.2514        0.4267 
BIG Plans   
Standard Plan
        0.0544        0.1086        0.1709         0.2526        0.4135 
Child Plus Plan
        0.0541        0.1084        0.1709         0.2533        0.4133 
Single Parent Plus Plan
        0.0539        0.1077        0.1717         0.2533        0.4134 
Adult Plus Plan
        0.0590        0.1118        0.1743         0.2531        0.4018 
Note: 
1.  Current System: Posttransfer, Posttax, and post-imputation of in-kind and all other programs except 
tax expenditures, using the assumption that actual value of in-kind and other program benefits is 75 
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Table 5 
The Effects of the Current Tax Transfer System and BIG Plans  
on the Horizontal Income Distributi on  
 
  1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Current System                 
Percentage of Winners 
1        0.7495        0.5317        0.2913         0.1450        0.0477 
Percentage of Losers 
1        0.0725        0.3073        0.5500         0.7541        0.8482 
Mean Increase of Winners          5,883          9,512        11,503         12,441        19,723 
Mean Decrease of Losers          1,597          3,009          5,093           8,945        22,695 
BIG Plans 
   
Standard Plan                
     Percentage of Winners        0.4706        0.4743        0.4358         0.3702        0.0578 
     Percentage of Losers        0.3601        0.2472         0.1702         0.0927        0.0606 
     Winners' Mean Increase          2,557          3,269          5,395           6,227          7,683 
     Losers' Mean Decrease          3,164          4,627          7,245         10,875        15,745 
Child Plus Plan                
     Percentage of Winners        0.4716        0.3106        0.4078         0.3752        0.1005 
     Percentage of Losers        0.3399        0.2550        0.1757         0.0968        0.0628 
     Winners' Mean Increase          2,241          4,233          5,816           7,638          7,880 
     Losers' Mean Decrease          3,033          4,547          7,350         10,797        15,676 
Single Parent Plus Plan                
     Percentage of Winners         0.4757        0.3050        0.4005         0.3995        0.0789 
     Percentage of Losers        0.3376        0.2555        0.1771         0.0991        0.0633 
     Winners' Mean Increase          2,116          4,352          6,059           7,291          7,266 
     Losers' Mean Decrease          2,978          4,559          7,340         10,674        15,660 
Adult Plus Plan          
     Percentage of Winners        0.4647        0.6014        0.4688         0.4445         0.0881 
     Percentage of Losers        0.3872        0.2390        0.1518         0.0899        0.0803 
     Winners' Mean Increase          3,551          3,791          6,603           7,114          8,624 
     Losers' Mean Decrease           3,217          5,737          9,202         12,605        16,864 
 
Note: 
1.  Winners or losers are those with 10% more or less income than with the previous income base.  The 
income base of current system is pretransfer and pretax, while the base of BIG plan is the current 
system. 
 
 
 
HOW BIG SHOULD BIG BE? 
 Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  130
Irwin Garfinkel, Chien-Chung Huang, Wendy Naidich 
 
 
With one exception, the plans simulated in this proposal are modest sized BIGs. All are 
financed from the elimination of other domestic programs and tax expenditures.  The Adult 
plus plan requires an additional 5.5 percentage points in income tax rates to finance, but 
achieves more poverty reduction.  Non-aged adult benefits could be raised another $2000 to 
equal the aged benefit of $8000 at an additional cost of $320 billion, or 5.7 percentage points 
of additional income taxation.  Why stop with modest programs?  Why not have a much 
bigger BIG?   
 
  There are several answers.  First, BIG is not the only desirable social welfare 
program.  Universal Education and health care are two achievements of the welfare state that 
few BIG advocates would (or should) quarrel with.  Each increases human capital and hence 
the productivity of citizens more than any cash benefit can hope to achieve. Though the US 
pioneered the provision of free public education and the rest of advanced industrialized 
nations did not catch up in secondary education until after World War II, a few countries 
have surpassed the US in very early childhood education.  Sweden and France, for example, 
have nearly universal provision of child care for children.  For the US to provide free 
universal child care would cost around $120 billion (Bergmann, 2002). Other BIG advocates 
may want to add a universal wealth transfer to their menu of desired reforms (Haveman, 
1988;  Ackerman and Alstott, 1999).  Ackerman and Alstott estimate that an $80,000 stake 
for all adults reaching age 18 would cost about $268 billion annually.  Finally, some of the 
programs eliminated in our simulations are undoubtedly worth keeping because for each 
dollar spent they produce more than one dollar’s worth of benefits.  For example, at a cost of 
about $50 billion, we could redesign a less expensive Unemployment Insurance System and 
retain Head Start, WIC, Child Care, Student Loans, and Job-Training Programs.  This $50 
billion shortfall could be financed either by reductions in the BIG of under $200 per  person 
or by increased taxes.  Other readers may want to retain other programs.  For this reason, we 
encourage each reader to review the list of programs in Appendix A.  
 
  Second, in addition to social welfare programs, government provides law and order, 
defense, and transportation and communication infrastructure.  These public goods must be 
financed as well as BIG and other social welfare programs.  If the aggregate tax rate becomes 
too high, incentives will be blunted and productivity and growth will suffer.  
 
  Third, as a general matter in public finance, it is a mistake to rely too heavily on any 
single instrument—be it a tax or a transfer.  Every tax and transfer has adverse incentives. In 
general the adverse effects grow more than proportionally with the size of the tax or benefit.  
Thus while a little or modest BIG, is in our judgment highly desirable, a very big BIG is not 
desirable. Financing a very big BIG would require high marginal tax rates on earnings and 
other sources of income which will discourage work in the legitimate labor market for the 
bulk of the population much like our current welfare programs discourage legitimate work 
amongst our poorest citizens.   
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  The reader will note the similarity of the arguments made in this section to those 
made by Bergmann in her paper.  We agree that the left in the US should not advocate BIG 
as a substitute for other advances in the welfare state such as universal health care and child 
care.  Where we disagree is on the utility of a small to modest BIG as a substitute for many 
existing programs, including partial substitution and restructuring of social insurance 
programs (see Garfinkel, 1983) and as a complement to universal systems of health, 
education, and child care, and social insurance.      
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The BIG plans we simulate decrease poverty more effectively than the current system.  This 
highlights the fact that some of the benefits in the current system, such as tax expenditures 
favor the rich instead of the poor or the middle class.  All the BIG plans redistribute income 
from the highest quintiles to the lower ones.   BIG not only more equitably distributes 
income among the quintiles, but the distribution of benefits is more equitable within the 
quintiles, particularly for people in the first quintile. 
 
   The different BIG plans have different effects on poverty and income distribution.  
Among them, the Adult Plus Plan is the most redistributive of the plans.  It decreases the 
poverty rate of persons most significantly, and favors the first three quintiles, instead of only 
the first quintile.  The Adult Plus Plan, however, is not self-financing.  The equivalent of a 
proportional tax on income of 0.0548 is required to finance the plan. Thus, losers’ mean 
decreases in the Adult Plus Plan are the highest among the plans. In contrast the Children 
Plus and the Single-Parent Plus Plans are self-financing and more focused on children and 
the first quintile. The disadvantage of the Children Plus Plan is that it may be too pronatalist.  
Similarly, the Single Parent Plus Plan, by rewarding single parenthood, may encourage its 
growth.  If the Single Parent Plus Plan is achieved via a child support assurance system, 
however, it will do more good at less cost and will have smaller effects on single parenthood 
than simply increasing benefits for all single parents (Garfinkel, 1992).  These refinements, 
however, should not obscure the basic lesson.  A small to modest BIG is a good fundamental 
building block for the modern welfare state.   
 
  Because other welfare state programs and other government functions are also 
valuable and because a very large BIG would have undesirable incentive effects, a small to 
modest BIG is preferable to a big BIG.   
 Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  132
Irwin Garfinkel, Chien-Chung Huang, Wendy Naidich 
 
 
References 
Ackerman, B., and Alstott, A.  (2001) Why Stakeholding?, Mimeo. 
 
-----------------. (1999). The Stakeholder Society. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Bergmann, Barbara. (2002). A Swedish-Style Welfare State Or Basic Income: Which Should 
Have Priority?  Mimeo. 
 
Burtless, G.  (1994)  Public spending on the poor: Historical trends and economic limits. In S. H. 
Danziger, G. D. Sandifur, D. H. Weinberg (Eds.), Confronting poverty: Prescriptions for 
change (pp. 51-84).  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.   
 
Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance.  (1995)    Washington, D.C.: Office of Management 
and Budget and the General Services Administration. 
 
Citro, C. F. , and Hanusek, E. A.  (Eds.).  (1991)  Improving information for social policy 
decisions: the uses of microsimulations modeling, Vol. 1.  Review and 
Recommendations.  Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.  
 
Citro, C. F.  and Michael, R. T. (Eds.).  (1995)  Measuring poverty: A new approach.  
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
 
Committee on Ways and Means U.S. House of Representatives. (1993,1994, and 1996).  
Overview of Entitlement programs: Green book.  Washington, D.C.:  Government 
Printing Office. 
 
Danziger, S. H., Sandifur, G. D., and Weinberg, D. H.  (1994) Introduction.  In S. H. Danziger, 
G. D. Sandifur, D. H. Weinberg (Eds.), Confronting poverty: Prescriptions for change 
(pp. 1-19).  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.   
 
Danziger, S. H., and Weinberg, D. H. (1994) The historical record: Trends in family income, 
inequality, and poverty.  In S. H. Danziger, G. D. Sandifur, D. H. Weinberg (Eds.), 
Confronting poverty: Prescriptions for change (pp.. 18-50).  Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Friedman, Milton. (1966) The case for the negative income tax: a view from the right. In Issues 
of American Public Policy (J.H. Bunzel ed.), Englewood Cliffs (NJ): Prentice-Hall, 1968, 
111-120.  
 
Garfinkel, Irwin. (1996).  Economic security for children: From means testings and bifurcation 
to universality.  In I. Garfinkel, S. McLanahan, and J.L. Hochschild (Eds.), Social polices 
for children (pp. 33-82).  Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 
 Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  133
Irwin Garfinkel, Chien-Chung Huang, Wendy Naidich 
 
 
------------.  (1992). Assuring child support.  New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
------------.  (1983).  The role of universal demogrant and child support in social security reform: 
An essay in honor of George F. Rohrlich.  International Journal of Social Economics, 
Vol. 10, No. 6/7, pg. 12-20. 
 
------------.  (Ed.).  (1982).  Income tested transfer programs: The case for and against.  New 
York: Academic Press.   
 
------------.  (1979).  Welfare reform: A new and old view.  The Journal of the Institute for 
Socioeconomic Studies, Vol. IV, No. 4. 
 
Greene, L.M.  (1998). The National Tax Rebate: A New America with Less Government. 
Washington/DC, Regnery Publishing Inc. 
 
Haveman, Robert H. (1988) Starting Even.  An Equal Opportunity Program to Combat the 
Nation's New Poverty. New York & London : Simon & Schuster. 
 
Lampman, Robert J. (1971) Ends and Means of Reducing Income Poverty. Chicago, Markham. 
 
Long, Sharon. (1986).  Food stamp research : Results from the Income Survey Development 
Program and the promise of the survey on income and program participation.  
Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Office of 
Analysis and Evaluation. 
 
Meyer, Daniel R. and Rebecca Yeun-Hee Kim.  1998.  "Incorporating Labor Supply Responses 
into the Estimated Effects of an Assured Child Support Benefit." Journal of Family 
Issues.  19:534-55.  
 
Schutz, Robert R.  (1996).  The $30,000 Solution: A guaranteed annual income for every 
American.  Santa Barbara: Fithian Press.  
 
U.S. Bureau of the Census.  (1995).  Current Population Reports, Series P23-189: Population 
Profile of the United States. Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office. 
 
Van Parijs, Philippe (ed.) (1992). Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical 
Reform. New York: Verso. 
 
------- .  (2001). Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the 21
st Century, Mimeo.  
Widerquist, Karl. (2001a). “Perspectives on the Guaranteed Income, part I.” Journal of 
Economic Issues, 35 (3): 749-57.  
 
------------------.  (2001b). “Perspectives on the Guaranteed Income, part II.” Journal of Economic 
Issues, 35 (4): 1019-30. Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  134
Irwin Garfinkel, Chien-Chung Huang, Wendy Naidich 
 
 
 
Widerquist, Karl and Lewis, Michael A.  (1997) An Efficiency Argument for the Guaranteed 
Income; in: The Jerome Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 212.  Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  135
Irwin Garfinkel, Chien-Chung Huang, Wendy Naidich 
 
 
Appendix A: Detailed List of Programs that Offset Costs or Are Eliminated: Budget Costs 
and Assumptions about Their Incidence 
 
PROGRAM   1994  Incidence 
Budget  (Million)  Assumption 
  
I. Offsets in Social Security    
   The amounts of Old Age, Survivors, and Disability  
   Insurance ($312.84 billion) minus harmlessness costs of  
   standard plan($37.15 billion). 
275,694  CPS
 1 
  
II. Elimination of Federal Programs    
A. Tax Exemption/Exclusions    
Exc. of Pension Contribution & Earning  55,300  Note 
2 
Deductibility of Mortgage Interest  45,500  Note 
3 
Exc. Employer Contri. for Med. care & Insurance Premiums 36,700  Note 
2 
Exc. of Soc. Sec. & RR Benefits  28,000  Note 
4 
Deduct. Of property tax on Owner-occupied Housing  13,700  Note 
3 
Exc. of Medicare Benefit  13,100  Note 
5 
Deferral on Sale of Principal Residence  14,300  Note 
3 
EITC 12,200  Note 
6 
Tax Expenditure related to Employment  7,200  Note 
2 
Individual Retirement Plans  6,200  Note 
2 
Tax Expend. related to elderly & disabled  5,900  Note 
7 
Exc. on Sale of Resid. of person 55 & over  4,700  Note 
8 
Deductibility of Medical Expense  3,500  Note 
2 
Keogh Plans  3,000  Note 
2 
Exc. of Interest on Bonds for Owner-occupied and Rental 
Housing 
2,800 Note 
3 
Depreciation of Rental Housing in Excess of Alternative 
System 
1,500 Note 
3 
Credit for Child Medical Insurance Prem.  1,300  Note 
2 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit  1,500  PP 
Subtotal  256,400   
  
B. Direct Income Support Programs    
Unemployment Insurance  27,274  CPS 
Public Assistance (AFDC and General Assistance) 
14  26,612 CPS 
SSI 
15  24,460 CPS 
SSI Administration costs 
15  3,695 GI
 9 
Public Assistance Administration costs 
15  3,282 GI 
Unemploy. Insurance Administration costs 
15  2,485 GI 
Low Inc. Energy Asst.   1,737  CPS 
Weatherization Asst.  206  CPS Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  136
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Indian Gen Asst.  84  PP 
Soc. Sec. Res. & Dev.  10  GH 
10 
Subtotal  89,845   
  
C. Special Needs/Social Services    
Food Stamps   24,434  CPS 
Food Stamps Administration costs 
15  3,665 GI 
School Lunchs  4,350  CPS 
Head Start  3,325  CPS 
Title XX - Social Service  2,807  PCP
 11 
WIC   2,480  CPS 
Child & Adult Care Food Prog.  1,355  PCP & PEP 
12 
Various Food Programs  104  PP 
School Breakfasts  958  CPS 
Child Care Block Grant  892  PCP 
Spec. Programs for the Aging  725  PEP  
Empowerment Zones  640  GI 
Comm. Serv. Block Grant  396  GH 
Corp. for Nat. & Community Service  348  GH 
At Risk Child Care  275  PCP 
Summer Food Program  243  CPS 
Emer. Comm. Serv. for Homeless  198  PP
 13 
Nutrition Programs for the elderly  149  PEP 
Food Donation  118  PP 
State Admin. Expenses for Child Nurtrition  86  CPS 
Emer. Food Asst.  80  PP 
Indian Child  & Native American Programs  74  PCP 
Refugee Assistance  62  PP 
Family Preservation  59  PCP 
CSBG Discretionary, Food & Demo  56  PP 
Comprehensive Child Dev. Center   46  GH 
Food for Soup Kitchens  40  PP 
Runaway & Homeless Youth  36  PCP 
School Milk Program  19  CPS 
Social Service Research & Demo  13  PCP 
Transitional Living for Homeless Youth  12  PCP 
Fam. Support Ctr/Gateway  7  PCP 
WIC Farmers Marketing Nutrition Program  5  PCP 
Subtotal  48,057   
  
D. Housing    
S.8 Vouchers  14,576  CPS 
Off. of Policy & Research  7,506  GH 
Low Income Hsng Asst. (S.8)  5,158  CPS 
Comm. Dev. Block Grant  3,003  PP 
HOME 1,275  CPS 
CDBG/States 1,232  GH Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  137
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Supportive Housing for the elderly  1,162  PEP 
Pres. of Affordable Hsng  398  PP 
Supportive Housing/Disabled  395  PP 
Elderly Home Equity Conversion Mortgage  347  PEP 
Shelter Plus  266  PP 
Public & Indian Housing  263  GH 
Supportive Housing  150  PP 
Operating Assistance for Troubled Projects  136  PP 
Emergency Shelter Grants  115  PP 
S.8 Pension Fund Demo  100  PP 
HOPWA 100  PP 
Hope 1, Hope 2, and Hope 3   92  PP 
Small Cities  54  PP 
Youthbuild 40  PP 
Congregate Housing for the elderly  22  PEP 
Housing Counseling Asst.  10  GH 
Historically Black Colleges and University  6  GH 
Subtotal  36,406   
  
E. Business/Economic Development    
Small Business Admin  14,568  GI 
Appalacian Programs  213  GI 
Overseas Private Investment  75  GI 
TVA Eco. Dev.  18  GI 
Comm.  Asst. Prog. (Flood Insurance)  4  GI 
Indian Business Dev.  3  GI 
CD Revolving Loan Program   2  GI 
Subtotal  14,883   
  
F. Student Loans    
Pell Grants  6,424  GH 
Vocational Ed. Grants  955  PCP 
Fed. Work Study  620  PP 
Fed. Sup. Ed. Opty Grants  585  PP 
Upward Bound  162  PP 
Student Support Services  140  PP 
State Student Incentive Grants  72  GH 
Voc. Ed./Consumer & Homemaking  33  GH 
Indian Higher Ed. Grants  29  PP 
Voc. Ed./State Councils  9  GH 
Legal Training/Disadvantaged   2  GH 
College Asst. / Migrant  2  GH 
Subtotal  9,033   
  
G. Farm Subsidies/Price Supports    
Conservation Reserve Prog.  1,735  CPS 
Wheat Stabilization  1,692  CPS 
Free Grain Stabilization  1,538  CPS Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty  138
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Commodity Loans & Purchase  1,524  CPS 
Cotton Stabilization  1,323  CPS 
Rice Stabilization  559  CPS 
Wool & Mohair  201  CPS 
Emergency Conservation  29  CPS 
Farmer Owned Reserve Prog.  12  CPS 
Small Farmer Outreach Trng  3  CPS 
Subtotal  8,616   
  
H. Employment Programs    
JTPA 3,505  CPS 
JOBS 872  CPS 
Apprentice Trng  Adv. Serv.  17  CPS 
Emp. & Trng R&D  12  CPS 
Subtotal  4,406   
  
Total programs can be eliminated  743,340   
Total programs can be eliminated (except OA and SSI)  522,449   
  
Note:   
1. CPS (Current Population Survey): The expenditure is distributed by micro level data. 
2. The tax expenditure is allocated by the ratios of third party health care benefits according to income  
    levels, as expressed in Table B1 in Irwin Garfinkel (1996). 
3. The tax expenditure is allocated by the ratios of mortgage and tax credit  according to income levels,  
    as expressed in Table B1 in Irwin Garfinkel (1996). 
4. The tax expenditure is allocated by the proportion of the Social Security and Railroad Retirement  
     benefits received within each household. 
5. The tax expenditure is allocated by the criteria of receipt or not of Medicare.  
6. The tax expenditure is allocated by the formula of EITC.   
7. The tax expenditure is allocated to subjects who are elderly or disabled in proportion to their income. 
8. The tax expenditure is allocated to subjects 55 years old or over using ratios of mortgage and tax credit
    according to income levels, as expressed in Table B1 in Irwin Garfinkel (1996). 
9. GI (General Expenditure related to Income): One-half of the expenditure is distributed equally to each 
    family and the other one-half expenditure is distributed by the income portion of the family. 
10. GH (General Expenditure related to Household): The expenditure is distributed equally to each  
       household. 
11. PCP (Program related to Child and Poverty ): One-half of the expenditure is distributed equally to   
      each poor household (below poverty) with child, the other one-half expenditure is equally allotted to  
      families with child between one and two times poverty line. 
12. PEP (Program related to Elderly and Poverty ): One-half of the expenditure is distributed equally to  
      each poor household (below poverty) with the elderly, the other one-half expenditure is equally  
      allotted to families with the elderly between one and two times poverty line. 
13. PP (Program related to Poverty): The 40 percent of the expenditure distributed to the families below  
      1/2 poverty level, the 35 percent expenditure to the families over 1/2 but below poverty level, and the 
       other 25 percent expenditure to the families over poverty but below 1.5 poverty level. 
14. Public Assistance, including AFDC and General Assistance, counted as two programs.  
15. Program benefits and administration costs counted as one program, including SSI, Food Stamp,  
      Unemployment Insurance, and Public Assistance programs. Chapter 8.  The Effects of Basic Income on Poverty 
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Appendix B : Differences In and Reconciliation Of Administrative Reports and CPS Reports on Expenditures 
and Recipients 
 
Program(s)  Admin 
Expend 
(billion)* 
CPS 
Expend 
(billion) 
Admin 
Number 
Recipient 
(million)# 
CPS 
Number 
Recipient 
(million) 
Avg Benefit/ 
Household 
Imputation Assumption of 
Recipients 
Imputation Assumptions for  
Benefits 
OASDI:  
Old Age, 
Survivors, and 
Disability 
Insurance 
 
312.88 
billion (b) 
 
273.49 b        Use the administrative numbers 
since the CPS data is somewhat 
skewed because some of the 
recipients are in institutions and 
therefore are not available to survey.  
(1994 Green Book,  pp. 890-1) 
 
SSI  24.46 b  17.74 b        Same as OASDI.   
AFDC 
 
22.79 b  16.49 b  5.04 million 
(m) 
3.91 m    All eligible single mothers with 
family income lower than the 
government guaranteed income are 
assumed to participate. 
After participant imputation, the 
aggregate number matches the 
administrative data. Participant 
imputation results in 1.51 m 
additional recipients adding 6.3 b 
to the CPS benefit. 
Food Stamps  24.43 b  17.70 b    10.24  
households 
(hh) 
  In addition to recipients reported in 
CPS, assume that families with 
incomes < 30% of the poverty line  
have an 80% probability of 
participation; families with  inc. 
between 30-60% of poverty line 
have 50% participation; families 
with income 60-100% of poverty 
line have a 20% participation rate; 
and, all families eligible but over 
the poverty line reported. (Long, 
1986) 
After participant imputation, the 
aggregate number matches the 
administrative data. 
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Program(s)  Admin 
Expend 
(billion)* 
CPS 
Expend 
(billion) 
Admin 
Number 
Recipient 
(million)# 
CPS 
Number 
Recipient 
(million) 
Avg Benefit/ 
Household 
Imputation Assumption of 
Recipients 
Imputation Assumptions for  
Benefits 
Housing: 
S8, Low 
Income Hsng 
Asst, and 
HOME 
$21.009 b      5.36 m  hh  $3,919    Assume total benefits of housing 
program is equally distributed to 
each household participating in 
program. 
Energy 
Assistance: 
Includes 
weatherizatio
n assistance 
$1.943 b 
 
  5.2 m  hh  3.91 m 
recipients;  
2.37 are 
poor. 
$193  Assume that the underreported 
participants are families below the 
poverty line.  The difference 
between the data from two sources 
is 1.29 m.  There are 17.16  
possible poor households,  2.37 
million of which are reported in 
the data.  The probability of a 
household not reporting is 
1.29/(17.16-2.37)=0.087.   
Assume that the imputed 
recipients have the mean benefit 
of the participants in the CPS 
data ($193).  Then use a fixed 
ratio to bring the aggregate 
benefit to match the 
expenditures.  The ratio to bring 
the fixed benefit per household to 
match the budgeted amount is 
1.94. 
Farmer’s 
Benefits: 10 
programs as 
per Table 1 
Section VII 
$8.616 b 
 
    2.38 m  hh      All farmers in the CPS data 
receive part of this benefit.  
Distribution is based on the 
income of each family in 
proportion to the aggregate 
income of farm families. 
WIC 
 
$2.48 b      3.37 m hh  $735  1.78 m households have one 
infant, and 1.59 m households 
have two children under 4.  
Assume that families with 
children under 4 and income at 
185% of the poverty level are 
eligible.  6.5m families would be 
eligible.  3.37/6.5=.518.  Use this 
ratio to determine actual 
Each participant household gets 
benefits equally. 
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recipients. 
Program(s)  Admin 
Expend 
(billion)* 
CPS 
Expend 
(billion) 
Admin 
Number 
Recipient 
(million)# 
CPS 
Number 
Recipient 
(million) 
Avg 
Benefit/ 
Household 
Imputation Assumption of 
Recipients 
Imputation Assumptions for  
Benefits 
Head Start  $3.32 b 
 
  0.74 m  hh    $4,493  Families with child age 3-5 and 
family income lower than federal 
poverty line are eligible; this gives 
high estimate of 2.73 m.  Use 
random function to draw hh’s to 
participate; probability of .271.  
Assume each household has only 
one child participating.   
(1994 Green Book, pp. 836) 
Each participant gets benefits 
equally.  3.325 b/0.74 = 4493. 
JTPA:  Six 
programs as 
per Table 1 
Section IV 
(omits UI 
Admin) 
 
4.406 b    1.85 m  hh    $2,381  According to the CPS data, 13.74 
m households are eligible.  
Calculation of probability is 
1.85/13.74=.134 to estimate 
number of actual households to 
receive benefit.  
Each eligible household has only 
one adult participating in the 
program.  Each participant 
household gets benefits equally. 
School 
Lunch and 
Breakfast 
includes also 
Summer 
Food, Child 
Nutri.tion 
Admin and 
School Milk 
 
5.65 b  6.00 b          A fixed ratio was used to bring 
the aggregate benefits down to 
match expenditures:  5.65/6.00 = 
.9423.  CPS data reflects the 
market balue of these programs 
as reported by recipients.  
Administrative data reflects the 
actual government expenditure. 
   
*  From 1995 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance    #  From 1996 Green Book  
9 
CIG, COAG and COG:  A Comment on a Debate 
Guy Standing 
 
The Vision Thing 
  
If one is talking about “Real Utopia” one must have a reasonably clear answer to two ‘grand’ 
questions, which one feels inclined to ask in convivial company discussing the issues against the 
backdrop of a gorgeous lake in Madison, Wisconsin.  
 
Bearing in mind that all theories of distributive justice espouse the equality of something, 
the first grand question is: What is it that should be equalized in the Good Society of the 21
st 
century? The essence of the answer is that for real freedom, everybody in society must have 
equal basic security. This must be unconditional and individualized, the latter being critical for 
gender-related (and other) issues. The word ‘real’ is used to signify that there must be a 
combination of ‘negative liberty’ – the negation of deprivation and unchosen controls – and 
‘positive liberty’ – the opportunity to make informed and worthwhile choices. Real freedom 
might be described as the opportunity and capacity to function rationally and purposefully and to 
develop one’s capacities or capabilities.   
 
The complementary grand question is: Assuming a veil of ignorance (not knowing where 
they would be in the distribution of outcomes), what sort of society would we want to leave for 
our children?  The gist of the answer is that they should be able to live in a society celebrating a 
diversity of lifestyles, constrained only by the need to avoid doing harm to others, and living in 
circumstances in which a growing majority of people work on their enthusiasms, to pursue their 
own sense of occupation – combining their competencies, or ‘functionings’, varying their work 
status, and possessing the means to be responsible to their family, neighbours and community. 
They should be able to live in an environment of co-operative individualism, in which individual 
freedom of action and reflection is backed by collective agency. This notion of development may 
be called occupational security – the security in which to develop capabilities and a working life 
in which one can combine forms of activity, including the stillness of contemplation.    
 
I contend that a CI (Citizenship Income) is a necessary but not sufficient policy to give 
effect to the answers to the two ‘grand’ questions, whereas, although it has its attractive 
properties and a laudable underlying motivation, a Citizenship Grant in the way envisaged by 
Bruce Ackerman and Ann Alstott would not be.
1 
 
A key term is security. Adequate socio-economic security is the bedrock of real freedom. 
However, one must allow that both as individuals and as society one could have too much 
security  or too little security. Freedom does require democratically chosen restraints or 
constraints, to check recklessness and selfish opportunism. But these must presumably pass some 
                                                 
1 Some of the points and themes indicated in this note are elaborated in a recent book. G.Standing, Beyond the New 
Paternalism: Basic Security as Equality (London, Verso, 2002).  Chapter 10. CIG, COAG and COG 
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veil of ignorance test. Bearing the desirability of basic security in mind, the ILO’s Socio-
Economic Security Programme has set out to establish two Policy Decision Principles. 
 
  The first, following Rawls but making security the locus of strategy, may be called the 
Security Difference Principle:  
 
A policy, or institutional change, is just only if it reduces (or does not worsen) the 
insecurity of the least secure groups in society. 
 
In other words, freedom cannot be advanced if, say, structural adjustment policies or 
“shock therapy” deliberately worsens the insecurity of those at or near the bottom of society. 
And this principle would hold regardless of claims made on behalf of political democracy. 
  
This decision rule, or the principle of constitutionality, provides for a floor, to protect and 
enhance freedom in moving towards universal basic security. If one accepts that real freedom is 
the opportunity to pursue a life of dignified and dignifying work, then one must recognize that 
this is about distributional outcomes – the woman outworker, the labourer and the peasant 
should have the same (or equivalent) basic security as the lawyer, the economist or the 
shareholder. 
 
The first policy decision rule should be complemented by one dealing with the threat of 
various forms of paternalism and state control, which also threaten freedom. This may be called 
the Paternalism Test Principle:  
 
A policy, or institutional change, is just only if it does not impose controls on some 
groups that are not imposed on the most free groups in society, or if it reduces controls 
limiting the autonomy to pursue occupation of those facing the most controls.  
 
Thus, unless husbands are subject to the same controls as wives, unless the poor the same 
as the rich, the unemployed the same as the employed, then policy, institutional or relational 
controls should be opposed as invalid. And they would remain invalid even if a political majority 
could be engineered to vote for them. Reducing the freedom of a minority (or a majority in the 
case of women in many societies) cannot be accepted, even if the change enhanced the freedom 
of others. 
 
The Paternalism Test Principle will become crucial in the first decade of the 21
st century, 
because of the dangers of ostensibly benign state paternalism. In the bristling machismo of the 
late 20
th century, universalistic social protection without behavioral conditions was widely 
condemned by loaded words such as “nanny state” and “dependency”. The irony is that state 
paternalism, in the form of workfare, welfare-to-work (sic) and other directive selective schemes, 
more deserves the epithet of nanny state – although such euphemisms should be treated with 
more disdain than they have. 
 
If the Paternalism Test and Security Difference Principles were to be respected, we 
should favour policies and institutions that move people’s work away from external controls, and 
towards greater autonomy, security and equality. This is not just about laws and regulations. It is 
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about work structuring – shaping work to suit people, not merely shaping people for jobs, or to 
make them more “employable” (sic), or even to give them more ‘human capital’ or ‘human 
capability’.
2 Freedom cannot be equated with capabilities or entitlements, unless one defines 
these terms so broadly that they lack specificity.            
 
We should wish to provide basic security for all, since that is essential to facilitate the 
individual freedom to develop. It is a freedom to develop ourselves through a creative, multi-
sided existence, in which our work and our contemplative sides are balanced and balancing. 
 
In this regard, notions of freedom are clouded by economistic jargon that many 
distinguished observers have treated rather uncritically. Consider “human capital”. Too many 
people see this in an unambiguously positive light. Thus, Amartya Sen sees ‘human capability’ 
as merely ‘broader’ than ‘human capital’. In claiming a linkage between the two, Sen notes that 
the latter leads to the “substantive freedom of people to lead the lives they have reason to value 
and to enhance the real choices they have”.
 3 One should go further: The human capability 
perspective  conflicts with the human capital approach, in that the latter starts from the 
presumption that education (or, more accurately, schooling) should be valued in terms of its 
contribution to capital accumulation and growth. Education for its own sake, for the development 
of our contemplative capacity, is at best downgraded and at worst relegated to irrelevance. 
 
Education is about time for contemplation as well as about exposure to the learning of 
techniques for acquiring fame and fortune. A prior condition for healthy education is basic social 
and economic security.   
 
The Socio-Economic Context 
 
All the great Utopias painted throughout modern history have had characteristics of gentleness, 
conviviality, fraternity and social solidarity. Any progressive strategy should be compatible with 
those features. With that thought in mind, what is the biggest challenge that we face in the 
affluent parts of the world? 
 
Let us be blunt. In the industrialised world, we live in an apolitical era, in which there is 
pervasive class fragmentation and a generalised lack of identity. The I-word dominates the We-
word. The young are cynical – and rational – about the politics on offer. In 2000, for the first 
time, more of those under the age of 30 who voted in the US Presidential election voted for the 
Republican candidate than for the Democrat – about 40% for the former, 20% for the latter, and 
40% for ‘independent’. In France, in the first round of the French Presidential election held in 
April 2002, a majority of that age group stayed in bed, leaving the extreme rightist candidate Le 
Pen, an odious character, to beat all candidates of the left. In the following weeks, chauvinistic 
 
2 The terms ‘employable’ and ‘employability’ have been hugely influential in European policymaking circles. The 
emphasis is always on altering the characteristics of people, including their attitudes and behaviour, so as to make 
them more pliable, adaptable, disciplined and so on. Rarely does see anything like as much attention being given to 
making jobs more workable, or whatever the equivalent term might be. 
  
3 A. Sen, Development as Freedom (New York, Knopf, 1999), p.293. 
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individuals and groups in the UK and the Netherlands, among other places, attracted levels of 
electoral support that sent shivers of concern through the body politic.  
 
In this context of disembedded populism, it may not seem an auspicious time to propose 
any form of Real Utopia. Yet surely that would be a faulty reading of the nature of the challenge. 
The fear should be that the cautious voices of the Lukewarm Left (LL) tendency that prevailed in 
the 1990s will continue to prevail, pandering to the weakness-of-will tendencies, not trying to 
create the collective agencies and spaces in which a progressive We can evolve. If this continues, 
the Young (and the not-so-Young) will continue to be disengaged.
4 Unless the Left offers a 
politics of paradise, its long-term prospects will remain bleak. It is not good enough for the LL 
tendency to say that the young should vote for them because if they do not do so a Bush or Le 
Pen or Berlusconi will obtain ‘power’.
5 It is better for the LL politicians to be taught sooner 
rather than later that pragmatic adjustment to the dominant economic orthodoxy can never be 
part of the onward march. 
 
One hypothesis to explain the declining turnout in national and sub-national elections in 
most affluent countries is that people are encouraged to be individualistic by market norms, 
whereas voting derives from a sense of social community and social relationships.   
 
The significance of the political disengagement is that the Real Utopia project must 
surely be one that builds on the energies and the anger of youth, who have always provided the 
backbone of progressive movements, and not on the adaptations that youth are obliged to make 
in order to adjust to current realities. It must surely appeal not to their weakness of will, but to 
their enthusiasms. 
 
What asset does Youth lack most? And what are the reasons for this? Coincidentally, 
what makes Youth angry?  
 
The asset youth lack most is time, both currently and, more importantly, in prospect as 
they move from ‘school’ to ‘work’. In modern affluent societies, there is constant pressure to use 
every moment, with work demands competing with the need to make contact with peers, through 
the internet, through emails, through mobile phones or whatever. Men and women in their 20s 
and 30s – and often in their 40s and 50s – have to face multi-tasking, and take their work home, 
and their home to work. The reasons for this frenzied loss of time is that the pressure to consume 
and to compete is intensified in electronically-connected individualistic capitalism. To pause is 
to risk becoming obsolescent, passed by in the latest splurge of gadgeting, or displaced by those 
people with the capacity to perform a revised set of tasks.  
 
4 I use the terms Young and Youth in a broad sense to cover the group in society (15-30?) historically inclined to be 
most energetic and politically active.     
 
5 It is a major factor in the decline of the progressive vision that membership of political parties of the left have 
dropped precipitously. In 1988, the French parti socialiste had 200,000 members; in 2002, it had only 80,000. In the 
UK, membership of the Labour Party declined between 1997 and 2001 by almost 100,000, while activism by its 
members declined even more dramatically – most do not do any work for the Party. The Guardian, June 18, 2002, 
p.11.    
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It is a lifestyle that is psychologically threatening, leaving both the successful and the 
failures teetering on the edge of a sort of hysteria. The notion of bowling alone is operating 
alongside the notion of burn out.  
 
While this intense pressure on time causes some resentment – often turned inwards, 
resulting in a sense of inadequacy, stress and periodic burn outs – the younger generations are 
also infuriated by a sense of injustice, which is also unlike the sense of injustice that 
predominated in past generations.  
 
In a global society, that takes the shape of revulsion against the gap between the affluence 
in the rich countries and the grinding poverty in low-income developing countries, and between 
the absurdly wealthy elites of the world and those detached from the mainstream of all society 
living a lumpenised existence of precariousness. But it also takes the form of anger about 
ecological decline, a worry that the quality of the environment is deteriorating as corporate greed 
and technological prowess threatens the sustainability of our planet. The poor in general, the 
hassled workers rushing to work on bus and underground, the slum dwellers, the inner-city 
dwellers, and numerous other groups live in crowded spaces, and they see the affluent living in 
space where they are in control of their environment. Youth see the rain forests shrinking, the 
range of species shrinking, the coral reefs shrinking, but they also crowd into cramped city 
spaces, on overloaded buses or trains, in small costly apartments, permanently in a rush. Time 
and space are crowded, and they neither own nor control their own time or space. This 
contributes to a pervasive sense of existential insecurity. 
 
A progressive politics and vision must tap the most critical source of deprivation and 
anger of its potential supporters, and thus be about a redistribution of those assets perceived as 
the most scarce and most valued, and most unequally distributed. In a feudal society progressives 
tapped the anger of the landless; in an industrial society they tapped the anger of those lacking 
the physical means of production. In the 21
st century, the key assets lacking for youth and the 
median “middle-class” worker are time and security.
6 Progressives should be tapping the anger 
of those most likely to lack time and security. 
 
The underlying malaise is not accidental. Modern capitalism has an interest in time 
compression among those who consume its products and among those who work to its rhythms. 
It is almost a truism that more and more people are living under a pressurised mix of 
inducements and incentives to “spend time” – purchase, possess, and display, that is the law of 
the modern prophets.
7  
 
In such circumstances, a subversive politics should be about wresting control over time 
for the ‘dispossessed’, and it should recognise that such control is the essence of real security. As 
 
6 These are also lacking for the poor almost everywhere, although some mistakenly portray the poor as having ample 
time. In reality, because they lack “time-saving” devices and because they have access only to low-productivity 
activities, they have to spend more time to achieve any given income, and have to spend more time on sheer survival 
activities. 
    
7 Over 30 years ago, Steffan Linder wrote a book called The Harried Leisure Class depicting the increased goods-
intensity of non-working time. The problem is more general now.    
   Chapter 10. CIG, COAG and COG 
Guy Standing 
147
 
 
in every radical moment in history, the progressive vision should be about redistributing the key 
scarce asset from those who possess too much of it to those with too little or none at all. No 
progressive agenda ever mobilised the masses unless it offered a strategy to redistribute the key 
scarce asset. 
 
This is where we reach a dilemma for those wishing to create a Real Utopia: The 
demographics are in conflict with the potential politics. While youth are concerned by a lack of 
time and are angered by a sense of ecological injustice, a sense of deprived space, the age group 
that is growing as a proportion of the total population is the elderly. In part because of the nature 
of social policy derived from industrial society, this age group does not lack time. The welfare 
state, even in its residual Anglo-Saxon form, was built on the presumed norm of the labouring 
man, the ‘breadwinner’, who received income transfers to compensate for “temporary 
interruptions of earning power”. Old age was expected to be a short interruption between labour 
and death. Although never justified, it was the closest to a norm in the middle decades of the 20
th 
century. It certainly no longer applies in the early years of the 21
st century. 
 
There is no intrinsic reason for the over 50-year olds to have a disproportionate share of 
society’s “free time”. Yet once having been granted it through PAYG pension systems during the 
second half of the 20
th century, they are scarcely likely to give it away – and in this they will be 
supported by those coming their way.      
 
The demographic dilemma is compounded by the awkward fact that there is a obvious 
reason for the elderly having little opportunistic interest in the main source of anger motivating 
youth under globalised capitalism. Youth fear ecological decay, global warming, closing spaces 
and all the spectres that come with them. Where will ‘We’ go in 30 years time, when the waves 
have come up round that island of peace and tranquillity, when those frenetic years are behind 
Us? The elderly will understand this existential insecurity, and some will be motivated by 
altruism to the point of protesting alongside their grandchildren. But they do not have a direct 
interest in those distant times, for the very simple reason that they do not expect to be around. 
 
So, here we have the dilemma. The angry generations, the potential energisers for any 
Real Utopian project, lack time, lack security and feel the ecological pain. The growing 
generations – the “wrinklies”, “grey power” – have ample free time and have only an altruistic 
concern for the primary source of anger among their younger citizens, a lack of ‘quality time’. 
This is scarcely a recipe for a strong model of social solidarity. A formula for a new social 
solidarity has to be found – or we can kiss good-bye to any hope of a Real Utopia, and come to 
accept a landscape of Warholian politics, of populist individuals or parties flitting before 
electorates for their proverbial 15 minutes of fame and electoral fortune, catching the passing 
mood with a flurry of buzzwords, playing on the fears of the crowd, swayed by the turbulence of 
global capitalism. The crass politics of globalisation and pervasive insecurity are populism and 
personalisation. The politics of paradise must defeat that.    
 
Recapturing control over time is a fundamental part of that politics. While preparing this 
note, I heard that, apparently, in the 1968 US Presidential election the average “soundbite” of the 
Presidential candidates lasted 45 seconds, suggesting some substantive reasoning process, 
whereas in the 2000 Presidential election the average “soundbite” had been shortened to 8 
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seconds. A reasonable interpretation of this and other symptoms of time pressure is that the 
populace is suffering from a National Attention Deficit Disorder syndrome – reproducing at 
societal level a pervasive modern illness among children and young adults that is now a 
recognisable learning disorder. Induced to flit idly between a flurry of time-filling activities, it is 
scarcely surprising that youth seem to lack an appreciation of history.
8 Dare one say that lacking 
a sense of past time is a guide to a lack of a sense of future time? Do not expect a Real Utopia 
from those who lack a sense of where they have come from and where they are going. 
 
The challenge is clear. The contours of the solution are no less clear – 
decommercialisation of the spirit, decompression of time. Every imagined Utopia has met those 
challenges. An agenda for Real Utopia should at least face them. 
             
COAG, CIG and COG 
 
With these evaluative points in mind, consider the so-called ‘stakeholding grant’ or 
‘capital grant’ idea, which should be called a Coming-of-Age Grant (COAG). In this note, I want 
to bring out differences between it and the Citizenship Income (CIG), but in doing so also 
highlight why a more generalised social dividend approach should give a place both to a CIG 
and to some form of Capital Grant. The variant of the latter that seems desirable is closer to what 
might be called a Community Capital Grant (COG).
9 
 
 Before considering each proposal, note that the COAG and CIG have a common heritage 
and set of objectives, which might be summarised as a desire to enhance real freedom and a 
desire to promote a more egalitarian form of capitalism.     
 
A danger of the debate between advocates of CIG and COAG is that both can be depicted 
as contrasting panaceas, when neither side believes in that. A CIG advocate would argue that a 
CIG is a necessary but not sufficient component of a package of policies to create the Good 
Society, whereas she might contend that a COAG is neither necessary nor sufficient. A COAG 
advocate might argue that while neither would be sufficient, a COAG would be helpful in 
enhancing economic freedom, whereas a CIG would not be politically feasible.   
 
In considering the merits of a COAG and a CIG, one must reflect on the nature of modern 
capitalism. We are in the midst of a great transformation, in which the economy has been 
disembedded from society, such that there are no adequate systems of regulation, redistribution 
 
8 Shortly after this note was written in draft, a major report was published showing that most high-school graduates 
in the USA did not have even a basic grasp of their country’s history, let alone know much about the rest of the 
world’s history. 
  
9 Note the neutral use of euphemisms and acronyms. Who would want a COAG if you could have a COG? 
Regrettably, the terms one uses are significant aspects of legitimising reform proposals. In South Africa, we have 
used the term Solidarity Grant for a CIG. Note also that a “baby bond”, the term used in the UK by the Government, 
is merely a COAG with a COA defined as registered date-of-birth. An advantage of the baby bond over the 
Ackerman-Alstott proposal is that, presumably, no recipient would have a criminal record, so it would be more 
universal. 
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or social protection to moderate the inequalities and insecurities being thrown up.
10 Globalisation 
and the spread of flexible, informal labour markets are associated with capital and labour 
fragmentation, in which controls (unfreedom) over workers and citizens are becoming more 
complex and indirect, and in which income flows are also becoming more complex. In brief, a 
small minority are receiving income mainly from capital, with a minority share coming from the 
performance of highly-paid labour (inter alia). At the top is an elite, blessed by absurdly high 
incomes and windfall gains that are a spreading dark stain on global capitalism. It is common to 
read of some executive receiving $10 million in bonuses, or much more. The stain is spreading, 
not just because more executives are joining that way of remuneration but because these incomes 
convert into huge wealth that is passed from generation to generation, producing the 
concentration of financial wealth that is the starting point for the COAG proponents. 
 
Alongside the wealthy elite, a diminishing core group of workers are receiving income 
from a variable mix of wages, state benefits, enterprise benefits and capital (shares). Below both 
groups in terms of income, a heterogeneous group has mushroomed, which for present purposes 
may be called outsiders (flexiworkers, unemployed, and a lumpenised detached group of 
homeless or socially ill people scraping by). The outsiders put the fear of insecurity up the 
stomachs of the insiders, who in turn retreat into implicit or explicit “concession bargaining” 
with their firms. 
 
One can complicate this basic labour market model, and for many purposes should do so. 
But for our purposes it is sufficient to depict the fragmentation in this way, to think of the 
implications of a COAG, CIG and COG.    
 
The Arguments over CIG 
 
A CIG would be a basic income grant paid monthly, to each individual regardless of work status, 
gender, marital status or age, although a smaller amount would probably be paid to those counted 
as ‘children’. It would be an equal amount paid to every legal resident, subject to some practical 
rule of time lived in the country. It would replace most other benefits, although supplements 
would be provided to certain groups with special needs, such as those with disabilities    
 
As such, a CIG would not be as radical as either its critics or some of its proponents like 
to believe. To some extent, it would amount to a consolidation of the patchwork of existing 
transfers coupled with a reduction in the number of conditions and administrative layers that 
exist today. 
 
The standard objections to a basic income are that it would be too expensive, it would 
reduce labour supply, would offend some notion of ‘social reciprocity’, would weaken 
governments’ resolve to lower unemployment, and would weaken the use of a minimum wage. 
These objections are dealt with at length elsewhere.
11 Here we will deal just with the main ones 
 
10 This theme, drawing on Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, is developed at length in my recent book. 
Standing, 2002, op.cit. 
 
11 Standing, 2002, op.cit., chapter 9. 
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in the process of concentrating on the advantages of moving in the direction of delinking basic 
inome security from any labour obligation. 
 
First, a CIG would be a means of integrating the tax-and-benefit system and 
consolidating much of the existing patchwork of out-or-work, in-work and out-of-labour-market 
income transfers and paternalistically provided social and personal services. In doing so, the 
gross cost would be the cost of shifting to a universal income support scheme, which would be 
the cost of including those currently not included. The net cost would be less because there 
should be a saving on administrative costs of policing the wide range of different conditions and 
tests for existing benefits, and a saving that would be hard to estimate in that by removing or 
reducing poverty traps, unemployment traps, and savings traps they would encourage more 
income-earning activity and more legal work activity. This is because any individual would start 
paying tax on any income earned above the basic income, and would not face a very high 
marginal tax rate going from non-employment to employment, or crossing a threshold of income. 
As for the alleged cost of ‘churning’, paying out to everybody and taxing it back from most 
people, this objection is disappearing because of the integration of tax and benefits systems made 
possible by electronic processes. 
 
The cost of existing systems is underestimated. The systems across Europe are riddled 
with poverty traps, unemployment traps, savings traps and behaviour traps that are arbitrary, 
inefficient and inequitable. This is partly because of the spread of selective, means-tested and 
behaviour-conditioned schemes. It is also partly because of the growing flexibility of working 
patterns and lifestyles. 
 
Whatever the truth about long-term trends away from ‘permanent’ (sic) regular full-time 
employment, it is both true and in principle desirable that more people at all ages move in and 
out of the labour force, take temporary jobs, combine several income-earning activities, and in 
the process do not conform to the simple three-stage model of life and work made the norm of 
industrial society, going straight from school or college into thirty or forty years of employment 
and then sharply shuffling off the stage into retirement. Means-tested benefits are scarcely 
appropriate for such a society, and nor are those arbitrary behavioural tests that technocratic 
‘Third Way’ policymakers and their special advisers love so much.
12 
 
This leads to a key advantage of moving to a CIG. One of the main criticisms of basic 
income is that it would be a “handout”, which would offend a sense of social reciprocity and lead 
to a fall in labour supply, to idleness, to shirking, and to a lack of discipline in jobs. This is a 
criticism from across the political spectrum. There are two ways of meeting it, one defensive and 
one normative. In assessing its validity either way, bear in mind that most advocates of a basic 
 
12 Across Europe and other industrialised countries there are thousands of variants. Thus, only if You, as an 
unemployed youth, look for a job three times a week and have written evidence to show you are prepared to travel to 
work 20 miles from home are you entitled to a benefit. Only if You, a disabled elderly person, have less than 2,000 
pounds (or Euros) in savings can you be entitled to a grant to pay for care services. Of course, we exaggerate. But 
we all have our favourites. 
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income envisage a modest amount sufficient just to cover basic subsistence needs, equivalent to 
the minimum income of social assistance schemes applied in many European countries.
13  
 
The defensive or pragmatic response to the criticism is to suggest that any adverse effect 
would be small or insignificant. The criticism presumes a pessimistic interpretation of the human 
species. We work for many reasons, and numerous surveys indicate that most people want to 
work and would do so even if they had enough income from other sources on which to subsist. 
Very few people are satisfied with basic subsistence, and aspire to much more. This is rather well 
known.  
 
In any case, there are essentially two types of person who could be expected to reduce 
their labour supply, those with a high opportunity cost of doing income-earning activity (i.e., 
those wanting to pursue education or training, those wishing to care for relatives, those in poor 
health, etc.) and those doing low-productivity and/or onerous forms of labour. In both cases, we 
should want to induce labour-market and policy changes that would be welfare-enhancing. In the 
case of those with more socially or personally valuable non-labour activity, surely cutting back 
on a labour activity would be desirable. In the case of the person who withdrew from or cut back 
on the amount of time spent doing a low-productivity, onerous job, there would be a tendency for 
wages to go up, inducing others to fill the gap, or a tendency for labour-saving technological 
change to be introduced, or for people to realise that they did not want or need those jobs 
performed. 
 
The normative response is based on an interpretation of the emerging mainstream 
character of 21
st century capitalism. We live in an era when globalisation and market capitalism 
are eroding the social fabric so painstakingly erected during the 20
th century – and so assiduously 
presented to the rest of the world as the model to follow. One should not be atavistic about the 
erosion, since the era of welfare state capitalism had many flaws and limitations. But nor should 
we be lulled into thinking that the ill-defined ‘European social model’ has essentially survived 
and is resilient enough to be sustainable with minor refinements.  
 
While we should neither exaggerate nor belittle the changes taking place, it is reasonably 
clear that under the aegis of global market forces there is a widespread loss of identity – of class, 
community and occupation. Belonging to a fixed group is becoming harder. And yet there is a 
paradox – individualisation with homogenisation, or in plain language a tendency for people to 
be on their own, seemingly an individual, while all rushing to adopt a similar lifestyle, buying 
the same goods, watching the same films and TV shows, and so on. We live under incessant 
pressure to consume, and to labour to earn enough, which is never enough. Accordingly, at least 
in the middle-years of life more and more people are driven into an intense frenzy of labour-
related activity. The story is too well known to need elaboration here. Electronic control systems, 
represented by personal computers, with the email plus internet imperatives, and by mobile 
phones, are only one side of this intensification, in which the borders of workplace and home, 
 
13 Some advocates, including Philippe van Parijs, have in mind a larger amount. Most envisage a modest amount, 
just enough to cover the basics in life. It is possible that a lot of confusion in the debate arises from different images 
of what level of basic income is envisaged.   
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and of leisure and work, are blurred. We are losing control of time. This is not a ‘middle-class’ 
phenomenon only, because the poor everywhere have rarely had any control to lose. 
 
Providing a basic income as a citizenship right would provide a sense of basic security, 
and in doing so would help in the necessary process of gaining control over the sense of time. It 
would allow for more rational deliberation, more freedom in which to make choices about how 
to allocate time. 
 
A related way of arguing for a basic income is by reflecting on the social struggles in the 
past century as capitalism has evolved. Broadly speaking, the progressive struggle in the early 
days of the 20
th century was to secure control over the means of production and to decommodify 
labour. This led to the twin policy of nationalisation of production and the welfare state. The 
latter was, in effect, a way of decommodifying labour, alongside corporate benefits and services, 
in which the wage became a smaller share of total compensation and of personal income, as state 
benefits and services grew. This strategy tended to produce rigidities and inefficiencies that 
became unsustainable as the era of open economies emerged, and it was always paternalistic, 
giving labour-based security at the price of limited freedom of choice.  
 
Under globalisation, there has been a recommodification of labour, with individualised 
wages, a cut in enterprise and state benefits and services (or a shift to user-paying schemes) and a 
weakening of protective statutory regulations. The challenge ahead is that while labour is 
commodified, the worker (labour power) should not be. A basic income could help make that a 
reality. In short, it could reduce the commodification of people (commodification implying loss 
of control over the key assets, namely time and security) while allowing for the continued 
commodification of labour. In this it would be compatible with a globalised economic system, 
while eroding the power of capital over people. It could also be a means of 21
st century 
Keynesianism, since it would provide a means of stabilising aggregate demand.                                         
 
The Dilemmas with COAG 
  
A COAG would be a one-off grant given to 21-year olds, or spread over several years in certain 
circumstances, and given to all those who had graduated from secondary school, excluding drop-
outs and those who have foolishly criminalized themselves before they reached that age. The UK 
“baby bond” scheme would not apply such conditions, apparently. 
 
By contrast, a CIG would provide basic economic security, in which to avoid the worst 
excesses of labour commodification, and it would do so in an essentially non-moralistic way. It 
would not make a judgment on when a person deserves a blast of security, and would not make 
any moralistic judgment about who should receive it and who should be excluded. A COAG 
seems to fail on both these scores. Giving a 21-year-old a huge lump sum offends the idea of 
basic security. It is also arbitrary because the age 21 is not necessarily ideal or optimal, for 
people mature at widely different ages, and their capabilities develop differently. The 
development of a capacity to make rational choices will vary across individuals and groups and 
communities. And excluding those 21-year-olds who have been criminalized  or who have 
dropped out from, or failed to complete, high school seems both moralistic and arbitrary, as well 
   Chapter 10. CIG, COAG and COG 
Guy Standing 
153
 
 
                                                
as inegalitarian.
14 A COAG offers enhanced security, wealth and future income for the more 
secure (the middle class) relative to the least-secure groups in society. It thereby offends the 
Security Difference Principle.  
 
A COAG is also not neutral in terms of what type of behaviour it encourages and 
rewards. It offers to benefit the commercially astute over those who have no commercial 
acumen. In what way is that fair? A COAG would give to those with relatively good talents 
(high-school graduates without criminal records) to take advantage of the opportunity to become 
Winners in a winners-take-all, losers-lose-all market society.  
 
Both a COAG and a CIG would be given to individuals. A danger is that schemes for 
individuals can be depicted as individualistic, i.e. encouraging and facilitating selfish and 
opportunistic behaviour and attitudes. Surely a Good Society could not come about if policies 
and institutions were to promote individualistic behaviour in the absence of policies to facilitate 
social solidarity (of some sort). One of the concerns about a block grant such as a COAG is that 
it would indeed foster the ethos of competitive individualism, while further eroding the already-
weak sense of social solidarity in most industrialised societies. It is definitely not neutral in that 
respect. 
 
In the last quarter of the 20
th century, as globalisation gathered strength, governments all 
over the world moved to cut back on policies that were mechanisms of social solidarity and to 
create more individualistic systems, limiting protective regulations, putting controls on unions, 
and cutting back on redistributive direct taxation. These trends accelerated the growth of more 
fragmented labour markets and social structures. How would a COAG affect this? It might give 
more meaning to equality of opportunity. But it would be equalising the opportunity to become 
more unequal. It would not affect the societal fragmentation or resultant inequalities in a direct 
way. By contrast, a CIG would strengthen the income security (albeit modestly) of what we have 
called outsiders, and would increase the bargaining position of flexiworkers, simply because 
increasing basic security usually strengthens backbones. Presuming that increased bargaining 
capacity would result in their obtaining higher incomes, which would thereby help to reduce 
intra-class income differentiation. 
 
What about the impact of a COAG and a CIG on the so-called “self employed”, a poorly 
named group that includes a lot of people working on contract or on a piece-work basis? On the 
face of it, both a COAG and a CIG would boost the supply of self-employed, including the 
number of petty capitalists (all those small-is-beautiful enterprises), for which a grant would help 
in dealing with set-up costs whereas a CIG would make risk-taking less daunting. But one cannot 
be so confident about the positive impact on demand for the self-employed goods and services, 
which might be such that average net incomes would fall among the ‘self-employed’, even 
widening the income differential between those involved and those in (core) wage labour. This is 
an empirical issue. 
 
14 It would also seem to offend a basic principle of justice, that a person should not be punished twice for the same 
offence. One senses that the proposal to exclude those who have fallen foul of the justice system is merely a sop to 
gain middle-class political support for the COAG. 
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The COAG seems more clearly problematical in that, by targeting on young labour force 
entrants, it is in effect a subsidy to the young that gives them an advantage over older workers.
15 
As such, it suffers from the defects of any selective subsidy. It would enable the young to accept 
a lower wages, and thus help them displace older more experienced workers. This could, on 
certain assumptions, actually lower overall productivity, and even output, of the self-employed 
as a group. It might also have negative effects on the skill reproduction propensities of older 
workers, discouraging them from trying to update or enlarge their skills because they would face 
a double competitive disadvantage (being older per se, and facing a subsidised competitor group 
in the labour market). 
 
By contrast, a CIG does not give one group an inbuilt advantage, and if anything would 
help to reduce segregation. This is an advantage of a universal income scheme. 
 
Finally, in thinking of a COAG on its own terms, one must allow that such a concentrated 
influx of money targeted on one narrowly-defined age group is almost certain to raise the price 
of goods and services consumed by that age group – good news for surf-board makers, bad news 
for 30-year-old new surfers. And interest rates for loans to this age group will tend to rise. The 
outcome could be that much of the transfer would go to other groups, leaving youth little better 
off. 
 
A COAG versus a COG 
    
A more general concern with COAG is that offers to fill the space where another variant 
of a capital grant could fulfil both the objectives of its proponents and the dictates of a Good 
Society, without its behavioural and distributional drawbacks. What are the ideal properties of a 
Utopian capital grant scheme? This big question is not asked or answered in the papers at this 
conference. Before considering that, consider the semantics. 
What attracts us to the underlying idea of a Capital or Stakeholding Grant is that it 
suggests a capital sharing device, coupled with a participatory component and a redistributive 
capacity. The principal proponents of the COAG use the term Stakeholding Grant, which has 
these connotations. However, in fact they are liberals and are primarily concerned with what they 
believe are the scheme’s freedom-enhancing  characteristics, rather than its redistributive 
egalitarian properties (which are not too hot). One does not doubt the laudable motives, but the 
term is misleading. And in using the term ‘stakeholding’ they tend to block consideration of 
genuinely more Utopian capital-sharing or stakeholding ideas. 
Now let us consider the big question. If what is attractive about the idea of stakeholding 
and capital grant is a complex image of sharing, redistribution, participation and freedom-
enhancement, then we could say that the optimum design of a (Real Utopian) scheme is that it 
should (1) encourage, or at least not discourage, investment, (2) encourage investment that is 
more ecologically and socially responsible, (3) redistribute income to the most insecure and 
 
15 Also, of course, it would worsen the relative and absolute position of the youth who have been criminalized or 
who have dropped out of school. This is an inegalitarian feature of the COAG. Another distorting aspect is that it 
would alter inter-generational relations, notably inside families. A COAG would give teenagers or 21-year-olds 
financial freedom from their parents, compromising parental guidance and potentially severing inter-generational 
ties. One may or may not like that prospect; you should not ignore it.   
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disadvantaged groups in society, (4) promote participation in economic and social activities, (5) 
strengthen (or at least not weaken) a sense of social solidarity, (6) strengthen real democracy, (7) 
promote good ‘corporate governance’, and (8) limit economic opportunism.  
 
No scheme could do well on all these counts. And, of course, neither CIG nor COAG 
address most of these issues and are not intended to do so. However, unlike a CIG, a COAG 
might be seen as occupying the space for a more progressive stakeholding grant.  
 
In this respect, there is surely more to be gained by promoting moves towards economic 
democracy through collective forms of profit-sharing. This brings to mind something like the 
early version of the Swedish wage-earner funds, as proposed by Rudolf Meidner, and even the 
Alaska Permanent Fund. We may call the ideal a COG (Community Capital Grant). It should 
contain three elements that reflect the emerging character of the productive system and the 
distributive system emanating from it, as sketched in the Appendix. 
 
A COG is close to what seemed to be at the heart of the ‘stakeholder capitalism’ debates 
that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when stakeholding was primarily seen as a quasi-
Keynesian method of promoting growth and employment. The emphasis was on profit-related 
pay, but many economists also touted collective profit sharing for incentive and capital-sharing 
reasons. Most crucially, any desirable COG scheme must be at least partly collective, must go 
beyond the firm as a unit, and must allow for workers and their representatives to have a Voice 
in decisions over the use of the resultant funds. The democratic governance is crucial. The main 
difficulties with a purely company-oriented approach to stakeholding is that would exclude the 
‘flexiworkers’ (casual workers, contract workers, agency workers, etc.) on the edge of companies 
and it would be a scheme that would widen inequalities between workers in high-tech, high-
profit, tradable firms relative to those working in or for low-tech, non-profit-oriented and non-
tradable firms and organisations, including those working in public social services. 
 
This is why an ideal model of capital sharing or stakeholding should have a broader 
community element, which might take the form of a social investment fund, by which a 
percentage share of profits would go into a fund that would be governed democratically, as a 
means of social infrastructural and skill development. Such a fund could be broken into one 
component for re-investment inside the firm and another that would be for the community 
outside the firm, which would facilitate redistribution to those outside the privileged insiders.
16 
 
If properly designed, a COG could limit the leakage of capital from the national and local 
economy, because a key point of the system should be a restructuring of corporate governance, 
with the social investment funds having voting rights on firm’s investment strategies as 
 
16 Of course, deciding what is ‘the community’ is a political and administrative matter. Although it had earlier 
antecedents, the modern thrust to this way of thinking was Rudolf Meidner’s original version of ‘wage-earner funds’ 
in Sweden in the mid-1970s. This was partly stimulated by the strains in the Swedish solidaristic wage policy, and 
in particular by the way Volvo was bypassing the wage policy by introducing individual profit-sharing pay, thereby 
increasing wage inequality. 
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stakeholders in their own right.
17 This contrasts with the classic so-called Anglo-American 
model of shareholder capitalism, because in the latter the principals (shareholding elites, 
including nominal salaried employees) are only interested in their income, which comes mainly 
from shares.
18       
 
As such, there are good reasons for thinking that a COG could combat the biggest threat 
to the emergence of a moderately egalitarian capitalism, by providing a capital-sharing scheme 
with inbuilt mechanisms to limit leakage in capital flight. Whether or not companies report that 
tax rates on corporate profits and capital are influential in determining their location and 
marginal investment decisions, the fact is that, over the past 20 years, country after country has 
reduced or abolished taxes on capital. A sensibly constructed COG could check capital flight and 
encourage high and socially responsible investment in the local economy. It would also make for 
a greater degree of participation in corporate and communal decision making and so encourage 
economic democracy. This is what stakeholding should be all about.  
 
The proponents of COAG have sold it as a stakeholder grant, and have claimed that it 
would be ‘democratic’. Yet it is neither an extension of democracy nor a reflection of 
stakeholding in the production process. By contrast, a COG would be an extension of real 
democracy – economic democracy – and would be real capital sharing. 
 
Almost incidentally, a COG would also have the potential to improve the way people live 
and work (unlike the commercialised individualistic frenzy that would be opened up by a 
generous COAG). By giving workers and working communities a greater Voice inside firms and 
inside the surrounding communities, a COG would tend to give workers a means of altering 
labour relations and workplace organisation, so taking the place of the weakening Voice of old-
style trade unionism. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
What is remarkable is the timidity of those talking about Stakeholding Grants. A COAG is 
fundamentally a populist measure, in the proper sense of that emotive term. It is likely to appeal 
most to those who do not have a stake in the system, but it does not touch the basic structure of 
capitalism. In that sense, it is profoundly un-Utopian. One could imagine TV chat shows and 
tabloids having endless items on “how Jane splurged her $80,000”, and another patting Jim on 
his broadening shoulders for having been an exemplary young adult.
19 There would be a splurge 
 
17 The agents would become part-principals, just as many managers and chief executives have become largely 
principals (receiving most of their income from capital).  
 
18 The Enron implosion is indicative of the danger of having elite principals divorced from the agents, which 
management is expected to be in shareholder capitalism. If corporate executives received most of their income from 
share options rather than from their salary, they will not have the interest of their workforce very high in their 
priority list.   
 
19 Hissing and loud clapping in the studio would be amplified, with appropriate music. 
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of sentimentality. If anything it would help legitimise the unequal society by encouraging people 
to adopt a casino-type set of attitudes.
20  
 
By contrast, a CIG is a low-key measure that could reduce the extent of frenzied 
commercialism, facilitating and encouraging a more gentle pace of life, and facilitating the sort 
of workstyle that is the essence of all Utopias painted throughout the ages, a mix of labour force 
work, care work, voluntary community work and constructive leisure.
21 It would not discourage 
work per se, and of course would actually encourage labour compared with the current means-
tested social assistance, through weakening poverty traps and unemployment traps. 
 
This brings me to a last point. Freedom and complex egalitarianism – the pillars of the 
Good Society – require basic security (the prerequisite for real freedom), capital sharing (high 
inequality being freedom-constraining) and basic Voice representation security (equally strong 
for all representative interests in society). This is why it is instructive to think of Karl Polanyi, 
and recognise that for any economic system to be sustainable and stable it must have a main 
functioning system or scheme of social protection, a main system of redistribution and a main 
system of labour regulation, as well as a public structure for providing those services (merit 
goods), where the drawbacks of paternalistic provision are outweighed by the drawbacks of 
private deprivation or market failure. Basic income security, capital sharing and Voice regulation 
should be the mainstays of a Real Utopia. Without those three elements, the Utopia on offer 
would not be worth visiting.    
       
                               
 
20 I recall visiting lower ‘middle-class’ families in small-town Pennsylvania who were living from State lottery to 
State lottery, all their hopes crystallised in the monthly set of numbers. Is this freedom? 
 
21 A CIG would also reduce the widespread tendency, induced by flexible labour markets and the international drift 
to conditionality and means-tested state benefits, for much labour to drift into the grey or illegal economy, evading 
taxes and contributions, and thereby contributing to pervasive disentitlement. For instance, a CIG would do away 
with the arbitrary conditionality of unemployment insurance benefits, which have long been a misnomer.  
10 
Basic Income versus Stakeholder Grants. 
Some afterthoughts on how best to reinvent distribution. 
Philippe Van Parijs
∗ 
 
Twin ideas? 
I have always liked the idea of a universal basic endowment or, as Bruce Ackerman and Anne 
Alstott prefer to call it, a stakeholder grant. But I have never regarded it as belonging in quite 
the same league, in terms of either feasibility or transformative power, as that of a universal 
basic income: either it is feasible but does not change much, or it would change a lot but then 
it is not feasible, and rightly so. Let me explain. 
There is, of course, an intimate conceptual link between the two ideas. So close that, 
after Hillel Steiner first drew my attention to Thomas Paine’s Agrarian Justice (1796), the 
first known formulation of a basic endowment proposal, I regretted for a while having 
baptised “Collectif Charles Fourier”, rather than “Collectif Thomas Paine”, the group with 
which I launched the European discussion on basic income in the mid-1980s.
1 Only for a 
while, though, for although Fourier’s (1836) authority could only be invoked to justify a 
work-unconditional but means-tested form of minimum income, the two earliest formulations 
of a genuine universal basic income I subsequently discovered —in Joseph Charlier’s Solution 
du problème social (1848), and in the 1849 edition of Mill’s Principles of Political Economy 
— were explicitly in Fourier’s lineage.
2  
Nonetheless, between grants given unconditionally and equally once in a life time, once 
every decade, once every year, once every month and once every week, there does not seem to 
be a fundamental difference in a world in which one can borrow and save, and certainly not so 
deep a difference that the effects would diverge markedly and that very different justifications 
would be required. So, why do I find one of the two ideas so much more promising than the 
other? 
 
Comparing the comparable 
To answer this question, it  is important to first reflect on what would constitute comparable 
versions of the two ideas. Universal basic endowments in cash already exist in a number of 
countries. For example, every newborn Belgian baby, boy or girl, rich or poor, is given a non-
taxable “birth premium” (prime de naissance) of about US$ 860.
3 The parents are at liberty to 
                                                 
∗ These afterthoughts have been largely fed by stimulating discussions at the workshop Rethinking 
Redistribution (Madison, Wisconsin, 3-5 May 2002). On the pros and cons of basic income and stakeholder 
grants, see now also 'The Ethics of Stakeholding' edited by Keith Dowding, Jurgen de Wispelaere and 
Stuart White  
1 See Collectif Charles Fourier (1984). 
2 My attention was drawn to Charlier by John Cunliffe and Guido Erreygers (2001, 2003a, 2003b) and to Mill’s 
section on Fourierism by George D.H. Cole (1953) via Walter Van Trier (1995). 
3 In 2002, the prime de naissance  was EUR 983.68 (or about US$ 1150) for every first child, or twin, or triplet, 
etc. , EUR 740.10 (or about US$ 860) for each other child. To be entitled, it suffices that at least one of the 
parents should belong to a “Family benefit fund” (caisse d’allocations familiales) by virtue of being employed, 
or officially unemployed, or a student, or retired, etc.  Chapter 10. Afterthoughts 
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put this money aside for when the child will reach adulthood, or to use it (sensibly, no doubt, 
in most cases) for some more immediate purposes. But even if they had the obligation to save 
this amount until the child reaches majority, the amount this would represent pales in 
relationship to the amount currently distributed in the form of (practically) universal monthly 
child benefits, which average over US$ 25.000 per child over a period of entitlement that 
varies from 18 to 25 years depending on how long a child studies. And it would obviously be 
even less of a match to even a very modest basic income paid throughout each person’s life. 
Other existing universal endowment schemes, most recently the much publicised “baby bond” 
introduced in the UK in April 2003, are even less significant.
4  
To  make a meaningful comparison of the pros and cons of one-off endowments versus 
regular basic incomes, it is therefore essential to choose levels of the endowment and of the 
regular (say, monthly) income that would be, in some sense, equivalent. Bruce Ackerman and 
Anne Alstott (henceforth A&A) are aware of this. They suggest that their proposed grant of 
US$ 80.000, possibly handed out in four instalments of US$ 20.000 can be regarded 
approximately equivalent to a basic income of US$ 400 per month from the ages of 21 to 65. 
The sum of the corresponding 528 monthly instalments of US$ 400 obviously comes to 
considerably more than their grant, namely $ 211.200, owing to a small extent to some people 
never reaching the age of 65 but above all to an interest rate which I understand they assumed  
(very generously) to be 5% p.a. in real terms. After the age of 65, A&A’s full reform package 
includes, like Thomas Paine’s, an unconditional regular pension given to all, irrespective of 
other income and past career, and I shall therefore take for granted in what follows that there 
is no  difference between basic income and their proposal beyond the age of 65. Let us instead 
scrutinize the claimed equivalence between US$ 80.000 at 21 and US$ 400 every month 
between 21 and 65. 
One important feature of the A&A proposal which needs bringing in at this stage is the 
claw-back of the stakeholder grant at the end of each person’s life. If the grant is supposed to 
be returned to society with the interest it could have generated over this period if invested 
safely (which is, I believe, A&A’s own preferred interpretation of this requirement), it is clear 
that the best thing to do for any dutiful beneficiary is precisely to invest it safely — unless she 
belongs to the small minority of those who can rightly feel pretty sure of using the money so 
as to yield a higher-than-average rate of return. Under this interpretation, the stakeholder’s 
grant is not really an endowment at all, but rather a loan, and its equivalent in terms of a 
monthly basic income is not US$ 400 but zero. 
On a milder, and perhaps more sensible construal of the claw-back clause, what needs to 
be returned to society is not the capital plus interest, but only the capital. In this case, the 
“equivalent” basic income simply corresponds to the “social dividend” yielded by a person’s 
personal share of society’s capital. Under A&A’s optimistic assessment of the interest rate, 
this means 5% of US$ 80.000 or US$ 4.000 annually and US$ 333 every month. Owing to the 
high interest rate, this is not far below the US$ 400 mentioned by A&A for the case in which 
both interest and capital are consumable by the beneficiary. Under what would seem today a 
more realistic long-term estimate of the real interest rate, however, this amount should easily 
be more than halved, and hence be of the same order of magnitude as the dividend paid to 
every Alaskan resident by Alaska’s Permanent Fund (about US$ 2.000 in 2000, though only 
US$ 1540 in 2002, or about US$ 130 per month).  
                                                 
4 The Blair government’s “baby bond”, whose introduction was announced in April 2003 by Chancellor Gordon 
Brown, has been fixed at £250 (about US$ 400, and hence less than half Belgium’s universal “birth premium”), 
for every newborn child. It rises to £500 for the children of the poorest third of households (Financial Times, 10 
April 2003). 
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Thinking about “equivalent” basic income schemes by bringing in the claw-back, 
however, takes for granted that the basic income would be introduced cohort by cohort, 
starting with the one reaching the age of 21 in the current  year. This would means that the 
first basic income cohort would, unlike the older ones, enjoy a basic income throughout its 
life, just as, in A&A’s proposal, the first cohort of stakeholders will get the full stake without 
older cohorts receiving anything. But there is another, no less natural (and, for a number of 
reasons, less problematic) way of thinking about the equivalence. The “equivalent” basic 
income scheme would then be obtained, not by spreading the grants A&A propose to 
concentrate on one year of one cohort equally over 45 years of life that cohort, but by 
spreading them equally this year over the forty-five cohorts aged 21 to 65. How much this 
amounts to per capita obviously depends on the age pyramid. A glimpse at recent 
demographic figures for the US suggests that the youngest cohort makes up somewhat less 
than 1/42 of the total population aged 21 to 65, and hence that the basic income equivalent to 
A&A’s US$ 80.000 would be around US$ 1.900, or US$ 160 per month. 
There is no need to quibble about the fine details of the simple reasonings leading up to 
these two estimates. The basic message should be clear. If one has in mind a basic income at 
the sort level of granted to single people by Europe’s existing guaranteed income schemes (at 
least US$ 600 per month), then the “equivalent” amount of A&A’s grant should in the order 
of US$ 300.000 per capita rather than 80.000. If instead we need to take the latter figure as the 
relevant reference amount, the “equivalent” basic income is a low “partial” basic income of 
about US$ 160 per month for every person aged 21 to 65. A sensible discussion of pros and 
cons would be best served, it seems, by using these orders of magnitude. 
This is by no means the end of the story, however, as part of the funding of the SG may 
come from a reduction of public expenditure (higher education, mortgage relief, etc.), which 
would be less naturally coupled with a basic income. In that case, only the “fresh money” 
component in the funding would be meaningfully available for funding the BI, whose 
“equivalent” amount would need to be correspondingly reduced. The choice would then be: 
Either a SG of US$ 80.000 without mortgage tax relief nor subsidised higher education or a 
BI of, say, 100, with unchanged mortgage tax relief and subsidies to higher education.  
But this again is too simple, because BI too would be naturally combined with (and 
partly funded by) a restructuring of tax-and-transfer systems, in particular the transformation 
of existing general income tax exemptions and of the bottom part of existing welfare and 
social insurance benefits into a basic income for the people involved. Hence, it would be naive 
to spread evenly into a basic income of, say, US$ 100 the “fresh money” component in the 
funding of a SG that is available for funding an “equivalent” basic income scheme. It would 
make far more sense to concentrate that money on people with low benefits and tax 
exemptions or none whatever, and to combine it with the money freed by the redefining of the 
bottom part of existing tax-and-benefit systems to fund a much higher basic income. The real 
choice would then rather be something like: Either a SG of US$ 80.000 without current 
mortgage relief and higher education funding or a BI of, say, US$ 300 without some of the 
existing means-tested benefits and income tax exemptions.  
The comparison thus becomes more complex, no doubt, but these complexities are 
essential for a meaningful comparison between actual reform proposals. To keep a sharp focus 
on the principled differences that may emerge, however, I shall assume in what follows that 
one is comparing a SG of US$ 80.000 to an “equivalent” BI of about US$ 160 a month, both 
funded out of the same amount of new fiscal resources without any substitution of existing 
schemes. 
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The equalisation of opportunities 
SG and BI have much in common. They are given on an individual basis, without means test 
or work requirement. Yet, they seem to belong to very different perspectives. SG is evidently 
intended to make opportunities more equal, whereas basic income is no less evidently 
intended to provide basic economic security more effectively than conditional schemes. 
However, while it is true that basic income does, and is intended to, contribute to security, it 
can and does also make sense from the standpoint of the “radical rhetoric of redefining 
inheritance”, and hence of equalising opportunities. Both stakeholder grants and basic income 
can be said to make the citizen’s opportunities less unequal over their life courses by 
distributing part of our common inheritance “equally” to all. What this “equally” means is 
different in the two proposals: the same amount to all those who reach the age of 21 versus the 
same amount each month to all those who are adult citizens (aged 21 to 65) alive that month. 
In the most superficial sense, SG is the more egalitarian variant, since those dying, say, 
at 25 will have received the full amount. But this is a misleading appearance. Firstly, given 
that the end of life is generally unforeseen, this hardly makes a difference to the “injustice” 
stemming from the inequality in the length of (the healthy part of) people’s lives: the person 
dying at 25 may have turned it into an annuity most of which will be left unconsumed or, 
worse still, devoted it entirely to an investment which has not yet started to bear fruit.  
Secondly, and crucially, SG opens up the possibility of “stake blowing”, whether 
deliberately for consumption purposes or involuntarily through bad investments (wrong 
house, wrong training, wrong business), This is bound to make SG far less opportunity-
egalitarian than BI. Why? Lifetime opportunities are of course determined only to a very 
limited extent by the stake received at 21. They are powerfully affected by intellectual 
abilities, parental attention, school quality, social networks of various sorts, and so on. On 
average, those young people who are already favoured along these various dimensions are 
precisely those who are most likely to make the best possible use of their stake. The real value 
of a stake of the same nominal amount will therefore be considerably less for those who lack 
the intelligence, guidance, education, connections, etc. that would enable them to competently 
select, in the light of what they care about on reflection, what is best for themselves. 
This huge egalitarian advantage of a BI over a pure SG scheme is significantly reduced, 
though far from abolished, relative to A&A’s actual proposal because of two important 
restrictions they impose. One is that they advocate a basic pension for the elderly, which 
amounts to preventing the young from blowing the part of their stake that is needed to secure 
them a minimum standard of living if and when they reach old age. The other is that they 
compel those who fail to complete High School to turn their stake into an annuity: BI as a 
consolation prize for the school drop outs. However, even with the stakes reduced to the 21-
65 stretch and with the set of potential stake-blowers shrunk to the 80% of each cohort who 
complete High School, the room for an inequality-amplifying effect remains considerable.  
BI, on the other hand, is assumed to be non-mortgageable, as is in most countries the 
lowest layer of any household’s income. Hence, it denies young people the freedom to blow 
their life-long stake in one go. However, especially for the less well endowed among them, it 
improves the real freedom to make sensible long-term investments. As Bart Nooteboom 
(1986), James Meade (1989) and many others have emphasised, an unconditional life-long 
security gives less wealthy people the confidence and endurance to make investments and take 
risks, while also making potential (private and public) lenders more willing to make the loans 
that will enable them to acquire qualifications or go into business. Unlike the freedom to make 
choices that jeopardise later freedom, therefore, the freedom to make choices that enhance it is 
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far less affected by the difference between SG and BI. Hence, while it is clear that a BI does 
better than an “equivalent” SG in terms of security, it is by no means evident that a SG does 
better than an “equivalent” BI in terms of equalising opportunities — quite the contrary. 
 
Wealth equalisation 
Sensible SG advocates may concede that SG is worse than BI in terms of equalising 
opportunities as soon as one realises, on the basis of considerations of the sort just sketched,  
that the opportunity space is enlarged to very different extents by a given SG depending on 
the genetic and social equipment of its beneficiary. But they may still feel confident that a SG 
funded by a wealth tax, as proposed by A&A, is more wealth-equalising than a BI financed by 
an income tax (be it in the form of a consumption tax or energy tax or value added tax), as 
proposed by most BI supporters. To shake this confidence, I invite them to pay some attention 
to the notion of wealth. 
First, economists soundly regard a working person’s current entitlement to a future 
retirement pension as a component of her present wealth, on a par with her savings. A secure 
future flow of basic income is no different. This broad sense of wealth is routinely used by 
economists — in his efficiency wage models, Edmund Phelps (1994,1997), for example, uses 
the expression “social wealth” to refer to the bundle of work-independent rights to an income. 
On the benefit side, therefore, BI constitutes no less than SG a form of wealth redistribution. 
Moreover, given what has just been said about the non-random inegalitarian distribution of 
stake-blowing, there is even no doubt — as far as the benefit side is concerned — that this 
wealth redistribution is more egalitarian with BI than it is with SG. 
As we turn next to the tax side, it must first be noted that BI could in principle be 
financed, be it partly, as it is in some proposals (including the very first one I made myself, 
back in 1982), by a wealth or inheritance tax. Note, moreover, that even a pure tax on labour 
income can be largely viewed as a tax on the return to human capital. If a person’s human 
capital is understood, as is again sensible, as part her wealth, its assessed value is bound to be 
negatively affected by the taxation of its return. Consequently, it cannot be said a priori 
whether a conventional wealth tax or an income tax is more wealth-equalising in this broad 
sense of wealth (which we have every reason to find more ethically relevant than the narrower 
concept). Much would depend, for example, on the correlation between income and human 
capital, and on how high and how progressive the income tax and the wealth tax are. 
 
Decommodification 
A final remark on the decommodification of human beings. There is an obvious sense in 
which both BI and SG contribute to it. A substantial and universal individual cash entitlement 
entirely independent of one’s selling or being prepared to sell one’s labour power amounts to 
conferring a radically decommodified economic status to each person.  
There is, however, a sense in which SG is, on the contrary, meant to produce a 
“commodifying” effect. A&A like to point out that their scheme would tend to foster a 
conversation among the young, and between the young and their parents, about how to use 
most profitably the stakeholder grant. They will devote time to discussing whether it should 
be used as an investment in the beneficiary’s human capital, or as the capital base for some 
business venture, or as a more or less secure form of saving. All this, it is argued, will 
effectively foster a market-oriented frame of mind. This is certainly no part of the typical pro-
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BI rhetoric. Quite the contrary, one argument frequently used is precisely that there will be 
less need to speak about money, owing to the security offered by the scheme, and hence, it is 
sometimes argued, more time to think about and experience what really matters: God, women, 
men, the natural world and other hopefully not too commodified  entities .  
There is, however, a distinct sense in which BI can also be said to contribute to 
commodification. For BI’s stated purpose of fighting exclusion from paid work can be re-
described in terms of a re-commodification of the skills of the excluded. This is supposed to 
be achieved through two mechanisms. First, a BI is not only unconditional as regards 
(willingness to) work, but also as regards earned income, which amounts to making it an 
implicit subsidy for low-paid work and hence (relative to means-tested guaranteed income 
schemes) a means of helping more people into a job without lowering their standard of living. 
Secondly, by making it possible, or cheaper, to reduce working time or interrupt one’s career 
at a time that best suits the person concerned, BI  works as a mechanism for sharing jobs 
between more people (the jobs one frees on a part-time or temporary basis can be taken up by 
others) and spreading paid employment over a longer stretch of one’s life (taking time off to 
look after one’s young children and to retrain before it is too late makes it less likely that one 
will have to retire early as a result of deskilling or burnout). Consequently, BI can be said to 
increase the commodification of people, in the sense that it fosters participation in the labour 
market for a greater proportion of people and a longer portion of their lives, while at the same 
time decreasing the commodification of people by making them less dependent on the labour 
market for their subsistence. 
This is a paradox, not a contradiction. Indeed, the fundamental reason why I find BI 
such a good proposal is precisely that it contributes to commodification in the former sense 
while contributing to decommodification in the latter. And the fundamental reason why I find 
BI so much better than a comparable SG is precisely that BI plausibly promises to do both 
these things both more powerfully and more equally than SG. 
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